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

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AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

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The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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SOVIET MYTHS AND REALITIES

By Philip E. Mosely

IT may be useful, on the eighth anniversary of Stalin's death, to review some of the misconceptions and mirages that have plagued Western efforts to interpret the changing Soviet scene under his successors. A stock-taking, even though brief and incomplete, may help Americans to understand better the international environment in which a new Administration will have to cope with old and new challenges to its hopes and purposes.

One persistent theme of Western analysis has been the concept of a debilitating and perhaps fatal struggle for supremacy within the Soviet apparatus of dictatorship. One widespread view runs somewhat as follows. A totalitarian system, by its very nature, cannot be legitimate. It cannot provide for the orderly transmission of absolute power. It is bound to be caught in a dog-eat-dog struggle for supreme control. On this premise, the top Soviet leadership is inevitably riven by a continuing and desperate rivalry among competing leaders and cliques. Hence, it is assumed, Khrushchev is constantly engaged in a struggle against multiple challengers within his own apparatus, and the function of "Kremlinology" is to identify his rivals for power by reading the obscure portents of personnel changes and turgid ideological hints.

One extreme interpretation of this alleged instability was current in May and June 1960. Supposedly, Khrushchev's vehement behavior at the abortive summit conference was dictated to him by unseen forces within the top Soviet hierarchy, perhaps by a ganging up of military leaders and Stalinist ideologues. Supposedly, Khrushchev had initially been willing to overlook the affront of the U-2 flights, with its drastic violation of the Soviet passion

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for secrecy, and proceed with the summit meeting and President Eisenhower's visit to the Soviet Union, but was forced by a coalition of rivals within the Party apparatus to take a stiff line. According to this view, he was actually enjoined to read to the Paris press conference a statement prepared for him in Moscow, while the Minister of Defense, Marshal Malinovsky, sat beside him to make sure that he did not deviate from the text!

Undoubtedly, a genuine struggle for the succession took place after Stalin's death. The arrest and execution of Beria was an important step in the downgrading of the power of the secret police which had been used by Stalin for many years—at least since 1934—as a personal instrument of terror against the Party. And the political police had undoubtedly used its role to dominate Stalin by playing on his many fears and phobias. The demotion of Malenkov, in January 1955, and the dismissal of Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich in June 1957, served to consolidate Khrushchev's control. The gestures that Marshal Zhukov made toward promoting his own political prestige and his own control over the army were followed by a swift downfall, in October 1957. Probably the decisive building up of Khrushchev's domination over the Party's instruments of power took place approximately between mid-1954 and late 1957. A decisive stage in this process was marked by his famous denunciation of Stalin's arbitrary and cruel rule over the Party, at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956.

Basically Khrushchev's structure of rule is very similar to Stalin's, but his "style" of administration differs from Stalin's in some important respects. Like Stalin, he has and uses his full power to appoint and remove the members of the Party Presidium, the central drive-wheel of decision-making, as well as the members of the Central Secretariat. It is clear, at least since late 1957, that Khrushchev's choice of this body of close collaborators is entirely his own; it is not determined by any factions or cliques operating outside his control. He has strengthened the Party's, *i.e.* his own, control over the military establishment and the secret police. Similarly, through appointing a long roster of Party Secretaries in the various Republics and oblasts, Khrushchev has established securely his control over the Party machinery. Through the Party's regional machinery he also determines the composition of the Party Congresses, and it is his handpicked Party Presidium that selects the membership of the Central

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Committee of the Party. Whether he has reverted to Stalin's single-handed manipulation of the secret police, or whether he shares control over it with the Presidium, remains obscure. In any case, neither the Presidium nor the secret police is likely today to offer any foothold to would-be challengers to his leadership.

If the structure of control remains basically unchanged, in what ways and why has Khrushchev changed the style or atmosphere of Soviet rule? Clearly Khrushchev allows a much freer expression of views within his entourage, and genuine discussions now take place on many issues before he hands down his decisions, as illustrated in the discussions of agriculture in the January 1961 session of the Central Committee. In this respect Khrushchev has apparently reverted in fact, as he claims, to a more Leninist style of work. New and important decisions, such as those on reducing the size of the armed forces, on raising the rate of investment in agriculture, on changing the requirements for admission to higher education, are often preceded by fairly open discussions and disputes in public channels, even though the basic work of decision-making is carried on within the Party Secretariat, the Council of Ministers and the Party Presidium, all of which are ultimately appointed by and responsible to Khrushchev.

Does this somewhat enlarged tolerance or even encouragement of more detailed and more frank discussions of ways and means of implementing Soviet purposes and programs mean, as some analysts have stated, that Khrushchev has allowed the reins of power to slip from his hands? Or that decisions are now made by counting votes within the Presidium? Or that Khrushchev can be outvoted by colleagues whom he has appointed? Or that members of the Presidium are free to trade votes on various issues and to form alignments or factions for and against Khrushchev? In the absence of firm information on this highly secret sphere of Soviet inner politics, many shaky assumptions have been given wide currency. Sometimes, it is Suslov, supposed guardian of ideological purity, who is touted abroad as leader of an anti-Khrushchev, Stalinist intrigue. Sometimes other names, such as Marshal Malinovsky's, are mentioned as potential rivals even though Malinovsky is not even a member of the Presidium.

As an absolute ruler Khrushchev needs frank discussions of ways and means to achieve his purpose. But as head of the So-

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viet party, he certainly knows how to suppress "factions" just as effectively as Lenin and Stalin did. Unlike Stalin in his later years, Khrushchev has seen the need to lay down broad purposes and then to leave the details to his principal subordinates, subject to his constant threat to check on their performance. But to assume from this useful and necessary subdivision of labor and partial delegation of operating responsibilities that he has carelessly let the reins of control slip from his hands and has somehow become a puppet buffeted by contending factions is clearly to underrate his experience and his willpower, and to underestimate the power that he wields. It can also lead to underestimating the skill and determination with which he is pursuing Soviet aims abroad.

The notion that Khrushchev's power is far from absolute or secure has been zealously spread abroad by Soviet emissaries, in supposedly confidential talks. "Our leader faces strong opposition at home in his effort to bring about a relaxation of tension with America" (or Great Britain, or France, as the case may be). "He needs something concrete to prove that he is right and the Stalinists wrong." From this it is but a step to implying that the West can safely abandon some of its positions and programs—West Berlin, the plans for strengthening NATO, Formosa—in order to assure the political survival of the "coöperative" Mr. Khrushchev and forestall the rise to power of some unnamed and supposedly more militant rival.

In the past, whenever a genuine struggle for power has been taking place within the Kremlin hierarchy, Soviet spokesmen abroad have been the last to refer to this dangerous subject. In those uneasy circumstances they have tiptoed about, avoiding tête-à-têtes without witnesses, and strongly denying all signs of dissension at home. The recent whispering campaigns seem designed to pave the way for one-sided concessions by the West, rather than representing an unprecedented rending of the veil of Soviet secrecy. The versatility displayed in this new tactic is, I believe, a sign of stability and great self-assurance. Only a very strong and confident Soviet leader can afford to turn to his profit self-launched rumors of his political vulnerability at home.

II

One beneficial feature of Khrushchev's new style of rule has been a greatly lessened reliance on the day-to-day use of political

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terror. Khrushchev has gained great popularity, within the ranks of the Party apparatus and among the Soviet population at large, through the greater sense of individual security and the spreading expectation of a somewhat more impartial justice. From this, however, there is a long jump, which many commentators in the West have not hesitated to take, to assuming that the system of political pressure and even of repression has simply disappeared. In this over-optimistic view, there are now no obstacles to a continuous evolution of the Soviet system toward a status of full freedom of person and opinion and, eventually, of active political liberty. Does this idyllic picture correspond to reality?

Today, factory managers, collective farm chairmen, artists and writers, Party officials of many ranks no longer fear sudden disappearance, whether through imprisonment or execution or exile to labor-camps or to forced residence. To a great extent the atmosphere of terror has been lifted. Some important improvements have been made in the administration of justice. To a considerable extent, the reforms of the past two years have separated the functions of investigation, prosecution and trial. Instead of being investigated, arrested, tried and sentenced by the secret police, an ordinary citizen can now expect that the evidence gathered by the police, secret or conventional, will be examined by a separate prosecutor's office, which decides whether to bring him to trial. And the trial will be conducted usually by courts which are separate in administrative "line of command" from the police and the prosecutor's office. Of course, all three arms of justice are controlled by the government, under the direction of the Party apparatus; all three are subject to appointment and removal from above. All three are responsive to the Party's demand for "vigilance," whether against hoodlums, embezzlers, speculators in *dachas* or cars, or disseminators of "Western propaganda."

Although the defendant is entitled in theory to the services of counsel, these may or may not be available in practice and defense attorneys are sometimes punished by the Party for an excess of zeal in defending their clients. Outside the system of state courts, the military tribunals are still empowered to judge cases in complete secrecy. Sentences are seldom published, except as a public warning to other potential offenders. Still, with all these defects, intolerable in a true system of law, the new condi-

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tions of justice offer a vast improvement over those of Stalin's days, especially for nonpolitical offenders.

In the past, a number of well-run autocracies, without a trace of democratic ideology, have also endeavored to provide their subjects with a regular and safeguarded system of justice, for injustice is a source of serious waste to the state itself. Each person wrongly condemned constitutes a direct loss of resources to the state. And the dread of unpredictable punishment brings with it many other losses, such as fear of taking responsibility, widespread resort to deception, apathy among the people and corruption within the government apparatus.

The new Soviet leadership has not, as many abroad prematurely assume, laid down its "punishing sword." Its secret police are still active. "They" are still watching and writing things down. The ordinary Soviet subject, especially anyone over 35, can recall earlier periods when police pressure, but not police vigilance, has been relaxed. And he knows that seemingly innocent remarks and even imputed motives can be brought up against him at a later time, when the pendulum has swung back toward renewed "vigilance."

In the past two years the Soviet state has unsheathed a new weapon against those whom it regards as "anti-social" elements. By the vote of a neighborhood or block meeting assembled and dominated by Party members, any "unproductive" member of society can be expelled from his place of residence and ordered to live at a distance of not less than 100 kilometers. In recent months, newspaper articles and letters have been demanding the more frequent application of this form of "vigilante" law. Apparently, this type of "exile by popular decree" is designed to supplement the specific provisions of the code by holding the threat of ostracism over socially "undesirable elements" and dissenters. The picture of a Soviet system that has chosen, or been driven—by what forces?—to abandon its police controls and to leave the way open to all kinds of initiatives welling up from below is a most appealing one, but one that can hardly stand the light of Soviet day.

III

But, it is frequently argued, the steady if unspectacular rise in the Soviet standard of living is bound, sooner rather than later, to undermine the dictatorial character of the régime. As

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people become more prosperous and better fed, housed and clothed, they will raise their spiritual demands. They will exact a right to form their own opinions and eventually to tell the authorities what to do.

The rise in Soviet living standards since 1953 is an important and highly desirable development. Since Stalin's death there has been a very substantial improvement in the supply of food. The enormous waste of time through waiting in line has been reduced. Above all, the Soviet housewife is now confident that she will find in the shops the wherewithal to feed her family. Food costs remain high in relation to average earnings, and the variety and quality are poor in relation to Western standards and Soviet desires. In the major cities clothing is available in relative plenty, and prices, though still high, have been reduced almost by one-half; the quality has also been improved, in large part through importing superior goods from China, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. In Moscow a customer can now shop around for quality and style instead of taking whatever is offered. Mark-downs and bargain sales, once decried as examples of inferior capitalist management, have been instituted in some lines, such as TV sets, radios and shoes.

Housing, long a blight on Soviet comfort, is being built on an impressive scale, especially in some 150 principal industrial cities. At last, under the program instituted in 1957, millions of citizens are being moved from old, dilapidated housing, and from a one-room-per-family standard, to new and clean if not very elegant apartments of two, three and even four rooms. Nothing can give greater satisfaction and pride than to see and participate in these benefits.

Soviet people are enjoying their increased purchasing power to the full. The peasants receive a much larger cash income and are demanding more good things to buy. A reform instituted in 1956 has given old-age pensioners, formerly condemned to slow attrition, an adequate basic income, buttressed by nominal rents and free medical care.A parallel measure to raise the minimum wage to 300 rubles (30 new rubles of 1961) has, it is estimated, improved the purchasing power of almost one-third of the employed urban population. On the other hand, successful collective farms are still pressed to share their profits with weaker neighbors, and there have been few major reductions in prices since 1955. Still, Soviet incomes on the average are rising markedly

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and will continue to do so as personal income taxes are gradually eliminated—though not the much more onerous sales taxes. All this can only bring rejoicing that the Soviet people, hard pressed so long and bitterly tried in a very destructive war and its aftermath, are now enjoying a larger share of the fruits of their labor and their forced savings for investment.

For the outside world, however, one major question still remains: Will the improved standard of living build up pressure on the Kremlin to modify its general line of policy, at home or abroad? Will it cause it to abandon its international ambitions, which have been restated so eloquently in the Declaration of 81 Parties, in December 1960, and by Khrushchev in his program speech of January 6, 1961?

Soviet resources are subjected to multiple and conflicting demands, and since 1953 the Kremlin has given a bigger though modest cut of the pie to the needs of the people. Following his tour of the United States in 1959, Khrushchev promised substantial increases in the allocation of capital for the production of consumer goods; he also announced larger allocations in January 1961. These additional resources, human and material, can be found only by making adjustments in other sectors of the plan, for example in heavy industry, in military programs or perhaps in the still modest program of foreign economic aid. It must not be forgotten, however, that light industry is growing more slowly than heavy industry.

In 1960 a Soviet newspaper took the unprecedented step of printing a "Letter to the Editor" which asked if it would not be better to spend less on sputniks and more on housing. Of course, the propaganda machine denounced the unnamed author and denied that there was any conflict. Soviet citizens, having received first installments of the long-promised good life, are eager for the day when the Soviet living standard will, as Khrushchev assures them, overtake that of the United States. Indeed, they would be more than pleased to see it equal that of West Germany or even Czechoslovakia. "Prosperity" and "peace" are powerful slogans in Soviet society as elsewhere, but the effect of their popularity seems quite different there than in countries of free and representative institutions.

One obvious result of the improvement has been to raise Khrushchev's popularity to a peak Stalin never knew. His eagerness to go out among the people, his willingness to explain his policies

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frequently and at length, his "folksy" manner, are all valuable assets. A further consequence has been to increase enormously the credibility of Soviet propaganda among the people generally. Formerly, when Stalin proclaimed that the Soviet Union enjoyed one of the highest standards of living in the world, his subjects were instinctively on the alert for new sacrifices or new pressures. Aside from the steady rise of the professional and managerial groups to a distinctly superior way of life under Stalin, most of the people saw no evidence to confirm these lofty claims, and their skepticism about domestic propaganda often carried over to the sphere of international politics.

In general, so public opinion analysts tell us, people are best informed about events in which they participate or which they observe at first hand. They find it somewhat harder to form independent judgments about national affairs. And, except in countries where they have access to a continuing and abundant flow of authentic and contradictory information, they find it still harder to form reliable opinions about events and problems in the external world. The increased confidence with which ordinary Soviet people now accept the leader's word in domestic affairs seems to have a strong carry-over in the enhanced faith with which they accept his picture of world events. Far from raising a stronger demand for freedom of information and opinion, the rising standard of living seems, from personal observation by many visitors, to have raised the level of popular trust in the Party's propaganda. It has positively enhanced Khrushchev's ability to mobilize his people's energies and loyalties behind his foreign as well as his domestic programs.

IV

If the effect of the slow but steady spread of greater material satisfactions has been to relax one of the major sources of tension between the leaders and the led, will not the ideological grip of the Party be gradually undermined by the remarkable spread of middle and higher education to more and more layers of Soviet society? Some analysts have asserted that the Soviet régime is thereby "digging its own grave." The expansion of education will, they believe, not only equip its beneficiaries to serve the system better but will "inevitably" give rise to a spirit of questioning, independent reasoning and critical judgment that will sooner or later destroy the Party's ideological control.

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Certainly there have been some signs, visible even through the strictly regulated Soviet press, of some stirrings of skepticism and dissent. Apparently, many students—at least in Moscow and Leningrad—were shaken by the events of 1956 in Hungary. Some expressed doubts of the Government's explanation that the popular uprising had been provoked solely by "imperialist intrigues." The much freer interpretation of Marxism within Poland has not been without some echoes within the Soviet Union. In the largest cities foreign delegates and tourists are now a commonplace sight. Officially sponsored channels of information, such as the Polish Art Exhibit and the American Exhibition of 1959, have had a wide impact, despite the official effort to discredit the Sokolniki display even before it opened.

Khrushchev's outburst of November 1958 against doubting or dissident students was surely not without cause, and he is not unmindful of the tendency, especially within a part of the younger generation which has grown up since the last period of purge and repression, to press beyond the permitted framework of official dogma. Very often students have shown their boredom with the Party's ideology and their eagerness to seek information through other than official channels. Khrushchev's demand, in 1958, that all students should have a two-year period of productive labor in a factory or on a collective farm, before proceeding to their higher education, was only one expression of his resentment and alarm at the attitudes of a part of the students. However, by the time his proposals were transformed into practice, beginning with the academic year 1959–60, the labor requirement was pretty much waived for students of engineering, pure sciences and medicine, as well as for technologists of all kinds.

The full impact of the new barrier has fallen on those seeking admission to higher training in the ideologically sensitive fields—social sciences, humanities, law and journalism. The most important provision of the new rules is, of course, the requirement that each candidate, after working "at production" for two years, must present a political recommendation by a "social organization," meaning the Party or its Young Communist League. As Khrushchev exclaimed in 1958, any student who is dissatisfied with the Soviet system ought to be expelled, so as to make room for the son or daughter of a peasant or worker who will value to the full the state-conferred benefit of higher education.

A spirit of inquiry, dissatisfaction or even dissent can arise

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even under a totalitarian system, for the demand for individual judgment, for sincerity, lies deep in each individual. This urge may stem from many causes, including boredom, family memories, the influence of Russia's great literature, or the impact of injustices. But the problem of harnessing scientific progress with ideological conformity is not a new one for the Soviet régime. It has persisted, in varying forms, from the beginning. The Party and its instruments have developed many ways of shepherding the young toward productive and orthodox careers well rewarded by the state, and away from dangerous thoughts. The controls can never work perfectly, and repression of potential dissent exacts its price today, even though that price is probably far smaller than in Stalin's time. The problem of making a uniform and "non-discussable" propaganda interesting or even palatable to young people after it has lost its initial savor of scientific infallibility is a continuing one, as witnessed by the Party's long and boring decree on propaganda, issued in January 1960.

By and large, foreign observers are left with the impression that any substantial spread of intellectual questioning is pretty much confined to a few major cities, and primarily to the sons and daughters of fairly well-placed and responsible Communists. It often takes the form of wanting to read everything and examine everything for themselves. It reflects a growing suspicion that the Party's choice of information may not be very complete or intelligent. For some it takes the form of wishing for more variety and color in a drab way of life, or of a fascination with the far wider range of literary, artistic and intellectual stimuli available in the West and even in such "friendly" states as India. For others it takes a less attractive form among the post-adolescent *stiliagi,* or "teddy-boys," who attempt to ape the manners, dress and haircuts of their Western contemporaries of a few years ago. Naturally, Soviet propaganda tries to equate all interest in the West with the fads and fashions of the *stiliagi,* and then to lump the latter with "hooligans," an American word which has long since been naturalized in Russian as "khuligany."

With the extreme official and popular emphasis on conformity —extending even to local puritanic attempts to forbid bright-patterned sport shirts and women's slacks on the otherwise fashionable promenades of Sochi—it would be strange if some high-spirited youths did not assert their "differentness" in various ways, some of them more intellectual than others. On the whole,

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however, Soviet youth seems highly conformist. For one thing, the college-level study of politically dangerous subjects, such as history, economics and law, is confined to a relatively few and carefully supervised students. The great majority of students, and often the ablest, are attracted by good stipends and promising careers into technical and scientific fields. For them, the study of world history or foreign literature, even in its carefully selected doses, ends at about 15. What goes by the name of "social studies" after that is simply Party history, Party theory and the current Party program of "do's" and "don't's." The widely noted apathy on the part of youth toward the cramming of Party ideology into their heads by dull propaganda hacks is probably far more serious than any conscious dissent.

The system of controls and incentives through which the Party promotes conformity with its views and goals is reinforced by a strong sense of national pride, even chauvinism. Soviet students are amazed when told that the Moscow subway was not the first one ever built. They assume that the sputniks have "proven" the superiority of the Soviet system. Most Soviet citizens accept as natural and desirable the extension of the Communist system to other countries, and they are unaware of the methods of control that have been applied or the deep-set hatreds those methods have implanted. They cannot imagine other systems, for example those that allow a genuinely free choice. While often displaying a greedy envy of Western comforts, gadgets and cars, they proclaim with full sincerity the superiority and inevitable triumph of the Soviet system. Needless to say, they are well briefed on American defects, such as economic fluctuations and unemployment, unequal access to higher education, and regional resistances to equal status for citizens of Negro descent. But they seem totally unequipped to reason critically about possible defects in the Soviet system; those that exist have either been removed by the post-Stalin régime or are bound to disappear with the spread of material plenty.

If anything, the slightly widened access to Western information and the presence in their streets of Western tourists makes ordinary Soviet people less aware than before of being cut off from contrary or thought-provoking information. Even the flow of casual foreign sightseers appears to confirm their confidence that Khrushchev is doing everything he reasonably can to reduce tensions and strengthen the prospects for peace.

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Despite occasional outbursts of fear and resentment, as in the case of Pasternak's "Doctor Zhivago," the Soviet system of control seems confident of its ability to identify, contain and, if need be, repress such expressions of doubt or dissent as appear among a small minority of its youth. In handling a problem that has plagued it throughout its existence, the Party is alert but not unduly alarmed by its newest manifestations. Unlike some wishful analysts abroad, it is confident that it can train a very large part of its youth to serve the state, especially in engineering and the natural sciences, without letting many of them stray from the approved paths of ideological orthodoxy, reinforced as it is today by national pride and arrogance.

V

What does all this add up to? First, that the Soviet system with which the West will be dealing in the 1960s is likely to retain a high level of political stability, based on premises and methods very different from ours. The dictatorship is not likely to be torn to pieces by internecine struggles at the top, to lose control over its people or to surrender its ideology. The Party structure is better equipped today to ride through a new succession crisis than it was in 1953. No doubt, names and labels will change, but the concept of a single party, justified in its absolute rule by its monopoly over "truth" and foresight, has been strengthened.

Second, the Soviet leadership will not abandon its ultimate power of life and death over its subjects, even though it now exercises this power with new moderation. Its leaders will resort to terror again if they find that necessary to their aims, but they doubt it will be necessary. The farther the Stalinist brand of terror recedes in memory, the more active the confidence and the more energetic the coöperation they can hope to elicit from their people. Any minor movements of dissent can be contained by partial relaxation of controls over intellectual life, combined with methods of repression less cruel than in the past.

Third, the shared desire of the Party and the people to raise the standard of living is relaxing very old tensions between the two, is lessening the contrasts between life in Russia and in the West, and is likely to evoke ever greater individual efforts to share in the enlarged rewards offered by the régime for hard work and "right-thinking" loyalty. Finally, the spread of education

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may create some annoying worries for the ideological purity of the new generations, but it is not likely to endanger the stability of the régime or its ability to pursue the goals which its leaders set for the Soviet people at home or abroad.

It would surely be comforting if an analysis of the evolution, recent and prospective, of the Soviet system could lead us to a confident conclusion that it contains the seeds of inevitable and desirable changes, and that we have only to fold our hands, lower taxes, buy a third car and wait for this development to occur in the fulness of God's time. Unfortunately, such is not the prospect. During the decade of the 1960s we shall, under present prospects, be dealing with a Soviet system that is growing rapidly in economic, scientific and military strength and which will have fewer rather than more difficulties in preserving political stability and an adequate measure of ideological uniformity. These growing strengths, not offset by equivalent new weaknesses, will enable its leaders to devote greater rather than smaller resources and political determination to achieving the worldwide purposes that have been proclaimed in an evolving pattern of interpretation by Lenin and Stalin and now by Khrushchev.

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NUCLEAR SHARING: NATO AND THE N+1 COUNTRY

By Albert Wohlstetter

IS the spread of nuclear strike forces good or bad? When we regard the diffusion of nuclear weapons as bad or at least worrisome, we refer to it as the Nth power problem. In this guise it appears as the principal menace lending a sense of urgency to our negotiations on arms control and as a trend to be fought. In particular, it is the chief justification offered for a test ban. During most of the time since the summer of 1958 we have been in negotiation with the Russians to conclude a treaty prohibiting the explosion of nuclear weapons. We do this largely because we hope that other countries will join us in abstaining from tests, and so find it harder to get a nuclear capability. Meanwhile we have stopped testing ourselves, and hope that the Soviet Union has too. Quite apart from the test ban, of course, we have for a long time so regulated our study, manufacture and operation of weapons as to reduce the chance of information of weapons design spreading to other countries, including our allies. These self-constraints have been embodied in our Atomic Energy Law. In both our atomic energy legislation and our arms control negotiation we act on the assumption that it is bad to increase the number of nuclear powers.

On the other hand, at least some of our military policies seem to proceed from the notion that it is good. Some contemplated NATO policies suppose in particular that we want to disperse the power to decide to use nuclear weapons, to have more than one center for such decision in the West. We have, of course, deployed nuclear weapons under our own control in many parts of the world. In several countries we have put weapons under the dual control of ourselves and our host. While we have not transferred warheads to the independent control of other countries, we have, in the case of several allies, sold or given them significant parts of a total system—delivery vehicles, personnel training and the like. We contemplate assisting the Dutch and the French to construct atomic submarines, or—in order to avoid a formal clash with the Atomic Energy Law—we might at least help them build the submarine hull and the non-nuclear parts of the propulsion machinery. In the case of the United Kingdom, we have actually

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given not only atomic submarine plans, but also designs and special materials for nuclear warheads. We modified the MacMahon Act in 1958 so as to justify this special treatment of the United Kingdom, but we did it in such a way as to seem to offer incentives to our other allies to demonstrate a nuclear capability of their own, and so become eligible for help.[1] We are now contemplating the transfer to NATO of the major components of an entire weapons system—submarines, Polaris missiles and warheads—possibly for use without our veto. In many of these actions we appear to have been the initiators of moves toward diffusion. In most of them we have tended at least to view the spread of nuclear capabilities benignly. We use an appropriately benign word, "sharing," which has overtones of fairness, Christian charity and right behavior.

It is conceivable that these two sets of policies are consistent, that we are *for* sharing nuclear weapons with some of our allies and just against spreading them to enemies or neutral powers or certain of our allies. But in fact it has always been clear that the two sorts of diffusion are not so easily separated, that the acquisition of nuclear military power by some of our allies can impel its acquisition by enemies and that it is particularly hard and divisive to select among our allies. The spread occurs in chain. It seems more likely that this division in our policies expresses a divided purpose.[2] The arms control moves that we have made to limit diffusion are largely formal or declaratory, tied to complicated and uncertain negotiations with the Russians, and, in fact, likely to depend on the coöperation of potential Nth powers. On the other hand, the moves we have made in alliance policy which favor diffusion are strong. If our military and foreign policies are to be consistent and effective, we ought to decide whether the Nth power problem really worries us, or whether we favor sharing and the state of the world it may bring about.

But perhaps there is no point in deciding how we feel about the diffusion of nuclear capabilities. It is frequently claimed that the

[1] It would be hard to imagine a deeper goad for the French than the statement by the Secretary of Defense on April 22, 1960. According to *The New York Times*, Mr. Gates indicated that "the United States did not regard two nuclear explosions as qualification for French admission to the 'nuclear club.'" "I am not sure there is a demonstrated ability," he is quoted as saying. "France would have to show a high level of technical competence." It appears that even our restraints offer a considerable incitement.

[2] The Russians appear to be not entirely clear about how *they* regard the diffusion of nuclear power. They have not hurried to give bombs to the Chinese or the Warsaw powers; yet they have repeatedly opposed safeguarding reactor programs against diversion of nuclear materials to military purposes in the underdeveloped countries.

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trend toward diffusion is inevitable. There are cheerful as well as pessimistic views of the trend. The pessimists, who are (correctly, I believe) concerned with the enormous instabilities and dangers of a world with many nuclear powers, call somewhat wanly for an immediate and comprehensive program of international controls. Some of the optimists, on the other hand, suppose that if bombs are spread much more widely they will be less likely to be used, that stability will increase. Others, not quite so cheerful, hold that since diffusion is inevitable we should go along with it or try to direct it into less harmful channels, but in any case we should help our friends in NATO by reducing the costs.

However, both the gloomy and lighthearted prophets of inevitable diffusion have been rather unclear as to precisely what sorts of nuclear capability will be diffused and how fast. A more analytic understanding might make the optimists less cheery, and lead the pessimists to a less fatalistic view. It seems very likely that *some* new countries will acquire *some* sorts of nuclear capability in the next decade, but it is by no means certain just how many countries and which ones will acquire what sorts of nuclear capability. Though even a little diffusion has important implications for strategy, it makes a great deal of difference whether 20-odd countries develop or are given bombs and delivery capabilities in the next six or seven years, or whether it is two or three of the more industrialized powers.

A mechanical view of the inevitability of the trend toward nuclear diffusion places the entire burden of stopping or slowing the spread on effective international agreements—which are hard to come by. It tends to ignore decisions that the United States can make on its own and so fails to exploit some possible brakes on nuclear dispersion stemming from the immediate self-interest of prospective Nth powers. Their decisions will affect the trend, too. It is worth pointing out to the responsible prospective Nth powers in the NATO community that the undertaking is not merely arduous; it is unlikely to pay off. A failure to pay in terms of immediate national self-interest is likely to affect the intentions of Nth countries more strongly than arguments about the stability of the world system.

So far as long-run world stability is concerned, the Nth country tends to think of the problem as beginning with N plus 1. The original irony intended by the label, "Nth power problem," was seated precisely in the fact that the United States and the Soviet

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Union thought of the trouble as the third-power problem, Great Britain thought of it as the fourth-power problem, France as the fifth-power problem, and so on. Each new or prospective nuclear power thinks of the problem as that of stopping the next country after itself. This is the N-plus-1-country problem.

As for world stability through arms control, France and England, for example, have tended to think of their own acquisition of nuclear weapons as entirely beneficial. Mr. Macmillan has justified British weapons and V-bombers on the grounds that they permit the English to exercise influence on arms-control arrangements between the two major nuclear powers. General de Gaulle speaks of the increased effect on nuclear disarmament which France would have by becoming a nuclear power. In the limit, one might suppose that unanimity for nuclear disarmament may be achieved by distributing bombs to everybody.

The choices among alternative nuclear policies confronting members of NATO are likely to play a key role in the diffusion of nuclear capabilities—especially in Europe—and in the problem of avoiding small or large nuclear wars. For this reason I would like to consider, from the standpoint of the national interest of the individual members, some of the major alternatives open to them. What sorts of nuclear capability are the lesser industrial powers in the West likely to achieve? What are the motivations for achieving independent capabilities? What is the role of the American nuclear guarantee? Is it, as it is currently fashionable to say, "incredible?"

The four main alternatives open to the European powers are these: (1) the rejection of nuclear weapons, of the American guarantee, and of all association with nuclear powers; (2) the development of national strike forces; (3) a jointly controlled force, and especially the NATO-wide force; (4) reliance on the United States guarantee. Let us examine the relevance of each for avoiding large-scale nuclear war and for meeting lower levels of aggression in Europe.[3]

1. The Repudiation of Nuclear Weapons

The rejection of any reliance on nuclear weapons, even an ally's, to deter Russian nuclear attack has been prominently advocated in England in the last few years, and very recently it has

[3] I am indebted for comments or stimulation to Michael Arnsten, F. C. Iklé, Malcolm Hoag, F. S. Hoffman, Herman Kahn, Ciro Zoppo, and especially to Daniel Ellsberg and William Kaufman. The views expressed are those of the author.

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gained some adherents in the United States. It deserves more extended comment than can be included here.

According to this view, nobody in his senses believes that either the Russian or the American Government would deliberately initiate a nuclear war, since this would amount to self-annihilation. None the less, it is thought, there is almost a "statistical certainty" that a continuing policy of mutual deterrence will result eventually in accidental war and the devastation of most of mankind. The diverse representatives of this view range from those who, like Mr. A. J. P. Taylor and Mr. Frank Cousins, call for exclusive reliance on conventional weapons, through those like Mr. Stephen King-Hall and the traditional pacifists who recommend passive resistance to Russian occupation, and finally to Mr. Philip Toynbee who contemplates surrender. A common thread in their arguments has it that the danger of war with the Soviet Union and the Soviet military threat itself are a consequence rather than a cause of the arms race, and that East-West differences are susceptible of settlement now, since the Soviet Union is a satisfied, status-quo power. Near one extreme of this view, Bertrand Russell takes Soviet desires for Communist transformation of the world as analogous to, and hardly more menacing than, Christian desires to convert the world to Christianity. The other end of the scale approaches those who, like some heads of Western states, are merely optimistic about early diplomatic settlements with Russia, including extensive disarmament. The United States is seen not as a defender of areas menaced by Soviet aggression, but as one half of a power conflict which threatens to crush third countries. In fact, it is held that the United States will not fulfill its commitment to defend its allies but is quite likely to implicate them in a war.

This view wishfully understates the conflict of interest between the East and the West, and, by repeating the familiar clichés about an automatic balance of terror, it shows no understanding of the difference between defensive military postures which would ensure damage to the aggressor and those which would make it highly probable that the aggressor would come off unscathed. It exhibits the weakest and most inconsistent form of the dogma about the automatic balance by failing to recognize that unilateral nuclear disarmament would insure the aggressor against retaliation. It is sometimes said that total disarmament and submission to Soviet demands would remove any motive for attack,

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but it is hard to take seriously the belief that the West at the height of its industrial and political power would follow a policy of *total* submission. Lord Russell himself regards this possibility as academic. The more likely result of "unilateralism" would be a partial disarming and resistance that would actually increase the danger of the nuclear war which advocates of nuclear repudiation want to avoid. Specifically, it would increase the danger of deliberate war.

The "statistical certainty" of accidental war so often referred to, sometimes even by reputable scientists, is usually a tautology that says nothing whatsoever about whether war is likely to come in any finite period of time. In this form the proposition states that there is a fixed, finite probability of accidental war in any given year, and that therefore if the situation continues "indefinitely," war will come. Mr. C. P. Snow is an exception. He has ventured to say that if events proceed on their present course, nuclear war is a "certainty" within the next ten years. This last prediction has some content but, so far as I know, is completely unsupported by evidence or analysis. It hardly illustrates Mr. Snow's high regard for the responsibility of the scientist in public affairs. The tautology, on the other hand, treats time in rather a cavalier fashion. It makes quite a difference if it continues for ten years or hundreds. Time is important in itself, because we—and our children—can live in it. What is more, the passage of time affords opportunities to alter both military postures and the root antagonisms which make them necessary. For those who hold that East-West differences can be settled now, it should not be hard to believe that they might be abated in 50 years. And the probability of neither accidental nor deliberate war is fixed year by year. We can affect the chance of accident by the way we organize our decision processes. The West has taken important steps in the control of its response and more can be done.

Furthermore, the nuclear disarmers have shown little understanding of the close connection between problems of deliberate and "mistaken" attack. They simply, but erroneously, assume that the West has an automatic decision system for nuclear retaliation; in consequence, they minimize the opportunities for deliberate attack and exaggerate the dangers of an accident. And finally, a non-nuclear defense conceived as a substitute for any reliance on nuclear weapons could not itself deter the Soviets' use of nuclear weapons and would quickly be overwhelmed by them.

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II. National Strike Forces

The justification for the spread of national nuclear forces—as elaborated, for example, by Pierre Gallois—is based on the belief that no nation can be counted on to defend another from atomic aggression, since in doing so it would chance annihilation. Thermonuclear weapons, however, favor the prospective victim of aggression, it is said, by making it comparatively easy to retaliate effectively. So a lesser power can deter even a major nuclear power such as the Soviet Union. Thermonuclear wars, therefore, will be unlikely when nuclear forces are widespread. And because limited wars risk escalation to thermonuclear war with its attendant destructiveness, they too are improbable. It would seem hard to find a more lighthearted contrast to the unilateral disarmers' grim estimate of the consequences of the diffusion of nuclear capabilities. But there may be more persuasive ones.

Let us begin with the rather paradoxical claim that it is not very difficult for a small power to deter a Soviet nuclear attack. This claim has had a long history, dating almost from the time of Hiroshima. A number of distinguished analysts then held that nuclear bombs would be the poor countries' weapon, a kind of equalizer in international politics, giving their smallest possessor the power of retaliation over the largest. However, such judgments were not based on any sophisticated analysis of the requirements for deterring the Soviet Union. Even at the time that Britain and later France decided to become nuclear powers, there was little evidence that the distinction between a first- and a second-strike capability was understood. Later justifications were excessively optimistic: The British exaggerated the time that would be available in the event of surprise attack, and French military theorists overestimated the number of Russian missiles required to destroy sheltered missiles, miscalculating their accuracy by factors no lower than 5 and sometimes as high as 25. Now, methods of keeping bombs and delivery vehicles on the move are being looked to in the hope that mobility will permit them to survive.

But the job of retaliation is more complicated than simply assuring the survival of a few bombs and delivery vehicles in the face of an initial strategic assault. Its analysis involves much more complex and uncertain quantitative interactions than the simple duels, now abounding in the literature of nuclear strategy,

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in which the aggressor's strategic missiles hit the victim's, and the remainder of these in turn automatically destroy the aggressor's cities. In the last year or two, it has become somewhat better understood that, even for the United States, getting a responsible deterrent to Russian attack is far from easy. It is vital and feasible, but hard. Yet the United States has incomparable advantages of distance, size and industrial strength. While there are many barriers to retaliation besides surviving strategic missile attack, in what follows I shall focus on one which plays an especially crucial role in an examination of theories of multiple national strike forces and joint deterrents. This is the critically important problem of maintaining a protected and responsible command and control.

This obstacle to assuring retaliation against a major power would be less formidable if we were willing to be sufficiently irresponsible, if in fact we were to institute the sort of automatic and decentralized decision system by subordinate commanders which Lord Russell infers to be the present arrangement. If our response system were sufficiently hair-trigger, we might make it unlikely that our missiles would be caught before launching; even very ambiguous indications would trip our nuclear response. However, the chance of starting a nuclear war by mistake or without authorization would then be very much larger than it is. If one takes a sufficiently responsible view and requires positive orders from high authority to launch a retaliatory blow, there is the problem of protecting that authority, and the flow of information to and from it.

The United States has not set up a response system which involves starting World War III automatically on the basis of radar or infrared signals, or as the result of a failure in communication, or even on the detection of an unidentified nuclear explosion. On the contrary, it has set up "fail-safe" procedures and positive controls. Frequently those who are most concerned about the Nth country problem and the dangers of accidental war believe that "the maintenance of deterrent stability is relatively easy to achieve," but they base this belief in part on the notion that we should or will inevitably erect a completely automatic system for deciding to go to war.[4] It is not surprising, then, that these theorists take the accident problem as something which will have to

[4] National Planning Association, "1970 Without Arms Control," Special Committee Report, p. 32–33, 44. Quotation from p. 48.

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be solved by the *deus ex machina* of international agreement. However, to adopt an automatic procedure, which these theorists themselves regard as extraordinarily dangerous, is not inevitable, but a matter of choice. Such considerations suggest that the problem of forestalling deliberate attack is inseparable from that of preventing war by miscalculation. The solution of one can be made comparatively easy only at the expense of the other. The task of both national defense and arms control is to solve them simultaneously.

With the multiplication of national strike forces, the control problem becomes especially acute. If many nations have the power of decision, and if, in addition, each nation decentralizes its control to a multiplicity of subordinates, or—worse—to some electronic automata, it is evident that the situation could get out of hand very easily. The difficulty of distinguishing accidents from attacks or, if the attack is actual, in identifying its source would be enormously increased. Diffusion therefore places increased burdens on control. Yet precisely because it is hard to get a responsibly controlled deterrent with a small national force, some advocates of diffusion have proposed such desperate expedients as huge "dirty" weapons with only the most primitive guidance and possibly no control.

There are other barriers to retaliation and analysis of them would reinforce the point: the task of getting and keeping a force able to survive Russian attack and hurdle all the barriers to retaliation, including the preservation of control and the flow of information necessary for intelligent decision, is much more difficult than proponents of independent strike forces have been willing to recognize. Not many nations will solve the problems involved. England's cancellation of its costly program for the Blue Streak missile marked the conscious transition from a hopefully "independent deterrent" to the much less ambitious "independent contribution to the deterrent." And it is not without reason —as François Mauriac has pointed out—that France's first "deterrent" vehicles will be called "Mirage."

The problem of deterring a major power requires a continuing effort because the requirements for deterrence will change with the counter-measures taken by the major power. Therefore, the costs can never be computed with certainty; one can be sure only that the initiation fee is merely a down payment on the expense of membership in the nuclear club. For the same reason, the alterna-

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tive idea that a lesser power ought to be given a deterrent which it cannot get by itself should be regarded with caution by both the donor and the recipient. The gift is not only expensive; it is obsolescent as soon as given. It is not a grant of independence but of continuing dependency.

It follows therefore that both the pessimistic and cheerful prophets of the wide diffusion of "cheap" retaliatory systems forget that this is not a simple matter of improving technology to cut the cost of a standardized product. Unfortunately the job of building barriers to retaliation is subject to improvement too. Published studies of the diffusion problem consider only the requirements for making bombs, not those for securing retaliatory systems. An effective system of retaliation must meet changing demands placed upon it by the aggressor. Retaliatory systems in the last decade have become no cheaper. They *may* in the future, but it is dubious, and the simple affirmation that they will is not very persuasive. The cost of the first 100 B-58s, Atlas or submarine-launched Polaris—including development and all other fixed and variable expenses needed for five years of peacetime operation—will be from three to five times greater than the costs of the first 100 B-47s.

Growing awareness of the complexities of retaliation has brought into prominence the argument that a smaller power, just because it is a less important prize, need not have a capability to do much damage in order to deter, and that a capability of sufficient size is not hard to acquire. This theory of "proportional deterrence" relies on several unfounded assumptions. Nothing quite so simple as a proportionality works here. There are huge "entrance fees" for getting even one's first strategic missile and the communications and other elements to go with it. The costs of a small force are disproportionately high. The research and development costs of American missiles have been extremely heavy. It might appear that such expenses will be substantially less for Nth countries, since they will benefit by the results of our work. This belief rests in part on ignoring the dynamic aspects of the problem and the possibility of counter-measures: the missiles which the Nth countries learn about after a time lag, and develop after a further time lag, are likely not to be relevant for their original purpose. Surely the history of development programs among the lesser powers for both missiles and aircraft is not very encouraging.

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But there are two additional factors, which weigh heavily against secondary powers. First, the United States and Russia benefit in any specific development program from parallel programs in progress or completed. Navigation systems or systems of propulsion, for example, may be transferable. So the Atlas was able to use a booster developed for the Navajo, and the Navy Ship Inertial Navigation System has several uses. Perhaps most important, the research, managerial and production skills, and the physical plant developed for earlier weapons are useful for the next. The major countries, in short, benefit in any particular missile development by the fact that they have created a huge space technology and rocket industry. This will be much less the case for a small country. Second, the United States and the Soviet Union spread their fixed or initial costs, including research and development, over a great many units—the lesser powers over only a few. The per unit cost tends therefore to be much higher for Nth countries.

Although this discussion has focused on *system* problems (specifically, command, control, coördination) rather than simply the vehicles, this does not mean that vehicles or their numbers are unimportant. It will not be easy for lesser powers to obtain their first missiles, much less an adequate number. Moreover, it should not be assumed that a force of 10 missiles—even assuming they are safely launched—will do one-tenth the damage of 100 missiles. Here again the proponents of the small deterrent have vastly oversimplified their problem. By means of active defense—to take just one example—a major power can reduce the effectiveness of a small force perhaps to the vanishing point. The development of decoys to aid the offense in penetrating defenses requires particularly costly and sophisticated study of reëntry into the atmosphere. While active defense against another major power is extremely difficult, it should not be very hard for a major power to erect an active defense capable of handling the retaliation, say, of Guatemala, supposing Guatemala had a few ballistic missiles. In fact, one of the consequences of nuclear diffusion would be to impose the necessity for such defenses on the major powers. A small strike force, then, could inflict, not proportionately small damage, but possibly no damage at all.

It is sometimes argued that the small power need not be able to offer much of a probability that damage will occur at all. Even a very small probability of retaliation—a mere "shadow of in-

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certitude," it is suggested—will be enough to deter, especially because a nuclear war might escalate and lead to almost "boundless" harm. As Raymond Aron has put it, any finite probability of a boundless injury is too much to make attack worth while. This line of reasoning parallels Pascal's famous argument that, even if there were only a small probability of eternal damnation, the risk would be excessive. Yet some have risked hellfire. It is important to observe that this argument for the adequacy of national strike forces also removes their principal reason for being —at least as it is currently avowed. The proponents of national strike forces claim they are necessary because of the lessened credibility of the American guarantee. But even the strongest enthusiast for an independent deterrent would concede there is some finite probability that the United States would fulfill its commitments, and the harm done to the enemy by an undamaged American strike force, if not boundless, is at least as great as that to be inflicted by a damaged national strike force. The advocates of national strike forces, in short, seem to place incompatible requirements on the credibility of American retaliation as compared to what they ask for themselves.

Even if the lesser power can assure only "a shadow of incertitude" of retaliation, the aggressor, in order to eliminate the possibility of retaliation, might have to effect enormous destruction. This might make aggression less attractive. But the victim's ability to force his own destruction is quite a different thing from a promise to do direct and extensive damage to the aggressor. It is rather more like the method of lying down on the railroad tracks or fasting until death, used (sometimes successfully) by the non-violent resisters. It is doubtful that it could be counted upon against a totalitarian opponent. And it is likely to wear heavily on the nerves of any but a nation of saints and heroes.

Of course the advocates of nuclear diffusion are only unintentionally non-violent. Yet in effect their tactic resembles the methods consciously chosen by some of those who repudiate the bomb altogether. And in spite of the obvious contrast, there are several strong points of resemblance between those who would distribute bombs to everybody and those who reject them altogether. It may be that the reaction of the unilateralists to the reckless nuclear policy characteristic of the diffusion advocates is made easier by the assumptions they hold in common. When General

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Gallois develops his view that no nation can be counted on to defend another in the atomic age, he sounds a little like Mr. Nehru and other members of the neutralist camp who talk of alliances as things of the past. It is not only the unilateral disarmers who call for the end of overseas bases and the withdrawal of American forces; the possibility of withdrawal is offered as bait by those Europeans and Americans who want us to give our allies bombs and, hopefully, the ability to shift for themselves. Both views share an underestimation of the problem of deterring deliberate attack, and specifically a deliberate Soviet attack.

Theorists of nuclear diffusion, in order to reassure us on the unstabilizing effects of the proliferation of weapons, sometimes say that no nation would use them except when confronted with annihilation or slavery. But anyone who believes this must, like the unilateralists, discount Russian nuclear attack, since the West does not confront the Soviet Union with these alternatives. It is significant that the moves toward nuclear independence in the last half dozen years have accompanied a lessening rather than a growing fear of Russian attack.

Whatever the motives for the national strike forces, they have a dubious utility for deterring Russian nuclear attack. There are, however, other functions which have been contemplated for them, and two are worth mentioning: (a) the deterrence of Russian non-nuclear attack; and (b) the defense of national interests in conflicts with lesser powers—possibly, for example, the defense of overseas interests in underdeveloped areas. Both of these have the familiar defects of the doctrine of massive retaliation which flourished in this country until recently; both lead directly to diminishing efforts in the field of conventional defense. As to the first, it is not hard for an enemy to devise a plan of aggression or a set of demands which are less than would seem to justify a nuclear response and, if conventional defenses are allowed to lapse, a small nuclear power will be extremely vulnerable.

So far as the defense of overseas interests is concerned, the utility of nuclear strike forces is even more obscure. Though the French in sheer frustration after Indochina and the British after Suez are supposed to have turned more definitely towards nuclear independence, the experience of the last decade and especially of Suez seems to offer the opposite lesson. The English at Suez could not have used nuclear weapons against Nasser, and their nuclear

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capability did not make them more resolute against Russian rocket threats nor, for that matter, against the possibility of economic sanctions by their principal ally. Nuclear weapons simply were irrelevant in defense of what the English conceived their interests to be. Precisely because these Western powers are answerable to electorates as well as to many military allies and trading partners, there is very little chance that they will use nuclear strike forces against a non-nuclear power, especially in defense of overseas interests.

This is not to say that such forces do not have indirect political uses as well as some psychological value. In fact these values have been candidly discussed in both the British and French debates on their military nuclear programs. After extensive debate in which the military value of the *force de frappe* had clearly failed to impress the French Assembly, M. Debré achieved passage of the bill on a vote of confidence and by accepting amendments which formally acknowledge that the purpose of the bill is "as much political as strategic." In the view of most observers, this amounted to agreeing that the purpose was primarily political.

It is not easy to define the political motives for nuclear weapons programs. They are necessarily a little vague and possibly not always consistent. It is none the less evident that they have carried a good deal of weight, and may have been more influential than some of the varying military purposes which have been avowed from time to time. The motives range from the intangibles of prestige and rank in the world to the somewhat more concrete desire for a special position in NATO. On the one hand they express the desire to be able to exercise a veto on the use of any nuclear weapons by the West and to obtain complete solidarity in the West with respect to African and Asian policies. On the other hand, they express the very human desire to be completely in control of one's own self-defense—one's own fate—a nostalgia for absolute sovereignty, or a desire to be able to influence or survive the effects of either a contest or a rapprochement between Russia and the United States. (England has thought that with its prestige enhanced by nuclear status, it could mediate between East and West as an honest broker. General de Gaulle has expressed fears as to the results for France of either development—rapprochement *or* nuclear conflict.)

One can only sympathize with a desire to control one's fate, but a nostalgia for sovereignty in the traditional or dictionary sense,

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"independent of and unlimited by any other," was probably never easy to satisfy. It is especially hard today. The United States depends crucially on its allies, though this dependence is less immediate and pervasive than that of its allies on the United States. And though questions of prestige are always delicate, it is doubtful that any genuine purpose can be served by exaggerating the independence possible for European powers. We should not assume that our friends cannot face up to the real limitations of national strike forces. Britain's bitter experience with the Blue Streak program suggests that attempts to achieve nuclear independence can as easily result in loss of prestige as in gain.

The use of nuclear status as a bargaining weapon to attain a special position within NATO is of course an acknowledgement of interdependence. The English have talked of the position of leadership conferred by their nuclear power. And the French, quite willing to believe in the existence of an Anglo-Saxon duumvirate, hope by attaining nuclear status themselves to restore the triumvirate. But it is not likely to stop there. Such an objective for a weapons program is by its very nature divisive. Not all members of the alliance can be "more equal" than the others. The allies who are slighted are bound to resent the superior position of the others, especially if, as is quite probable, it is obtained by diverting national resources from alliance obligations, and by getting the help of the United States. The British nuclear force was a direct spur to the French, and every real or fancied discrimination made in favor of England has added more incentive for the French to follow suit. It is hard to believe that the Germans will not be moved to follow the French, if we reward the French for their efforts to develop an independent nuclear power. Influence in the alliance might better be determined by contributions to NATO's defense. National nuclear forces have not added significantly to either the sword or the shield by comparison with equal amounts spent for conventional defense.

Up to this point we have been examining the worth of a nuclear capability largely from the national standpoint of a prospective Nth power. I have deferred speaking of the implications for "world stability," or more concretely the probability of small or large nuclear wars. It is easier to do this now when we can make a little more precise the sorts of nuclear capability that might be widely diffused. To begin with, we should distinguish the capabilities of the lesser powers against the major powers, and the

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sorts of capability a lesser power might have against various other lesser powers. This last in particular has been neglected.

First, to deter a major power such as the Soviet Union is hard, and this ability is not likely to be widespread. Second, the ability to disarm a major country and so to preclude extensive damage to oneself is likely to be still harder, if the major country exercises care, and particularly if it is a totalitarian country exploiting the characteristic advantages of secrecy. Against totalitarian Russia, I know of no *reliable* way even for the United States to achieve and maintain such a "preclusive first-strike capability." There remains a third capability—to strike first and do damage without precluding retaliation. Against a major power only this third sort is likely to be at all general. But this is a good deal less useful to its possessor than either a deterrent or a preclusive first-strike capability.

Against lesser countries, a secondary nuclear power might have any one of the three capabilities described. It might be able to do a little or a lot of self-destructive mischief. It might be able to attack and prevent all damage to itself. This obviously would be the case if the victim were not a nuclear power, but it could also be the case if both the aggressor and the victim were nuclear powers. Each might have the ability to preclude the other from striking, depending on who struck first. The only live question then would be which one would be dead. Finally, between some pairs of lesser powers there might be a relation of mutual deterrence.

What does this mean for the likelihood of nuclear war? The view that widespread diffusion will be stabilizing assumes that the prototype relation among the many powers will be mutual deterrence. But it would in fact be a miracle if *every* pair of countries out of a large number of nuclear powers stood in this relationship. These countries are at different stages of development and in different relative strategic positions. It would be remarkable if there were not strong asymmetries and sometimes symmetrical "preclusive" capabilities. Relations, moreover, would shift constantly with changes in the military technology of the various powers and with the shifting coalitions among them.

If one starts with the assumption that all prospective Nth countries are interested in deterrence rather than aggression, one might suppose that an addition of nuclear weapons to their arsenal might merely add to the deterrent. However, in the real

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world, if there are many nuclear powers, some are likely to be interested in aggression and some able to get away with it without response from the victim. While the more responsible powers would be hard put to it to find a use for their nuclear capability, diffusion is likely to bring some less responsible recruits into the club. Then, with the major powers eager to avoid involvement, a lesser nuclear power might feel that he could attack one of his brethren with impunity. On the other hand, if, as may happen, a potential conflict looks as though it will be hard to isolate, it may be less likely to occur, but much more serious.

The probability of war by "mistake" as well as by deliberation is likely to increase. Vulnerability to attack and the incidence of "mistakes" can, it is important to observe again, be affected by the way we shape our posture, including our decision-making processes. However, the proliferation of nuclear forces has an essential connection with the difficulty of solving these two problems simultaneously. It places an increased burden on a system of positive control, and therefore increases also the problem of its protection. A dispersion of nuclear weapons complicates the problem of responsible deterrence by increasing the ambiguity as to sources of attack. One must decide not only whether one is under attack, but who has attacked; or one may feel obliged to attack all possible culprits including powers so far not involved; or the powers not yet attacked might preëmpt in order to diminish the consequences to themselves of a probable spread of the conflict. The instability would be a worldwide problem. Even if, with large-scale proliferation, each new nuclear power adopted a positive control system with a high standard of responsibility, there would be an increase in the possibility of mistakes, simply because there would be *more* control centers. It is apparent that this problem is not widely understood. When it is, this should reduce any temptation to cut the costs of a national force by "volume" sales to other powers.

To sum up the case against national nuclear forces: from the national standpoint of a responsible power, they are costly and of dubious military value. Their political value has been exaggerated, for, as the English have learned, it encourages emulation and is therefore transient. From the standpoint of world stability, wide nuclear diffusion would be gravely disruptive. It would increase the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons both by accident and by deliberation.

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III. Jointly Controlled Strike Forces

Joint forces, such as the proposed NATO strike force, have been suggested as a means of strengthening the alliance and of heading off the diffusion of nuclear control—in particular, to offer the French some substitute for a national force and thereby to remove a stimulus to the Germans. Some very thoughtful analysts and policy-makers have supported these proposals, and, given the disturbing implications of nuclear diffusion, they deserve the most sympathetic consideration. None the less, I believe the proposals for joint nuclear forces are mistaken. They are *likely to propagate the diffusion they are intended to control.* They are expedients and their precise content is unclear. I believe therefore that they will weaken rather than "save" the alliance.

Proposals for a NATO strike force usually take at face value the claim that Europeans are genuinely fearful of a massive nuclear attack to which the United States would not respond and that it is this fear which motivates diffusion. To begin with, let us also take this claim at its face value. Would a NATO strike force in fact satisfy the problem? Would it be more credible as a deterrent to nuclear attack on Europe than the U.S. guarantee? There are several reasons for believing that it would be considerably *less* credible. I shall focus once more on the command and control problem.

What is it that members of NATO want—the power to launch a nuclear strike or the power to say "No"? There is much evidence to suggest that Europeans have been worried most about the possibility that the United States may be trigger-happy; they are mainly interested, therefore, in the power to say "No." Even General de Gaulle, who has said that it is intolerable for France to depend on other countries for its defense, has indicated that he would like the ability to veto the use of nuclear weapons by the West anywhere in the world. But if those who jointly control the NATO force are principally interested in the power to say "No," then the response of the joint force is less credible than the U.S. guarantee. For one thing, as a member of NATO the United States has a vote, and if a strike is not in our interest we would presumably exercise our veto. But even if we did not have a vote, or did not exercise it, the chance that at least one of the European powers would vote "No" seems extremely high—higher than the chance of an American veto, simply because there are many pow-

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ers voting. But ironically, the power to veto the use of a NATO strike force would not offer much satisfaction to those who are worried about the control of their fates, and specifically control over supposedly trigger-happy Americans. Giving the members of NATO a smaller strategic force to veto during a crisis would not by sympathetic magic prevent Americans from invoking the tremendous power of SAC. Plans for joint controls, then, provide no assurance that the NATO strike force will itself respond, and none that SAC will not.

On the other hand, if the purpose of joint control is to say "Yes," then what is its meaning? No one to my knowledge has suggested that the NATO strike force be at the disposal of any member of NATO who desires to use it, regardless of what the others think. This of course would be the extreme short cut to the nuclear decentralization which the NATO strike force is supposed to avoid. Is the decision, then, to be taken by majority vote? By all or a majority of a subcommittee? Suggestions that have been made for committees of five or three powers to launch the NATO strike force raise in the most acute form questions of national sovereignty. They are not likely to be more practicable than the modest proposals for a division of labor in NATO, which have so far presented insurmountable obstacles. For the 15 countries to define "rules of engagement" for the use of a strategic force means that each must state in advance the precise circumstances under which it is willing to be committed to a general thermonuclear war and to whom it would give this power of commitment. Agreement here would offer the greatest political difficulties. The hope that the problem can be solved by the formation of a United Europe, in which there would be no separate considerations of national interest, seems at the present date rather forlorn.

Another alternative, and the one most frequently discussed, is to delegate the decision to the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe. But SACEUR is at present a highly responsible American general, and it seems very doubtful that any other than an American could be agreed upon. (There is at any rate little enthusiasm for an English SACEUR in France, for a German SACEUR in England, for a Turkish SACEUR . . . and so on.) But is it really easier to place confidence in a decision by a responsible American SACEUR than by the American President? If retaliation were not in the American interest, SACEUR would order it

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only if he were not responsible to that interest and to the President: that is to say, only if he were not a responsible American general.

This point will stand out with greater clarity if it is understood that the launching of the NATO strike force is intended—quite explicitly in the minds of most of its proponents—as a trigger for central war and the use of SAC. The firing of Polaris missiles from NATO-controlled submarines would be indistinguishable from the firing of missiles under U.S. control. Russian retaliation is then likely to be directed at the United States and, since the United States would expect this, it would have little choice but to launch its weapons in anticipation. The power to launch the NATO strike force is therefore the power to decide on World War III. The President of the United States has not delegated the authority to make war to the Commander of SAC. It is unlikely that he would give to SACEUR an irrevocable power to commit the United States to war, especially for a contingency in which the United States is not attacked, and the President is alive and able to make the decision. In fact, it is hard to see just how such power could be made irrevocable. But if it is revocable, how has it helped the supposed problem of "credibility?"

I have suggested that protecting command and control and making them responsible are crucial for avoiding accidental war and at the same time deterring deliberate attack. If, as we have seen, it is difficult for the European countries individually to solve this problem, it is still harder for a *joint* command and control close to the enemy. The joint decision is more complex, involves more parties and will be extremely hard to protect. It seems dubious that the NATO strike force will be a convincing substitute for the American guarantee in the event of massive nuclear attack on Europe.

On the other hand, the NATO strike force has sometimes been suggested as a substitute for the American guarantee not in the event of a massive nuclear attack on Europe, but in case of a nuclear attack on a single NATO nation. However, it is hard to see in this case why the unattacked NATO countries would be more likely than the United States to exchange their cities for a few Russian cities in retaliation for their fallen ally. We would have to presume that, say, Turkey is more closely identified with Norway, or Iceland with Greece, than is the United States.

In sum, it seems unlikely that a NATO strike force would pro-

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vide a deterrent to the Soviets more credible than that of the dubious national strike forces. It is still more doubtful that it would improve the American guarantee.

Let us now examine critically the assumption that the Europeans are moved to seek nuclear independence or a NATO strike force by a deep concern about a Soviet thermonuclear attack on Europe to which the United States would not respond. In good part the American estimates of European fears project some American emotions. We have initiated much of the movement toward reliance on nuclear weapons in Europe, and our advocacy of nuclear sharing and of European union has been reinforced by an implicit isolationism: a hope that somehow a Europe capable of self-defense would enable the United States to reduce its overseas burdens and commitments. Such American views in turn unsettle the Europeans.

We greatly oversimplify the diverse fears and motives of the NATO powers. The only NATO countries that have attempted nuclear independence are England and France, and their programs started long before anyone was raising grave doubts about the American response—the English in the 1940s, the French in 1954. While these programs have been rationalized variously at different times, there is little evidence that the dominating incentive has been an urgent fear of Russian nuclear attack. On the contrary, diminishing efforts in national defense, hopeful statements about the prospect of resolving East-West antagonisms, and many explicit avowals suggest that the Europeans are little worried about a deliberate massive nuclear attack. If they are not worried, then their doubt about an American response to such an attack becomes an academic question. In discussing national strike forces, I have already listed motives for nuclear military programs which have nothing to do with fear of Russian nuclear attack, and may even be incompatible with such a fear. The Europeans of course do have legitimate worries, but these center on the adequacy and appropriateness of NATO response to lower levels of aggression.

The NATO strike force is no more relevant for other objectives of national nuclear forces. For deterrence of Russian non-nuclear attack, it has roughly the same defects as national forces. Like them it may favor the illusion of providing a suitable response to conventional attack, though many of its principal proponents have the opposite intent. As in the case of those who advocate

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multiplying national nuclear forces on condition that conventional forces be expanded, the condition seems hard to impose. The joint force obviously could not be used for defense of purely national interests or in conflicts with other lesser powers; especially in the case of overseas interests, it is hardly likely to receive the consent of other members of the alliance. It is no use at all as a bargaining weapon for special position in the alliance, and it opposes completely the affirmation of national sovereignty. In short, it satisfies neither the surface nor the underlying motives for national nuclear military programs, and it is not likely therefore to head them off. In fact, many of the French have been explicit on this point. Like President de Gaulle, some members of parliament oppose the NATO force. Others openly favor it as a boost to the French national force, because, for one thing, they believe it will further weaken the MacMahon Act. But with or without the NATO force, the French Government intends to get its own *force de frappe*. In the words of General Billotte, the NATO strike force "does not respond even partially to the exigencies imposed for the security of France . . . it could in no manner be substituted for the French project."

Another hazard of a NATO force is that one of the members might withdraw some part of the force in time of crisis or, perhaps, to realize some purpose of its own. As a safeguard against this withdrawal, it has been suggested that installations be manned by mixed teams from all the member nations. Operational commanders, however, question whether such an arrangement is workable. In any case, the questions of sovereignty are here raised in a particularly acute form; General de Gaulle has resisted much less thorough integration. (The recent compromise on integrating French air defense in Europe applies only to the very small fraction of French fighters on German soil.) This safeguard of multi-national teams seems destined to be compromised out of existence also.

One omen of such compromises is that the NATO strike force has among its supporters not only those who want to restrain nuclear diffusion, but some who are simply unclear, and many who are actively in favor of the spread.[5] These gentlemen are like

[5] For example, *The New York Times* of July 23, 1960, reported that the Secretary General of NATO explored with General de Gaulle the possibility of France's accepting a gift of nuclear missiles under its own control, provided they would also accept some others to be placed under joint control.

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the stout lady who drinks her Metrecal as an appetizer before a full-course dinner.

Some proponents of the NATO strike force concede that its military worth would be low, but feel that its political value is high. Its political worth, however, may be negative. First of all, its political effects cannot be divorced from its military content. If, as I have suggested, the alleged merits of a NATO strike force will not bear analysis, this will be evident in time and is bound to trouble our allies. Second, the automatic-decision features in some versions of the proposal have disturbing political implications and would be likely to feed the fires of unilateralism both here and in Europe. Third, the probable refusal of some of our principal NATO partners to join in the project would tend to break the alliance into blocs. Fourth, it may be interpreted as a move toward withdrawal of the American umbrella. Some of the French are quick to catch suggestions to this effect in the American press. During the November debate in the French senate, Philippe Dargenlieu used these suggestions to justify doubts about the American guarantee, and as evidence of the need for a national nuclear force. Fifth, it lends a little substance to the fashionable statements about the incredibility of the American guarantee.

In many indirect as well as direct ways, then, the NATO strike force seems more likely to be a step along the way to diffusion than a means to inhibit it. Both its military and its political worth are more than doubtful.

IV. The American Guarantee Against Nuclear Attack

It is fashionable to say that an American response to a Soviet nuclear attack in Europe is incredible. Is the statement true? What precisely does it mean?

Perhaps the first thing to observe is that it means nothing very precise. To talk in terms of credibility or incredibility suggests that the alternatives are simply Yes or No. But in fact neither our response nor our failure to respond is certain. The real questions center on how likely we would be to respond in circumstances that are worth considering. What risks would the Russians undertake if they attacked Europe on the assumption that we would not reply? How safe would the Russians feel? These questions are connected with others: How large is the American stake in defending Europe from annihilation or take-over by the Communists? From the American point of view how would the

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risks of failing to react—if bombs were dropping on Europe—compare with the risks of retaliation? What are the chances of irrational decision? What would be a rational decision in terms of American self-interest?

Sober thought would suggest that the American response is by no means "incredible." The fashionable notion, I believe, is wrong, even if we interpret "incredible" as meaning simply "very unlikely." In any plausible circumstance of thermonuclear attack on Europe we would be likely to reply today, and, if we and our allies choose our policies carefully, this will remain true. It seems clear that the Russians do not find an American response hard to believe, since they have been deterred from taking over Europe by fear of this response, and not by moral scruples or an inability to overwhelm purely European defenses.

There are many reasons why the Russians should doubt their ability to isolate Europe and attack it alone, without attacking the United States. For one thing, a considerable portion of American nuclear power is dotted over Europe in a great many places from the United Kingdom to Turkey. It would be difficult to distinguish between a massive nuclear attack on Europe alone and the first wave of a wider attack which would almost immediately engulf the United States. There are profound questions as to whether we could stand by while our allies were being taken over and destroyed piecemeal, without expecting a basic shift in power which would threaten eventual annihilation or take-over of the United States itself. But quite apart from such relevant long-term questions, there would be a large risk of imminent destruction of much of the continental United States.

To understand this a little better, we might contemplate how such an attack might look in the awful moments of the crisis itself. Is it likely that the Russians would stage a massive nuclear attack on Europe and leave untouched the several dozen points where American nuclear forces are stationed? It would be extremely dangerous; most would agree, very improbable. On our control boards in the basement of the Pentagon, in Colorado Springs and elsewhere, we would see that a considerable portion of our nuclear capability had been eliminated, that a large portion of our forces had not yet been hit. Could we be counted on not to use these forces while they were still alive?

To fill out the picture a little, we should recall that around and about the United States at any particular moment there are un-

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known aircraft not definitely identified as friendly. From time to time the number gets quite large—large enough to be "critical," that is, to be explicable only as an extremely out-of-the-ordinary configuration of air traffic or as errors in identification or possibly as an enemy raid headed toward or already infiltrating the United States. Experience shows that crises tend to generate false reports of over-flights or incursions. These and several other types of false alarm are ordinarily taken in stride. They are evaluated along with other indications of hostile action. But the coincidence of such an alarm with unmistakable confirmation of a Russian attack on Europe, if not certain to get us going, would surely add appreciably to the Soviet risk.

If we add to this picture of great menace to the country the knowledge that hundreds of thousands of Americans as well as millions of our close allies would already have been killed, it should not be hard to believe that we would make the decision to send our forces off. It is quite absurd, in fact, to think that the Russians have nothing to worry about. They would have to calculate our reactions under enormous stress, and they would have to risk a good deal more than a "shadow of incertitude." To destroy part of our strike force and leave a larger part of it untouched would involve the utmost risk.

There are other ways in which we have identified our own defense with that of Europe. The most obvious one deserves considerable weight: We have signed a treaty saying that we do. For the United States it is not merely a figure of speech to say that we will treat an attack on Europe as an attack on ourselves. A failure to fulfill a commitment on a much less momentous matter would mean a tremendous loss in political power. While our promise alone may not be enough, it would be a mistake to underestimate the seriousness of our undertaking. We have predisposed ourselves to act.

Even if a cold calculation were to suggest that the balance lay in favor of *not* responding to Russian aggression, there is obviously a very considerable chance that in the circumstances we would not calculate coldly. In any event, there are immediate and long-run risks in failing to respond. The analysis presented so far should make clear that our response would not simply depend on the possibility of our acting irrationally. If Europe had suffered a massive nuclear attack, it would be *reasonable* for us to expect the same at any instant. An aggressor who did not

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take this into account would himself be extremely irrational, for he would have put himself in an extraordinarily dangerous position, inviting by his delay an attempt by us to blunt his strategic force. The situation would be terribly unstable and would not recover quickly. If an attack on the United States did not immediately follow an attack on Europe, we would be justified in assuming either that the act was unauthorized or that some tremendous miscalculation had been made. And whether or not this were true, the aggressor would have to be concerned about the possibilities of preëmption. The temptations on each side to forestall the other would be enormous.

Even if the aggressor were to take pains to make clear that he was attacking "only" Europe, and leaving America intact, this would be so unreasonable that it is unlikely we could be convinced. It is hard even to imagine a sensible motivation for an attack of this sort. A somewhat more plausible scenario might be trumped up for an attack against a single ally that had become a menacing, independent nuclear power. This, it should be observed, would be the result of diffusion, rather than a justification for it. But no plausible motive suggests itself for a massive attack on Europe in isolation. Such an attack seems to be a creation of some overly simple models of the world, rather than anything likely to occur in it. For Europeans it would seem that the last contingency to worry about is a deliberate massive nuclear attack on Europe which ignored the United States.

One final point should be recalled. To deter such an attack our response need not be certain. It must be probable enough to make the aggression excessively dangerous to the aggressor. The probability of our response is clearly large.

In examining the probability of our response, I have concentrated on the risks to us of failing to respond. We can and should also reduce the damage we could expect if we did respond. It is important, however, not to exaggerate what can be accomplished in this area. We should attempt to control the violence and diminish the frightfulness of a thermonuclear war. We should do this primarily because, in spite of our best efforts to avoid it, thermonuclear war may come, for example, as the result of an "accident" or an irrational or unauthorized act. But no active or civil defense or other program for limiting the damage done to us in a thermonuclear war is likely to be so reliable that it would seem reasonable for the United States to go to war unless the

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alternatives were enormously risky. For this reason, a program to limit damage is not likely to make the United States be or seem aggressive. For the same reason, it would not reassure the Europeans that we would respond if there were not substantial risks in failing to respond.[6] The most important purpose of our commitment to Europe and the deployment of our forces there is to make explicit to the Russians, to the Europeans and to ourselves that we are aware of the enormous risks to the United States in not defending Europe against massive nuclear attack.

What sort of risks would the Russians take? When we are not thinking wishfully about the Russians, we tend to think of them as if they represented the complete negative of our desires. But a move which would damage us would not necessarily be useful to them. It is important to consider a Russian threat from the standpoint of Russian self-interest. From their standpoint the problem of successful aggression in Europe is to find a level and kind of attack large enough to be useful, but small enough to be well below the threshold risking American nuclear response.

NATO's problem is to try to make sure the Russians cannot manage a useful attack without making it so large that it would be hard to distinguish from the start of a central war. Europe's principal strategic disadvantage is that it is susceptible to attack with conventional weapons, whereas the United States is not. It is becoming more and more widely accepted among critics of NATO that the most important task for the alliance today is to raise by conventional means the threshold of attack that the

[6] The military editor of the London *Times*, for example, finds it as hard "to imagine an American president willing to risk deaths of five million Americans as of fifty millions." His comments were prompted by some widely discussed American doubts about the credibility of American response to nuclear attack on Europe. However, these American doubts envisage quite incredible hypothetical circumstances in which our decision would be made. Mr. Herman Kahn ("On Thermonuclear War," Princeton University Press, 1960, p. 27f.) constructs his hypothesis as follows: (a) The Russians "simply to demonstrate their strength and resolve" wipe out London, Berlin, Rome, Paris and Bonn. (b) Following this event, which must be the classic case of all time for simply flexing muscles, the American decision-maker is prevented from making any decision for 24 hours. (c) During these 24 hours he is assumed to contemplate first the fact that 180 million Americans would be killed if he should say "Yes" and second, the fact that no attack on the United States would be made if he said "No." Mr. Kahn varies the numbers of Americans assumed killed in the raid to let the reader determine the "price" he would be willing to pay to fulfill American commitments to Europe. But he does not vary the probabilities of either the number of Americans dead given that we strike or the number of Americans dead given that we do not strike. In effect, he suggests one alternative with a very large price and another one that carries essentially no penalty.

In the real world the alternatives are not likely to be tens of millions or 180 million dead with certainty versus the certainty of total survival. Mr. Kahn leaves out all of the factors favoring a rational decision to respond, the large risks likely to be incurred by not responding.

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Russians would have to launch in order to be successful. The main defect of NATO strategy in the 1950s was a refusal to face this problem. Since 1954, NATO policy has been based on the assumption that the alliance would respond with nuclear weapons to any kind of aggression other than a local or temporary incursion. NATO military theorists took the view that the West had no choice but to adopt a policy of nuclear response to Soviet attack. The Russian hordes, we were told, could not be matched by NATO manpower, but only by the increased firepower derived from nuclear weapons. This argument was doubtful both in its estimate of NATO capabilities for non-nuclear defense and in its notion that nuclear weapons would redress the balance in favor of the West.

There is one point worth adding to the many telling criticisms which have been made of this nuclear policy. It has become clear in the last year or so that we must revise downward our estimate of Russian conventional capability. Premier Khrushchev's famous speech to the Supreme Soviet in January 1960 and other evidence indicate that Russian force reductions went further than the West had expected: two successive cuts since 1955 of over a million men each, and a cut in all categories of non-nuclear capabilities, including the surface navy, air force planes capable of delivering high explosives, and ground forces. Apart from the expected references to disarmament, the justification for these cuts appears to be much the same as those that influenced the West—the increased "firepower" of the new weapons—although the current manpower shortage arising from low wartime birth rates is probably a more important reason. It would seem that the Russians might have difficulty meeting the NATO hordes.

What are the implications of these changes in Russian force estimates for Western choices between nuclear and non-nuclear defense? Of course it might be argued that since the Russians are prepared for nuclear war, there is no point in our getting ready to meet a non-nuclear attack. Such an argument would sound strange coming from the same military analysts who argued that there was no point in our trying to defend ourselves with conventional weapons because the Russians were too well prepared for conventional war. On the contrary, it is now feasible to meet a wider range of possible attacks without raising the level of violence. This is one of many indications that the requirements for the defense of Europe ought to be reconsidered.

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In essence present NATO policy promises to meet any prolonged aggression—even if it is local, so long as the intention to persist is clear—by turning it into World War III. Sometimes when people doubt the credibility of the American response, it is *this* policy they refer to and it is the validity of the strategic guarantee to deter *lower* levels of aggression which they doubt. Europeans do fear that so drastic a promise might not suffice to deter a carefully prepared aggression that was clearly at a lower level of violence. They also fear that if the aggression occurred we might keep our promise. In any case, the use of the strategic threat to deter smaller aggressions paralyzes efforts in conventional defense by making them seem superfluous. Recently high NATO officials have emphasized that NATO's "normal" response would be conventional. A more clear-cut change of concept in this direction would help revitalize the alliance. Though the Europeans cannot decisively affect the capability for long-range strategic war, they can contribute a great deal to meet lower levels of aggression.

While giving NATO an artificial strategic capability makes no sense, the Europeans have a strong interest in increasing control of nuclear weapons of shorter range and of weapons based on their own territory. It is worth exploring an increase in their participation here. Tactical nuclear weapons have been oversold. Their use cannot be initiated with any confidence that the level of violence will be stable. This does not imply, however, that we want to leave ourselves only the option of using large-scale strategic weapons or conventional weapons. Where the aggressor initiates the use of tactical nuclear weapons, for example, greater flexibility than this would be in the interest of the Europeans.

One of the principal reasons for opposing nuclear sharing is connected with the need to try to limit the violence of war—either to keep a conventional conflict from becoming nuclear or to control or smother a nuclear conflict before it spreads. Clearly, a necessary condition for stable conventional warfare by an alliance is a highly responsible, centralized control of nuclear weapons. As for efforts to control the violence of a nuclear war, whether by making some distinction between military and urban targets, or by controlling the application of force within either category, or as part of a bargaining process to force termination of the war on more favorable terms, they become a rather remote possibility with nuclear diffusion. Coördinating and controlling one strike

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force in time of war is difficult enough, but to attempt coördination among congeries of independent strike forces seems quite hopeless.

Responsible control over the decision to go to war and over the level of the conflict is a central concern of our allies. Some of the current proposals for NATO nuclear policy err implicitly in assuming that the Europeans worry only because they doubt the Americans will issue a "Go" order when it is needed. In fact, a concern about a "Go" order is not easily separated from anxiety about the veto. The concern for a veto, while it may appear inconsistent with a desire for independence, is a very deep one. Moreover, it is precisely this which is ignored by the swarm of proposals in the United States as well as elsewhere in the West which in one way or another suggest—in order to make our deterrence of deliberate attack more certain—an automatic system of response. A concern about a veto is associated with the basic fact mentioned earlier that the problem of deterring deliberate attack and avoiding accident are inseparable. The task for United States policy is to continue to perfect a force which would have a clear likelihood of being used in case of a massive nuclear attack on Europe, and yet be so controlled that it can reassure the Europeans as well as the Americans that it will not be used in the event of small provocations or false alarms.

Attempts to solve the first half of this task by automatic engagement rules that make the decision independent of the will of the United States will not satisfy us. And if the rules are automatic enough to be independent of both the Europeans and the Americans, they will, in their recklessness, satisfy no one. The only responsible way to satisfy doubts about the American will is to keep the United States so engaged in the immediate fate of Europe that the decision to answer a massive nuclear attack on it is a rational one, and to keep Europe's defenses strong enough to cope with any other reasonably likely form of attack.

The presence of American forces in Europe not only implicates the United States in a Russian attack on Europe, but also implicates Europe in a Russian attack on the United States. This could have its drawbacks, if we were extremely provocative or irresponsible. But it is necessary, and the United States is not irresponsible. It might seem ideal from the European standpoint if the United States could be involved in a Russian attack on them, and they could be untouched by a Soviet attack on Amer-

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ica. There are undoubtedly some analogous American desires, but they are equally fantasies.

Some fears expressed by Europeans about our eventual withdrawal from the alliance suggest, as much as their hopes for "independence," a belief that in the nuclear age alliances are things of the past. But the United States does have a crucial long-run dependence on its allies. The only very firm foundation for believing in our continuing engagement in the fate of Europe is that if the Europeans and other of our allies go Communist, we may follow or be destroyed. The process of Communist transformation of the non-Communist world cannot proceed indefinitely without making the United States itself subject to attack even by non-nuclear weapons. It could force us to expand our defense to levels very much higher than the current ones and possibly higher than is compatible with democratic forms. The alliance is viable, because neither our allies nor the United States in the long run can survive without it. This is the reason for deliberately entangling our forces and their dependents in the lot of Europe. We identify our short-term fate with Europe's because we think our long-term fate cannot be extricated from theirs.

While I believe the American guarantee is absurdly underestimated in some current discussions—sometimes merely as a rationalization for national strike forces—this does not mean that the strength of the American guarantee is immune to change. On the contrary, one of the most serious troubles with moves towards NATO or national nuclear strike forces is that they might weaken the American guarantee in the future. If either a national or a joint deterrent can really deter the Soviet Union, it is hard to justify an American commitment for this purpose. If European nuclear forces should present merely a facade of deterrence, they might convince the American Congress even if they do not convince the Russians. Then Europeans will be surrendering something of enormous value for something that may be worth little or nothing. Advocates of nuclear diffusion as well as proponents of a European strike force have in fact offered as bait the possibility of reducing American forces overseas. It might not need the next balance of payments crisis for the bait to be taken. Clearly, extensive withdrawal of the United States from Europe would not only reduce our immediate stake, but would make it easier for the Russians to level an attack which was unambiguously against Europe and not against the United States.

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I would like to avoid the impression of an American *folie de grandeur*. Given the critical importance of Europe for the United States, the need for the American guarantee to deter massive nuclear attack on Europe is a token of the limits of American, as much as European, independence. In fact, the principal implication of my argument is that the much used notion of interdependence has to be taken seriously.

To sum up the four alternatives for avoiding nuclear attack on Europe: For the Europeans, the first alternative, to repudiate all reliance on nuclear weapons including the American guarantee, would increase the likelihood of Soviet attack. Such an attack would still be dangerous for the Soviet Union, since the long-run interests of the United States would be critically injured by it. Yet it is apparent that, in so far as the attempt to disentangle the immediate fate of Europe from that of the United States was successful, it would lessen the probability of American response and the consequent risks of aggression. But the second and third alternatives are hardly better than the first. A European effort to achieve nuclear independence, either in the guise of national forces or of any of various joint enterprises, would have much the same effect. It would weaken the American guarantee against Soviet attack without putting anything of substance in its place. The fourth alternative, the American guarantee of Europe, is a necessity for both the United States and Europe.

To keep the American guarantee valid, it is important not to diminish American nuclear power in Europe until conventional forces have expanded to close any gap; but in any case it is essential for us to stay in Europe. To remove any doubts about the responsible use of nuclear power, it is vital to keep that power under centralized control. For deterrence and responsibility we must do what we can to inhibit the diffusion of nuclear weapons.

Such a policy is best from the standpoint of both American and European security. It happens also to be sound from the standpoint of the stability of the world system and—in so far as the Soviet Union has a common interest with us in avoiding the chance of nuclear miscalculations—it may be in their interest too. This last is not necessarily a demerit. Our interests are not the negative of Russian desires, any more than the reverse is true. We should not assume that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by China or the Warsaw powers is good for us because it is bad for the Russians.

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A good many people today favor unilateral steps toward disarmament, even at great risk, in the hope that this will lead the Russians to take similar actions. My point is quite different. The policies advocated here would *improve* alliance defense. We should take these measures, so to speak, "even though" they are in the interests of both East and West—for example, in reducing the chance of war by miscalculation or "accident."

It may be felt that such a national policy to abate, delay or control nuclear diffusion is too uncertain or slow, that only an extensive arms-control agreement and perhaps even the imposition of a world authority are worth trying. However, we should not think of the achievement of arms control as if it were going to take place in one millennial, transfiguring instant. The serious control proposals on the agenda for negotiation today would themselves be at best very small steps, very indirect and uncertain. A verifiable test-ban agreement could have a modest utility but it would be a long way from stopping the diffusion of nuclear capability, and would fail to offset the strides toward diffusion taken by several of our alliance policies. By the same token, a reversal of such alliance policies is likely to be a more effective brake on nuclear diffusion. Both in our national security policies and in our arms-control agreements, we can only hope to work on the problems of stability piecemeal. The probability of nuclear war, however, can be affected year by year.

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U. N. ON TRIAL

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

IN the closing days of the General Assembly last December one heard even responsible heads of delegations remark, sadly, bitterly: "The United Nations is done for." Others exulted. They took the visible discouragement of the Western delegations as a sign that the "interference" and "one-sided intervention" of the United Nations in places and problems around the world would soon be terminated. They were correct, of course, in calling the U.N. interference one-sided. By definition and in fact the United Nations is on the side of the weak and threatened against the strong and greedy.

The United Nations, though not yet done for, is indeed on trial for its life—at any rate in the incarnation that enabled a country like the United States to think of it, as statesmen said so often, as "a cornerstone of American foreign policy." The verdict may be rendered sooner than anyone expected, as we see from the manner in which the Soviet bloc and fellow-travelling states exploited the crisis precipitated by the death of Patrice Lumumba. They pounced on the killing to attack ferociously and with preposterous untruth the United Nations itself, its operations in the Congo, the office and person of the Secretary-General and all countries which recognized the government of President Kasavubu. To add intimidation to calumny they organized attacks on foreign embassies (including in some instances those of the United States) in capitals where no public act can be spontaneous and the only demonstrations possible are those approved by the government itself.

If the assault succeeds, if the power to manipulate the United Nations for its own designs passes to the Soviet Union, or if the organization is rendered impotent by the structural changes which Mr. Khrushchev has demanded, it is indeed "done for" as a functioning agency of world collaboration. And though Moscow may be frustrated now, the trial is merely adjourned.

When the final showdown comes, whether on the Congo, the Secretary-General or some other issue, the result will depend on the answer to this question: Are enough members willing to take the risks necessary to ensure the United Nations a new span of life in something like its original form and with something like

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its intended functions? If not, it will be condemned to desuetude by disillusionment, confusion, lassitude and fear among its earlier supporters, indifference and "disengagement" on the part of many of the new members and the persistent hostility of one of the two strongest. In that case the outlook would be gloomy enough. Many of the chief functions of the United Nations would be moribund and whatever was left of them would become subject to strong Communist influence. But since Moscow began to heighten by every means possible the crisis that followed the Lumumba murder an even more sombre possibility is in view: the Soviet leaders may be prepared to bring the United Nations to an abrupt end. If they fail to paralyze it or gain a controlling influence in it, they may decide to set up a rival organ of their own composed of Communist and fellow-travelling states plus as many of the unaligned states as can be intimidated or lured into disowning neutrality. Mr. Khrushchev and his deputies have found the United Nations useful as a forum for propaganda, blackmail and intimidation, a place to test the nerves of both opponents and in-betweeners. But as originally conceived, and even as now constituted, its liabilities for the Soviets are greater than these assets and give them reason to hate and fear it and wish to kill it, either outright or in everything but name.

The United Nations has thwarted major Soviet designs on half a dozen occasions; and so long as it exists and has the support of the United States it poses the sobering possibility that even minor pickings and stealings brought there for discussion can develop into an all-out trial of strength between the Soviet Union and its major antagonist. Some time back, therefore, the Soviet leaders saw the importance of bringing that support to an end. They could hardly count on mustering enough votes in the General Assembly to pass measures directly injurious to the United States—a development which supposedly might persuade the American public that U.N. membership is too risky to be continued. But they saw that with the obedient votes of their satellites plus the support of a considerable group of African and Asian states and a few others they might be able to line up the one-third of the General Assembly membership needed to thwart positive actions under the Charter; and in this way they might hope to demonstrate to the American public that the United Nations had become helpless and useless and that continued membership was a waste of effort and money.

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Concurrently, the Soviets organized a drive to paralyze the United Nations at its operating center by abolishing the office of Secretary-General. The Secretary-General is chosen as the embodiment of the ideal of an impartial civil servant, imbued with the United Nations spirit and responsive to the instructions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Mr. Khrushchev decided that the office must be abolished because these qualities obstruct his efforts to use the United Nations for his own purposes. His determination hardened as the crisis in the Congo deepened, for the present Secretary-General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, proved stubbornly determined that U.N. operations there should be conducted in a neutral manner as between opposing local factions in strict compliance with the instructions of the Security Council. On February 4, Moscow's personal attack on Mr. Hammarskjold reached some sort of a summit of unreason and untruth when he was branded as an accomplice and organizer of Mr. Lumumba's murder.

Mr. Khrushchev's manœuvre takes the form of a demand that the Secretary-General shall be replaced by a triumvirate representing the Western, Communist and unaligned states. He has not made clear how he would want the triumvirate to function. Would each of its three members have the right to veto every U.N. operation? Or would whichever of the two more powerful members recruited the unaligned member thereby attain majority control? One can see a situation developing in which the neutralist representative, wavering between the arguments of the other two (and perhaps their promises and threats) would delay any decision until an emergency had developed into a catastrophe. In all circumstances, decision by committee is notoriously unsatisfactory. To substitute it for a single official acting under instruction from constituted authorities and accountable to them at every moment would damage the organization irreparably. Soviet control in the proposed triumvirate might be equivalent to a veto in the Assembly.

The proposal to replace the Secretary-General by a three-man directorate was in part designed to please the unaligned states, particularly those that might hope to serve on it. But Prime Minister Nehru took warning, at least for the time being; he advised against attempting "at this juncture" to effect structural changes by revising the Charter. Other governments had second thoughts also. A substitute that might be acceptable to the So-

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viets as a stopgap would be for the General Assembly to appoint an Advisory Committee to work with the Secretary-General. Would it advise him or control him? Either way the plan is only somewhat less objectionable than Mr. Khrushchev's project to replace him outright. Either the Advisory Committee would be in agreement and would try to impose its will on the Secretary-General; or it would be unable to agree and this would be interpreted as meaning that he should refrain from any action. Whether or not the Secretary-General followed the Committee's advice he would be in trouble. If he did, he would be accused of being its catspaw; if he did not, it would be said that he was acting rashly on his own. There is no acceptable substitute for a single chief administrative officer, responsible for his actions directly to the sources of power designated in the Charter.

Warning came on November 11, 1960, that the Soviet delegation might be in sight of the time when it could carry out some of its destructive designs. It came in the form of a sudden proposal by the Nigerian delegation that the General Assembly postpone the election of new members of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, thereby putting off the choice between rival Soviet and Western plans for providing better Asian and African representation on those bodies. The Soviet plan was to displace enough Western members to make room for members from Asia and Africa; the Western plan was simply to enlarge the Councils and add Asian and African members. The Western states opposed the Soviet plan for the obvious reason that it would cut down their own representation, and they opposed the Nigerian proposal because they did not want to risk paralyzing two key U.N. organs, as would happen if the delay lasted beyond the end of the year. The Western delegations (except Finland, which abstained) and those from Latin America (except three mavericks, Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic) voted against the Soviet proposal. The Soviet delegation, however, had some time back introduced a factor into the discussion of this question which it now revived and which proved decisive; it made known that it would not accept any plan, even its own, until Red China had been admitted to U.N. membership. With this veto in the Security Council staring them in the face,[1] most of the unaligned states joined the Communist bloc in voting for

[1] A Charter amendment adopted by a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly must be ratified individually by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

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delay, and the Nigerian motion was carried 51 to 38.[2] Two special factors affected the outcome: one of the Western candidates, Portugal, was particularly unacceptable to the anti-colonialists; and there was a valid argument that no action should be taken until a special committee appointed to study the question had been able to agree on a report. But it was the Soviet Union's threat to prevent any change whatsoever in the Councils except on its own terms that settled the matter. The ulterior purpose was clear—to secure wider backing among the unaligned states next autumn for the move to admit Red China to membership.

The writing was now on the wall of the General Assembly for all to see; henceforth Western arguments and Western votes would not necessarily be effective against a coalition put together by the Soviet delegation by the simple tactic of facing the unaligned states with a choice between reward and punishment. When this happened, the result at best would be a stalemate which would prevent the General Assembly from taking any action.

The Soviet delegation would obviously exploit its advantage to the full and at once. One argument for speed was that although the Soviets currently exercise great influence with certain ambitious African leaders, they must foresee difficulties in holding all of these in line indefinitely. Aid programs and anti-colonialist oratory will not be enough to satisfy them once they begin vying in earnest for supremacy, demanding preferential economic treatment, and, even more embarrassing, political support against their rivals. Soviet encouragement of the Pan-African movement has been profitable and will continue to be up to a point; but there are differences within the movement which orators on the theme of "the African personality" skim over lightly. Already these differences—national, tribal, cultural, linguistic and religious—reveal the outlines of serious future disputes. (Europeans, after all, live on one compact continent, have skins of the same color and have fought each other for centuries.) It will tax Soviet skill to maintain an influence with various clients who are on opposite sides of these disputes.

There was another reason for the Soviet Union's wishing to mount its full offensive in and against the United Nations as soon

[2] As the question was procedural, a simple majority was sufficient. Of the African states, Dahomey was the only one to vote against the motion, while Gabon abstained. Japan, China and Turkey also abstained.

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as possible. Some of the newer states (and some not so new) appear not to understand that decisions on even purely organizational issues will affect the capacity of the United Nations to intervene promptly in disputes in which they themselves may become involved. This unawareness, however, may change. Forces beyond Moscow's control may jolt these Asian and African states into realizing that though the old European empires have crumbled others are in the making. Soviet leaders must leave as little opportunity as possible for repetitions of the rude lessons given Prime Minister Nehru by Red China when she repudiated the *Panchsheel* principles of live and let live, massacred thousands of Tibetans and invaded Indian territory.

By every sign the United Nations was destined in 1961 to become a principal testing ground of Soviet and Western statesmanship. How successful either would be was evidently to depend largely on its flexibility and skill in working with the new world forces there represented and in adjusting to the new ways in which the traditional machineries of negotiation and conference now operate. The murder of Patrice Lumumba gave the Soviets the opportunity they wished to bring the two forces into head-on collision in conditions which they hoped would not be favorable to the West.

II

A member wanting to use the United Nations for selfish purposes has found increasing scope for manœuvre as the membership has grown. In favor of the intriguer, too, is the fact that no one of the organization's key bodies—Security Council, General Assembly, Secretariat—is functioning today as was planned 15 years ago at San Francisco.

The Security Council was intended to act as the U.N. executive organ with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. But as all the world knows, it is held in a state of chronic stalemate. By the latest count the Soviet Union has used the veto 94 times; the other four permanent members have between them used it seven times (the United States so far has not been one of those using it). All the permanent members consider the right of veto a necessary safeguard, and none would relinquish it, although Secretary Marshall proposed unsuccessfully in 1947 that its use might be restricted.

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Because the Security Council is disabled the General Assembly has edged further and further into the field of action. Recognition that its functions ought to be expanded came principally in the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution of 1951, which among other things authorized it to meet in emergency session at short notice when the Security Council was prevented from taking action, and to recommend collective measures, including if necessary the use of military force.[3] Today, however, the General Assembly is not what it was in 1945 or 1951. Its original membership has nearly doubled; over half the present members are from Asia, the Middle East and Africa; and perhaps a score of prospective candidates from those areas are gathering in the wings and will one day be admitted. All the 99 delegations represent sovereign nations and are dependent on instructions from home governments, which in the case of the states only recently organized suffer from a crippling lack of trained personnel. As a result, the General Assembly has become unwieldy and the discussions diffuse and lacking in spontaneity; there is neither crisp debate nor prompt action. Instead it is the arena for the battle of the blocs. For the 99 delegations divide roughly into three categories—Western, Communist and what is usually called neutralist, meaning more accurately states not formally aligned in the cold war. In this division, the unaligned states hold the balance of power—not of real power in the world, of course, but of voting power. So far they have not formed a cohesive bloc, and even if they did so the bloc would not have the votes to enforce its separate will. The situation would be different, of course, if any number of the Latin American republics entered the doubtful column on critical issues. At present the strength of the unaligned states is simply that they can block the proposals of either of the two other sides, and they can negotiate with them collectively and individually as to which way they will swing their votes.

The arithmetic of the situation is not what has been the most disturbing to Western delegations. They accept as a matter of

[3] The resolution was adopted November 3, 1951, by a vote of 52 to 5; only the Soviet bloc opposed it and only India and Argentina abstained. As early as 1947 the present writer made a somewhat similar proposal to strengthen collective security through a protocol to be signed by all members wishing to do so. It would provide for collective resistance to armed attack if two-thirds of the signatories so decided and if the Security Council failed to act ("The Calculated Risk," New York, Macmillan, 1947). Authority for the procedure was found in Article 51 of the Charter, reserving the right of individual states or groups of states to resist armed attack. Senator Vandenberg endorsed the proposal (*New York Times*, October 6, 1947). The same basis served later for NATO and other regional defense organizations.

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course the Charter provision that a third of the membership can block a substantive motion; and when they make a proposal they expect the Soviet Union to try to secure the support of enough unaligned states to defeat it. Their fear comes from the fact that the General Assembly seems particularly likely to be incapacitated in just those moments of extreme crisis when it is called on to take unpleasant decisions and risky actions. The pacifist creed professed by many unaligned states is not fully credible; one thinks of India and Pakistan, Indonesia and New Guinea, Ghana and Togo, and others. But it will give them a ready excuse to fall in with the arguments against effective collective action sure to be put forward by the Soviet Union when either it or a state in its camp is accused of threatening aggression.

It is not only in moments of world crisis, however, that U.N. decisions of the highest importance may be warped by high idealism and pacifist prejudice untainted by specialized knowledge, to say nothing of less admirable motivations. Surely no subject is more important than disarmament and surely none is more highly technical or more baffling even to experts who have lived with it for years. Yet representatives of states which have no technology, few if any men of science and probably not a single official assigned to full-time study of disarmament problems are expected to have opinions not only on goals but on the staggeringly complex steps suggested for reaching them. No wonder that, as one weary expert has put it, "They do not greet our proposals with hostility, just with incomprehension." In these circumstances the most vague and far-reaching programs, the ones that promise most and dwell least on the land-mines dotting every foot of the way, are bound to attract wide support. The Soviet proposal of complete and immediate disarmament is calculated to make this appeal and attract this support.

Leaders of countries next door to Red China or Soviet Russia might have been expected to realize even more clearly than others the risks lurking in this simplified approach to the disarmament problem. The abolition of all military force, international or national, would automatically give an overwhelming advantage to nations of mass population and ambitious leadership. What, for example, would then hinder the leaders of Red China from loosing hordes of their people in a "peaceful" surge into adjoining territories? Partisans of non-resistance might think it admirable that no shot had been fired. But when the day

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came, would submerged small countries be so philosophic? Unfortunately, not all Asian spokesmen gave signs of real alarm at the Soviet suggestion to abolish at one blow all deterrents to mass movements, armed or unarmed.

The change in the character of U.N. membership began some years ago when India, Indonesia and other important states proclaimed devotion to what was loosely called neutrality. The formulas differed in name but were alike in seeming to rule out support for the U.N. purposes and principles enumerated in the first paragraph of Article 1 of the Charter. The repudiation was not explicit; but from what various leaders said time and again in speeches it became plain that escape from the risks of collective U.N. action, under the banner of pacifist neutralism, was the bedrock of their foreign policy (except of course where their own frontiers or nationalist claims were involved; there they could be intransigent, even militant). Development of the theory of pacifist neutralism helped erode what remained of the concept of collective action after the Soviets had made plain in the Security Council and otherwise that they would permit such action only when it favored them and their protégés. Many members followed an attractive lead which seemed to offer U.N. benefits without sharing U.N. duties and dangers; and most of the newly admitted states have done so as a matter of course.

All this was highly significant once it became necessary to rely on the General Assembly not just to talk but to take the responsibility of acting in crisis when the Security Council is helpless; for although talk in the General Assembly knows no bounds, there is no assurance that if it is required to act it can muster the courage to do so.

The potential value of the members of the young delegations in the work of the United Nations must not be underestimated. Arriving in New York, they find themselves in an unfamiliar environment and called on suddenly to participate in decisions for which they have had only brief preparation; but many among them are men of the first order, highly cultivated and conscientious, and some have already begun to play useful roles both in their own right and as intermediaries between West and East. As was inevitable, however, delegates from states which had not yet been born at the time of the last great war know little about the depth of feeling which brought the United Nations into being and the reasons for the presence in the Charter of each long-debated

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article. The Allied peoples who sent their delegates to San Francisco in 1945 held certain beliefs, formed from their experiences in two world wars and their previous attempt and failure to create an effective world organization. They were determined that there must be a new international organization and they knew that it must demand more from its members than the old League of Nations had done if it was to work better and last longer.

The majority of the new states of Asia and Africa were spared these experiences and looked on what the Allied nations had tried to do at San Francisco in their own special way. Their whole life, in so far as it was politically conscious at all, had been dominated by one concern: the struggle for independence. They had lived outside the international scene. Today, they are less concerned with what often seem to them theoretical formulas of how world peace is to be preserved than with immediate problems of how they can give their new independence a stronger economic and social base and help other colonial peoples to independence also. In their imagination, the purpose of the Charter adopted in 1945 was not the idealistic one of preserving peace. They cannot help suspecting that the long orderly procedure set up for dealing with international disputes—from conciliation and arbitration to collective measures to defeat aggression—had the hidden purpose of freezing the status quo and thus perpetuating the colonial régime. They still mistrust the colonial powers, even the ones now rapidly freeing their colonies; and since the same powers are prominent in the effort to preserve the integrity of the United Nations they have some suspicions about their motives there too.

In recent years the United States has found itself included in the general mistrust because it has maintained links with its wartime allies in defense organizations against Communist aggression. Several of the NATO countries still have colonies, and the demand of those colonies for independence has placed the United States Government in a dilemma: to weaken the alliance by following its own traditions and openly favoring independence movements, or to keep the alliance intact at the cost of damaging the confidence of the African peoples. On the whole it has tried to straddle the issue, without remarkable success. A case in point was the Declaration stating "the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations" which came before the General Assembly last December. Western opinion about it was divided. Some observers considered

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it on the whole innocuous. Others pointed to the article reading: "Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence." This, they emphasized, was an encouragement to create more Congos. Two Soviet amendments that would have set a 1961 deadline and imposed other undesirable conditions were defeated. In view of this, some Americans felt that the Declaration indicated a general direction more than it set forth a timetable, and would have liked the United States delegation to put itself on that side. On December 14 the Declaration was adopted by a vote of 89 to 0. The United States abstained.

On occasions when specific colonial issues were before the Trusteeship Council or the General Assembly the African and Asian states also have been critical of what seemed to them an inability of the American delegation to make up its mind, pro or con. One such case was when India and eleven other states last November introduced a resolution calling on the Portuguese Government to supply information about Angola, Mozambique and other overseas territories under its administration, something they claimed it was bound to do by Article 73 of the Charter, under the heading "Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories." The Portuguese Government has refused to transmit such reports, on the grounds that the territories are not colonies but provinces of Portugal proper. In arguing its position it also gave very different interpretations of Article 73 and the Charter's intent in promoting the welfare of peoples. The Soviet delegate, Mr. Kuchava, said the resolution was shockingly weak and accused the sponsors of having been "forced by the colonialist powers to accept this emasculated thing." To which the Indian delegate, Mr. Jung, replied spiritedly: "My country, for one, needs to be given no lessons in anti-colonialism." The resolution was adopted, 45 votes to 6, with 24 abstentions. The United States was one of those that abstained, giving among its reasons that some of the phraseology was objectionably broad (which was true) and that it was not proper to single out countries to remind them of their obligations under Article 73 (which the sponsors considered a quibble, since Portugal is now the only power refusing to report on its overseas territories).

South Africa does not present, properly speaking, a "colonial problem," yet in anti-colonialist quarters it has been the origin of resentment against the United States for not condemning racism

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more formally. Washington did issue a critical statement after the Sharpeville shootings, and this created a sensation in Africa because it was so prompt and explicit; but its effect was dissipated when Washington seemed to have second thoughts about the wisdom of speaking out so frankly. In discussions of the South African question in the United Nations, the United States has shown great reserve. Its caution may spring partly from the knowledge that racism also exists in the United States, even though the United States Government, unlike the Union of South Africa Government, does not make discrimination an official policy but on the contrary condemns and fights it. But the caution comes more directly from a determination not to intervene in matters which, in the language of the Charter, "are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." That Charter provision was universally demanded at San Francisco, and without it not merely the United States but many other nations around the world would have refused to accept the duties of U.N. membership. In the realm of feelings as distinct from actions, Prime Minister Macmillan's "winds of change" speech revealed that his government is as convinced as ours that *apartheid* offers no solution for the racial conflict in South Africa. But the Union is an independent member of the British Commonwealth and there is no way in which London could coerce Pretoria if it would. On one matter which concerns the Union the United States need not maintain the same reserved attitude that it does toward racial problems within the Union. The lineage of South West Africa as a mandated territory seems clear enough to justify the United Nations in requiring that the Union submit reports on conditions there, and to permit the United States to support the demand with vigor.

The Algerian war presented the United States with perhaps its most perplexing difficulties in satisfying a NATO partner and at the same time avoiding involvement on the "colonialist" side. We have come to place our hopes on President de Gaulle's patient efforts to end the struggle and, incidentally, save us from our dilemma; and in past months the chances that this might in fact happen have on the whole improved. The United States has felt a special duty not to do anything that might lessen de Gaulle's chances of success. This would have been its position even if France were not a NATO member, for it could not in conscience take any action which risked blocking the only hopeful exit in

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sight in Algeria, thereby increasing the danger that the war might even ignite civil war in France itself. The American attitude has been resented in many parts of Africa, but not everywhere. The French-speaking Republics now grouped in the Community or the Entente have favored de Gaulle and approved our wish not to hamper him. Tunisia has tried as earnestly to be helpful in the Franco-Algerian negotiations as Morocco, Guinea, Mali and the U.A.R. have tried to sabotage them.

When it comes to dealing with problems like these Mr. Khrushchev does not have to weigh alternatives of responsible statesmanship. His choice is predetermined. He will take whatever course promotes the disintegration of the Western alliance; favors turbulence in Africa or anywhere else that will permit Soviet penetration; and damages as much as possible the reputation and influence of the United Nations as a force for the orderly settlement of disputes and resistance to aggression and blackmail. He feels quite uninhibited—indeed takes a self-righteous tone—in attacking colonialism and imperialism, and when he does so he wins applause from many of the neutralist delegations (and not the smallest or most inexperienced only). The applause is exhilarating, and he gazes contemptuously around the chamber at the stony-faced Western delegates. But his deeper aims are clear: to make the lie that the Soviet Union is the paladin of the oppressed so familiar by endless repetition that in the face of all the evidence the credulous in the end feel there is something to it; and to divert attention from Soviet oppression and from the Soviet form of colonialism which, fortunately for his argument, fastens itself on regions comfortably far from the tropics.

The fact is that there is very little interest in the uncommitted states in the issues of the East-West struggle. Differences between the ultimate goals of Communism and democracy seem irrelevant to leaders just starting from scratch to build viable national economies and political régimes that can run them (and that they can run). They look for aid where they can get it. They do not waste time speculating about what may be the outcome of the present world struggle; and they disregard the possibility that it will determine their own fate.

III

The attitudes of individual unaligned states and their allegiance to the groups with which they usually are identified are

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less clear-cut, of course, than has appeared from the foregoing attempt to give an idea of the play of forces in the General Assembly.

Certain unaligned states maintain a fairly steady orientation, departing from it only occasionally if at all; others belong to regional or other groups but usually do not vote with the majority; others occupy positions between the two extremes. Delegates from the older Asian states—Japan, the Philippines, Thailand and Turkey—meet regularly with the representatives of the more recently established nations of Asia and Africa. Their views are usually quite different, however, for the four states mentioned have defense ties with the West and usually vote on that side. So do Pakistan and Malaya, unless their Western partners take unsatisfactory positions on colonial issues. As a rule, the former French colonies in Africa which now belong to the Community or the Entente are still favorable to the West, if only to the extent of withholding their votes on various controversial issues; the exceptions have been on questions of African independence, though even here, as noted above, they have sympathized with de Gaulle's efforts for a peaceful solution in Algeria. On the other hand, a considerable number of states such as Afghanistan, Ghana, Indonesia and lately Morocco line up as a rule on the Soviet side; recently the United Arab Republic and the former French territories of Guinea and Mali have done so almost invariably.

India's attitude has special importance because of her size, her prestige and the lofty moral principles expressed by her leaders. She was one of the first declared neutrals and she is the one whose wish really to be neutral is least open to doubt. When other countries that had supplied contingents for the U.N. force in the Congo were withdrawing them and the whole operation seemed on the point of collapse, Prime Minister Nehru uttered cautionary words and offered to send combat troops to help fill the gap. Yet on other occasions the actions of the Indian delegation in the United Nations have been perplexing unless they are thought of not as originating so much in neutrality as in a desire to keep Russian friendship as a brake on Chinese belligerency.

Americans do not much mind Mr. Nehru's condemnation of American materialism; they themselves think it has been overdone. But they may be uncharitable enough to have read without profound sympathy his recent plaintive comment about another

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country's lack of gratitude for the aid which it had received from India. Speaking of Nepal's hostility, he said: "That is what we are getting in exchange for all the friendship and help we have given in the last ten years or so." On the whole, however, homilies on spiritual versus material values, East and West, or doubts as to whether sufficient recognition is given the role played by American material prosperity in keeping India's five-year plan going, leave Americans unruffled. What would worry them would be if they saw signs of an increasing tendency among the hitherto unaligned states to adopt anti-American attitudes automatically or, carrying this a step further, form themselves into an anti-American or anti-Western voting bloc in the United Nations. This does not exist so far. But some factors do operate, consciously or unconsciously, to create the impression that one day it might. Occasions when Indian delegates take a middle-of-the-road position, attempt to modify Soviet measures or vote against them have unfortunately attracted less attention than the occasions when Mr. Krishna Menon's zeal as grand marshal of the Asian and African states has resulted in their lining up against some Western measure.

Jugoslavia presents an altogether different aspect of "neutralism," one which in recent months has become quite enigmatic. Jugoslavia is not aligned with the Soviet Union; indeed, she has been threatened in the past by Soviet military and economic power and has escaped from Soviet domination only by a marvelous display of courage. She has repeatedly received loans and credits from the United States to strengthen her army and economy and help her maintain independence from Soviet or other control. President Tito has stated categorically that the United States has never sought to use this aid to influence his domestic or foreign policy. As recently as December 27, 1960, his government announced a monetary reform linking the Jugoslav economy more closely to the capitalist West, based on credits of more than a quarter of a billion dollars pledged by the International Monetary Fund and a group of Western countries, including the United States. In her own society, Jugoslavia pursues Marxist goals in a manner radically different from what is approved in Moscow, and this has brought down concerted ridicule and abuse on President Tito from Soviet and satellite leaders and press. Nevertheless, President Tito stated recently that "on the most important issues of the day" Belgrade and Moscow hold identical

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views; in the last session of the General Assembly, Jugoslavia's votes were consistently the same as the Soviet Union's; and the Jugoslav delegation has been as active in colonial issues as any former colony in Asia or Africa.

Even friendly observers cannot help wondering what President Tito's "most important issues" are. Evidently, by the record, maintenance of national independence and removal of threats to it are not among them. Is one of them coexistence? If so, this would indicate that the West has shown less desire than Moscow to coexist peacefully with Jugoslavia. Or disarmament? This would imply that President Tito would really feel at ease if the armed forces of Jugoslavia (population 18,000,000) and Soviet Russia (population 210,000,000) were simultaneously disbanded. (Actually, he has implied that he believes graduated disarmament would be more practical.) Or anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism? These expressions cost nothing to use, and may be profitable psychologically in preparing the way for a spread of Jugoslav popularity and trade in Africa (to the disadvantage, moreover, of Red China's influence there).[4] Closer home, President Tito can hardly have forgotten how often Soviet leaders and press have lumped him with other imperialist miscreants and have accused him, in vile terms, of committing a crime which in essence has been only to take help where it could be found for defending his country's independence. He has been too courageous on occasion in defying the Soviet Union to be suspected of appeasing it now. The enigma remains.

Viewing the tendency of some newer African and Asian states in the General Assembly to be "neutral on the side of the Soviets" one must remember that they may vote as they do out of what they consider necessity, or simply because it seems advantageous, and that often their motivation has little or nothing to do with their conception of the merits of Soviet policy. It is not that they love us less, supposing for a moment that sentiment of any sort comes into their attitudes, but that they fear the displeasure of the Soviets more. Those that need to turn to both East and West for help with their social and economic problems are always under temptation to talk and vote against the United States; they know they can do it with impunity, and they know

[4] In 1959 and 1960 Jugoslavia provided credits to Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Morocco and the Sudan for the purchase of Jugoslav goods or services. A trade agreement was also signed with Tunisia and trade negotiations were opened with Ghana and the U.A.R.

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that opposite behavior would awaken damaging Soviet displeasure. Their realistic appraisal simply calls attention once more to the handicap of having a reputation for acting with reasonable decency and understanding.

IV

Until the autumn of 1960, Secretary-General Hammarskjold seemed to have a fairly stable footing amid the swirling currents and shifting sands of the General Assembly. The results of his "preventive diplomacy" in the Middle East had not been approved in the West, especially when it became evident that it left Egypt free to prevent the transit of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal. On the other hand, his manœuvre in persuading the Security Council (by a procedural vote) to establish a United Nations "presence" in Laos, though at first it achieved the desired calming effect, was for that very reason not at all satisfactory to the Soviet Union, which questioned the legality of the action and criticized him for it freely. In the end, the U.N. action in Laos did not succeed because only a policy in which the United States and the Soviet Union were in agreement could succeed (unless, that is, one side gave way before the other's threat of war). The incident epitomized the grounds on which Mr. Hammarskjold has been criticized on other occasions, including the Congo crisis, namely that unless an ambitious political program conducted by the United Nations has the backing of the "veto" powers in the Security Council and of two-thirds of the General Assembly it may be frustrated and eventually fail. Specific criticisms aside, however, Mr. Hammarskjold was respected for his independence and integrity and for his calm demeanor amid storms. In particular, a number of the smaller states seemed to realize that he was the principal custodian of their interests.

The generally favorable attitude toward the Secretary-General reached its high-water mark on September 20, 1960, during the special emergency session of the General Assembly called to consider the Congo crisis. On that date, on a motion sponsored by 17 African and Asian countries, the Secretary-General received a vote of 70 to 0 in support of the policy he had been following in the Congo. The Soviet delegation had done everything it could to turn the General Assembly into the opposite course. Only the day before it had introduced a draft resolution holding the Secretary-General guilty of violating Security Council directives in

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the Congo and specifically of removing the legitimate Congolese government and Parliament. But the strong African and Asian support which he had at this point induced the Soviets to withdraw their own resolution; and in the end they decided it would not be politic to vote against the other one, and simply abstained.

Only two months later the situation had been reversed by the growing African fear that Belgium was seeking to regain control of the Congo and that U.N. operations were favoring this result. Some 20,000 Belgians had stayed in the country despite the terror which followed the revolt of the Congolese National Army. Later an estimated 3,000 returned. Many Belgian technicians were retained in their previous jobs, often because only they could keep necessary public services running. In Katanga, Belgians were prominent as advisers to Mr. Tschombé in his self-styled independent government and in the Katanga military and police. Others—estimated at 1,200—were active in the entourage of President Kasavubu and in government services in and around Leopoldville (in the past, those services had been staffed by about 4,500 Belgian officials and technicians).

The U.N. resolutions under which Secretary-General Hammarskjold was acting in the Congo stipulated that he must show strict neutrality as between Congolese politicians and factions, and at the start the African states had favored this policy. But many of them came to feel that what they had favored in principle worked in practice against ex-Premier Lumumba, who had more and more become a symbol in their eyes of extreme nationalism and, in distinction from President Kasavubu, of resistance to the former colonial power. In retrospect they regretted the U.N. recognition of President Kasavubu and blamed it on American influence. They particularly resented the Secretary-General's decision that U.N. forces could not be used to put down the Katanga secessionists. (Before long, Messrs. Kasavubu and Tschombé also would be complaining about Mr. Hammarskjold's bias—on the opposite side, of course.) Radical African leaders who had ulterior purposes may also have thought that Mr. Lumumba would be accessible to their influence and would join with them in building an African power bloc. Little by little a number of African and Asian states turned against Mr. Hammarskjold and against the Western powers who were sticking by the agreement not to send aid to the Congo except through the United Nations.

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The extent of the shift in African and Asian opinion became clear on December 20, just before the General Assembly adjourned. An effort had been made in the Security Council to secure approval of the U.N. course in the Congo, but the Soviet Union had intervened with a veto. In the General Assembly two rival resolutions were introduced. One, sponsored by India, Jugoslavia and six other states, and backed by the Soviet Union, called among other things for the liberation of former Premier Lumumba and all other political prisoners and the neutralization of Colonel Mobutu's armed forces. It withheld any approval of Secretary-General Hammarskjold's past policy or any authorization for him to continue it. The other resolution, introduced by the United States and Britain, called on President Kasavubu to summon a round-table conference of Congolese leaders with a view to reconvening Parliament; and it contained instructions for the Secretary-General to continue to discharge the mandate given him earlier by the Security Council and the Assembly. Neither motion secured the necessary two-thirds support of the members present and voting. The Indian-Jugoslav resolution had 28 favorable votes and 42 against, with 27 delegations abstaining and 2 absent. The Western resolution had 43 favorable votes and 22 against, with 32 abstaining and 2 absent. In each case, the opposition votes were enough in view of the abstentions to block adoption of the motion. If the 20 African and Asian nations that were among those abstaining on the Indian-Jugoslav resolution had voted for it, it would have been adopted. If only one of the 32 nations that abstained on the U.S.-British resolution (they included France and Portugal) had voted for it, it would have been adopted.

Secretary-General Hammarskjold deplored what he called the "dual failure" of the Security Council and the General Assembly to give him the necessary new directives. He said firmly: "Naturally, the operation will be continued under the previous decisions." But he can have had no doubt as to the portent of the December 20 vote, especially in light of the violent offensive launched against him and his office by Mr. Khrushchev. Not only would he face the unremitting hostility of the Soviet bloc; from now on it was doubtful that a majority of the Africans and Asians in the General Assembly would make common cause with the Western nations when they went to his defense and the defense of his office.

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The split in the General Assembly did more than damage Mr. Hammarskjold's personal position; it was a blow to the efficiency of the operations themselves, for it diminished the authority of his representatives on the spot and gave warning that whatever they did by his orders might be repudiated later—certainly would be if Moscow could manage it. It also whetted the appetite of various African leaders who thought that by favoring the Congolese extremists they could spread their fame and influence throughout the continent; and it encouraged the Soviets to increase their unilateral intervention, hoping that if the United Nations undertaking failed spectacularly they could exploit the even more ferocious personal, tribal and provincial struggles which would certainly follow.

In January, while a U.N. Conciliation Commission with Jaja Wachuko of Nigeria as Chairman was at work in the Congo, the heads of five purportedly unaligned African states—Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and U.A.R.—met in Casablanca and announced their intention of pulling out their contingents from the U.N. Congo force. Indonesia had already shown the way on December 13 by stating that its troops would be withdrawn. The withdrawals announced at Casablanca would reduce U.N. effectives to some 14,000—to maintain order in an area one-quarter the size of the United States. Did some of the Casablanca leaders imagine that by bringing things to a head in the Congo they would open the way for African states, their own not laggard among them, to take over the whole Congo situation? Whatever the motives, the withdrawal of African contingents promised to increase the anarchy in the Congo, with the Soviet Union as ultimate beneficiary.

The killing of Patrice Lumumba, announced from Katanga on February 13, was the signal for the Soviet Union to withdraw its "recognition" of Secretary-General Hammarskjold and label him an "assassin." It already had refused to recognize the government of President Kasavubu and instead had recognized the Lumumba régime in Stanleyville; now it transferred its recognition to Mr. Lumumba's deputy, Antoine Gizenga, and promised him "all possible assistance and support." The United Arab Republic also accepted the Stanleyville régime and was followed by Communist East Germany, Jugoslavia, Ghana and others.

Within a few days, however, there were indications that African sentiment did not unanimously favor a course leading so

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obviously to civil war, with Africa's deeper involvement in the cold war to follow. The U.N. Conciliation Commission headed by Mr. Wachuku, of Nigeria, which had been conducting an investigation in the Congo for six weeks, now cabled from Leopoldville "certain principal conclusions." These all opposed what the Soviet Union and fellow-travelling states had been aiming to accomplish. Among its recommendations were that the newly-formed Provisional Government of Prime Minister Ileo should be the basis for a broadened government of national unity; that the Congolese National Army should be insulated from politics and reorganized under the authority of the central government; that a "summit meeting" of political leaders should be convened at a neutral place; that the aim should be a federal system as the only form of government able to preserve national unity and territorial integrity; that political prisoners should be released and a general amnesty granted; and that Parliament should be reconvened either at once or after the above steps had been taken.

Meanwhile the debate in the Security Council reached if not a climax a pause in the early morning of February 21, when two significant things happened, one negative, one positive. The Council defeated a Soviet resolution to oust Secretary-General Hammarskjold, repudiate his policy in the Congo and order the withdrawal of U.N. forces within 30 days. The vote was eight against, with the lone Soviet vote in favor, and with two abstentions (significantly the United Arab Republic and Ceylon). And it adopted a resolution by Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic affirming previous Council and General Assembly resolutions under which the Secretary-General had been acting, urging the United Nations to take appropriate measures to prevent civil war in the Congo, including "the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort," and asking the immediate withdrawal "of all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and advisers not under the United Nations command, and mercenaries." The vote here was 9 to 0, with the Soviet Union and France abstaining.

Thus one of Ambassador Stevenson's first important votes found the United States delegation lined up with the African and Asian group while the Soviet Union stood apart. Another resolution adopted urged the convening of Parliament, the reorganization of Congolese armed units and the coöperation of members in implementing these objectives. Mr. Hammarskjold said that while

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these actions gave him "a stronger and more clear framework for U.N. action" they also increased U.N. duties. He was certain, he added, that the states which favored the Security Council's action, many of which had troops in the Congo, would realize the necessity of strengthening the U.N. force "by further generous contributions." India, Malaya and others had already signified they might help. It seemed that on this occasion the Soviet Union had overplayed its hand.

Without losing a day Mr. Khrushchev returned to the attack. In a letter to Prime Minister Nehru and others he proposed that an all-African commission take over in the Congo, in coöperation with the "legitimate" Gizenga government in Stanleyville. This went a recent proposal by President Nkrumah one better, for the Ghana leader's suggestion had been simply to place the Asian and African forces in the Congo under an all-African U.N. command. Mr. Khrushchev meant to rule the U.N. out of the Congo entirely. Just how the commission was to finance and munition its troops was not clear. Would the money and supplies come from the Soviet Union? The Soviets have refused to contribute a ruble toward the cost of the Congo operation, which has been borne by the other U.N. members, chiefly, it must be said, by the United States. They also have refused to share in the cost of the two other main U.N. undertakings—care of the Arab refugees from Palestine and maintenance of the U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East. Together the costs of the three undertakings amount to several times the normal U.N. budget. The refusal of the Soviet Union to pay its share saves its money. More important in its eyes, it enables Soviet propagandists to argue that the operations themselves are "imperialist plots." The proof? Simply that the "imperialists" have been left to pay for them.

It remains to be seen, as these lines are written, what the effect of this manœuvring might be. Recent events had shocked many hitherto uncertain Asian and African states into a new sense of responsibility. How much of it would carry over into the General Assembly? Would it prevent the Soviets from putting together a large enough group of unaligned states to hold up the work of the United Nations to the point where Mr. Hammarskjold might feel impelled to resign? In earlier U.N. crises he had been willing to take on responsibilities which stronger collective shoulders should have been prepared to bear, but were not. In carrying them out he had often been subjected to criticism. But not even

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Britain or France at the time of Suez had said he was animated by prejudice. Now the Soviets had been so outraged by his impartiality in the Congo crisis that they promised to destroy both him and his office. He himself said he was conscious of having made some errors of judgment; perhaps they have been magnified in retrospect, but they did cause some of his losses of African support. How much following would the Soviets now be able to drum up in the attempt to sweep him out of their path? They were not able on September 20 of last year to get the General Assembly to repudiate him, but with the aid of unaligned states they prevented the formation of a majority to approve him. They failed in the effort to have the Security Council censor him on February 21, and instead saw it confirm its earlier instructions to him. Certainly the attack on him, and through him on the United Nations, will continue—in this session of the General Assembly, and if turned back there, in the General Assembly next fall, and relentlessly thereafter. For the moment, the omens are in his favor. While the Soviet Union tries, and tries again, he is not likely to give way in dismay. His future is now bound up with the future of the organization he serves, and for its sake he will not fail to fight.

V

All the problems touched on in these pages face the United States delegation in one form or another at this moment, or will do so before the end of the year. Some raise questions of principle, some of tactics, some of both. Where the integrity of the United Nations is at stake its position will undoubtedly be stonily firm. Where questions of general policy are involved its attitude may succeed in being less doctrinaire than it sometimes has seemed in the past.

On colonial issues, for example, the United States may take fresh account of the fact that by virtue of the speed with which former colonial empires have been disintegrating, and because of the volume of new admissions to the United Nations, the issues that remain cannot be viewed solely within the framework of traditional political relationships. The world-wide impulse toward independence for everyone, ready or not, has gained such momentum that though it may be influenced by arguments of reason, and assisted by prompt material aid for new nations as they emerge on the international scene, it cannot be thwarted except

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by incurring greater risks than those involved in accepting it and working with it. We have every duty to advise delay when a rush toward unprepared independence is going to result in chaos and suffering for the people concerned or the establishment of a new form of colonial domination, or first one and then the other. But in viewing the issue of colonialism as such, that is, in general terms, we should be able to put ourselves on the side of independence more clearly than we have done so far. The temptation to let our sentiment and our traditions determine our action was very strong, one hears, at the time the Declaration on Colonialism was coming up to a vote in the General Assembly last December. The Soviet Union had proposed a Declaration of its own, couched in extravagant terms; and it offered two amendments to the Declaration as adopted that would have set an immediate deadline for the fulfillment of the most extravagant hopes, besides raising innumerable difficulties in execution that could not have been solved and were not intended to be. The Soviet Union lost on both points. But when the United States abstained, the sting of the Soviet defeat was removed. What the African and Asian world remembered was that on the general anti-colonialist issue the United States had not supported them. The objections to certain passages in the text were not insignificant; but in retrospect we see that the purport of the Declaration was more significant than individual phrases.

In several matters of less scope but hardly less consequence the United States position should be unyielding. It must use all its resources to defeat the Soviet effort to replace the Secretary-General by a three-man directorate or to destroy his effectiveness by encumbering him with an Advisory Committee. It must continue to press for giving the Asian and African states adequate representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. If its proposal to enlarge the Councils to match the growing membership of the United Nations is adopted, the Soviet delegation, if it is as good as its word, will have the happy task of slapping down the hopes of the nations which it has been cultivating so assiduously.

Mr. Khrushchev coupled his demand to abolish the Secretary-Generalship with complaints that the Soviet Union, like many of the new states in Asia and Africa, was inadequately represented in the Secretariat. His protest was based on the undisputed fact that the number of Soviet officials having professional rank is not

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proportionate to the Soviet financial contribution to the organization. The stipulations that must guide the Secretary-General in selecting his staff are laid down in the Charter; his "paramount consideration" shall be to secure a staff with "the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity," and he also shall pay "due regard" to recruiting it "on as wide a geographical basis as possible." Mr. Hammarskjold has faced a difficulty in observing the stipulated "paramount consideration" when he has tried to enlist citizens of Communist countries. A Communist is by definition devoted exclusively to the interests of the Communist Party and the government which the Party controls; that is, he is precluded from becoming what the United Nations needs and wants, a true international civil servant. The difficulty has been increased by the Soviet Government's insistence that when the Secretary-General wishes to recruit Russian citizens he must simply accept the candidates which it names. Evidently the Secretary-General must continue his effort to solve this problem. The United States should support him in refusing to accept arbitrarily nominated candidates, dedicated to serving national aims that conflict with the international aims of the United Nations.

The Secretary-General has had less trouble, of course, in recruiting qualified officials in Asian countries where there is a civil service tradition. Three or four Indians, as well as Iranians, Burmese and others, fill high U.N. posts in New York and in the field with high distinction. The number of Asian countries supplying U.N. personnel must nevertheless be increased, not to lessen Asian support for Soviet proposals but because it is fair and proper in itself, and indeed overdue. The Secretary-General is known to want to appoint a qualified African as Under-Secretary if one can be found who is not so desperately needed at home that his government can spare him. In these projects he is sure of American support.

To work seriously and successfully through the United Nations we must not expect that the majority will always be on our side. But whenever possible we must have a side for the majority to be on. In his first press conference, Secretary of State Rusk said, apropos of the Congo: "It would not be correct to say that we have proposed an American plan. What is needed is a United Nations plan. . . ." He very likely was right not to reveal the existence of an American plan at that moment. But as a general rule the emphasis should be in the opposite sense. More specific

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U.S. policies have been needed in the U.N. in the past, and will always be needed if we are to show the way and win majority support. Most of all, of course, we want to have the majority on our side on important issues. As a matter of pure tactics, we should avoid making every issue seem important to us. Where we have no direct stake we can afford to be relaxed and let events take their course. The less we engage our prestige on secondary issues, and the less we ask our friends to engage theirs, the fewer will be the occasions when we may be defeated and the more support we shall have when we need it and set out in earnest to rally it. It is not at all impossible to build majorities in the General Assembly if we follow this pattern and take time to negotiate painstakingly for acceptable compromises. It is harder to do so successfully than it was before a nucleus of the supposedly unaligned states became habitual supporters of the Soviet view. But the attempt must be made and persevered in.

Dynamism is a key element in successful parliamentary manœuvring. An example of when the American delegation should have seized the initiative was the moment following President Eisenhower's speech in the General Assembly proposing increased aid for underdeveloped countries. The proposals were not presented in detail; but that was all the more reason why they should have been "worked up" and put forward for debate. The United States delegation never made any attempt to do so. It was a pity, for the sake of the proposals themselves and because the Soviets would have been hard put to oppose them without alienating the Asians and Africans.

Successful leadership is not domineering. Its keys are consultation and persuasion. In the past the American delegation has sometimes been criticized for failing to consult fully with allies and neutrals. Often the fault has been in the White House or the State Department, where decisions were delayed and instructions withheld till the eleventh hour. The delegation then had no time to explain the American position at length, and the requests for support which it hastily sent out were so urgent that they sounded peremptory and as though they took the recipient's vote for granted. That is not leadership.

In the best sense, moreover, leadership is not provided just in formal speeches and committee debates or in lobbying for votes in the corridors; it is exercised by all the members of a delegation, informally and in a friendly spirit, inside and outside U.N. head-

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quarters. Congress has made such parsimonious provision for American delegation members that it has foreclosed any really adequate performance of the hospitality functions which the United States as the host country might be expected to fulfill naturally and gladly. Social activities may not seem worth mentioning in the present context; in all earnestness, they deserve to receive much more attention than they have in the past, especially since many delegates who find themselves in strange surroundings will be as grateful for friendship and guidance as they will resent being ignored, particularly if they have reasons to imagine that this may be because of their color.

The over-all American performance in U.N. committees will depend not on the competence of the Permanent Mission alone, but on the quality of the delegations appointed each autumn to the General Assemblies. In recent years, some members of these annual delegations were wholly inexperienced in the sort of tasks they were invited to undertake. Race, color, religion, sex and party do not, by themselves, constitute qualifications for helping the Permanent Representative and his associates negotiate on some of the most difficult and important problems in the world.

VI

President Eisenhower opened a new discussion of neutrality on June 6, 1956, when he remarked in a press conference that a nation has the right to be neutral and that a decision to keep clear of military alliances may in some circumstances even be prudent. Not long thereafter the State Department came to accept the thesis that present-day neutrality is something different from what the term had traditionally meant in textbooks of international law, that it is a political expedient, that (as the present writer once wrote in these pages) "it is a jumble of wishful, hopeful, opportunistic but not necessarily unfriendly propositions." It became established policy in Washington that provided neutrality was not in fact unfriendly, provided, that is, it was practiced sincerely, it was enough that a neutral nation was not militarily aligned against the United States for it to have American friendship and qualify for American aid.

We are now entering a new period of international negotiation. The political and psychological aspects of the world's major problems, including disarmament itself, are more important than those that are strictly military. When each principal antagonist

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can destroy the other, and be destroyed, the relatively small additions of military strength which a neutralist nation might bring to one side or the other cannot be decisive; what matters is its political weight in the world forum where its vote counts equally with the vote of any of the larger powers. Perhaps the United States will not be able to continue accepting indefinitely the statement of certain nations that their neutrality is simonpure simply because in a formal sense they are militarily unaligned. Not long ago Mr. Nasser boasted that the last 14 votes cast by the United Arab Republic in the United Nations had all been with the Soviet Union and "not once with the Americans." Does the boast sound like that of a sincerely "uncommitted" leader of a sincerely "unaligned" nation? To be 100 percent pro-Soviet in foreign policy and 100 percent anti-Communist in domestic policy does not equal neutrality.

The United States has counted on the United Nations as the chief instrumentality existing in the world (apart from its own military strength and that of its allies) to deter aggression. It has hoped that by acting to settle disputes in different parts of the world the United Nations would lessen the chance that the United States might become involved in them directly, and it considered this a substantial contribution not only to world peace but to American security. If the political weight of a growing number of nations were to be almost automatically thrown against American efforts to keep the United Nations in effective operation, this would be seriously damaging to the American interest. Their votes might delay or defeat resolute action by the General Assembly in a moment of extreme danger; and more immediately they would be assisting those members of the United Nations which are out to weaken or destroy it. Because of the political balance which the unaligned states hold in the United Nations their actions there become a principal criterion by which the United States must judge whether the neutrality of each one of them is sincere. It has no right to expect more from them than independence of mind on the issues of the day; it will find it increasingly hard to accept what consistently seems to be less.

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GOALS AND MEANS OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE

By Heinrich von Brentano

PRESIDENT Kennedy in his impressive State-of-the-Union message to Congress frankly expressed his concern about the present situation of the Western alliance system and, in particular, of NATO. We, too, are moved by the same anxieties, and so are the other allies of the United States in Europe. We should therefore reflect and consider in common where the mistakes lie and how they can be remedied. We must not shrink from criticism, even if it is painful; we cannot ignore any demands, even if they concern some of us directly.

I shall refrain from outlining the familiar facts about the origin and development of NATO. I would only recall that the Soviet Union in the years preceding the foundation of NATO forcibly brought more than a hundred million people in Europe under the sway of Communism and absorbed about 600,000 square miles of territory into its sphere of power. Its latest attempt to continue this policy of expansion in Europe began with the Berlin blockade which came to an end almost simultaneously with the establishment of NATO. I believe that the attitude of the Soviet Union to Berlin now and in the near future will be an index of its assessment of the solidarity and capacity for resistance of the Western world.

There is no doubt that the economic and military power of the Soviet bloc has been steadily increasing in the past 12 years. In 1949 the Soviet Union's atomic armament was still in its infancy, whereas that of the United States was already well advanced. Today various signs indicate that the Soviets are equal to the United States in some spheres of nuclear armament and rocket development. The same applies in many other spheres of armament—we need, for example, think only of the Red submarine fleet. This increase in military strength is coupled with a considerable development of the Soviet Union's economy, a development which has been enhanced by the integration of the economies of the satellite states into the Soviet system. On this basis there has been a steadily growing self-assurance on the part of the Soviets and this, in turn, has led to a world-wide political activity and expansion. It is not yet possible to judge whether

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the rise of Chinese Communism will affect the build-up of the Soviet position of power advantageously or adversely. It may be that serious tensions exist between the Soviet Union and Red China, perhaps ultimately rooted in conflicting ideological trends. These differences may affect the future attitude of the Soviet Union towards the Western world. But I think it would be dangerous and premature to record these possible tensions and differences at present as credit items for Western policy.

On the Western side the picture is not so clear. In the economic sector the past 12 years have without doubt led to a significant rise and recovery. Appreciable defense efforts have produced a certain feeling of security. Thanks not least to American help, the free part of Europe has acquired a vitality which is of considerable weight in the over-all potential of the free world. But do not let us deceive ourselves: the equilibrium so laboriously maintained up to now between East and West may change at any time to the disadvantage of the West. The so-called non-committed world, the emerging peoples of Africa and Asia, are vacillating. In their quest for independence they are apt to overlook the real dangers threatening their freedom in the future. And even the free states of the world are in danger of subordinating their security to the maintenance and improvement of living standards and of forgetting that social welfare alone cannot resist political and military pressure supported by superior atomic missiles. This holds good not only for security but also for science and technology. The achievements of American and European scientists in the past hundred years were brilliant and unique; but this would soon become a futile recollection if technical developments in the West were now to lag behind those in the Soviet empire.

That is the position we are in at present. What is NATO's part in this set-up? Has NATO failed? Or can it contribute to the solution of the problems confronting us?

Let us take a look at the Treaty of Washington which is NATO's constituent instrument and constitution. Only the first five articles of this brief and impressive document are of essential importance. Only one of them, namely Article 5, deals with the obligation to furnish military assistance. Articles 1 to 4, on the other hand, contain far-reaching commitments mainly of a political or economic nature which are regarded by the public at large—if known to it at all—as at most political trimming. Even

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in informed quarters, including our governments, NATO is frequently looked upon as a merely military alliance which owes its special importance perhaps to the extent of the danger threatening us, but which, apart from that, is no different from any other military coalition. And therein lies an error to which many a mistake, many a failure in recent years, may be traced. Anyone who regards the strongest link uniting the West as nothing more than a military alliance is easily inclined to regard the problems of the world today merely, or largely, from the angle of military security. And, paradoxically enough, this way of looking at things harbors a grave danger precisely for military vigilance and defense preparedness. Whenever the opponent alters his tactics, temporarily suspends the military threat, and operates publicly with apparent pliancy and readiness to compromise, the military danger recedes from the popular consciousness, and there is a noticeable tendency to neglect defense efforts. Visible signs of this dangerous development are the efforts to restrict national defense budgets and curtail the duration of military service.

The one-sided picture of NATO as a military defense alliance also contains the danger that the military authorities and their purely military demands may gain a predominant influence on politics. And this touches the very core of the Western world. For us, politics can never be a function of military thought, but must be the responsible organization of all the vital forces in the nation, a task to which defense must be clearly subordinated.

An alliance such as NATO, to which such comprehensive and far-reaching tasks and aims have been entrusted in the preamble as well as in the individual articles of the Treaty, cannot and must not be confined solely to the military sector, to the more passive work of organizing defense: it must regard as its main function the active shaping of a better future. Every decision, every measure we prepare or take, should aim at contributing to a peaceful order both at present and as desired for the future. Seen in this light, the tasks imposed on us by the cold war fall into their logical position and assume their right proportions, as do also any military and other measures serving to deter or, if need be, to wage a hot war. The purpose of these measures is to secure the present peaceful order and keep the way open for achieving a still better order.

In spite of the strong emphasis on NATO's military function,

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it cannot be said, unfortunately, that NATO's military strength is adequate. Gone is the early momentum which was due not least to the shock of the glaring Communist aggression in Korea, and which culminated in the military decisions of the NATO Council at Lisbon in February 1952. People do not like to be kept in a state of constant over-all strain. Elections and internal political struggles take their toll. All that is part of the concomitants, known to us all, of the democratic way of life, which in our view is the only form of government capable of preserving man's freedom and, therefore, the only form of government offering any prospect of lasting stability. But as the motto of the integrated headquarters of the European NATO forces says, "Vigilia pretium liberatis"—the price of freedom is vigilance—and vigilance demands a considerable measure of discipline, restrictions and even sacrifices for freedom. Inhibitions are therefore all too understandable. Nevertheless, we must demand such sacrifices from our peoples, our parliaments, our states. Just as the individual must fit himself into his family, so must governments and states in the interest of preserving their independence consciously recognize a certain interdependence.

The danger of war can be reduced without any loss of freedom only if we are at least as strong as our potential opponent. Today this means more than an adequate proportion of divisions or cannon. The brains behind the conduct of war, *i.e.* political leadership, are today at least as important as physical armaments. We are faced by a politically fanatical opponent who manipulates his instruments of military power with an iron hand and with a uniform, concentrated power of command. We are 15 free states with 15 independent armed forces. Each state has, in turn, its internal and external tasks and problems requiring the services of those forces. Only a part of those forces are at the disposal of NATO. All of this may be politically understandable and inevitable. But it is far from rational that the armed forces at the disposal of NATO are not all under one supreme commander invested with clear-cut authority.

We have four different command areas (Europe, the Atlantic, the Channel, Canada/U.S.A.) the commanders of which are not subordinate to one single supreme commander but to a committee, the Military Committee, to which another committee, the Standing Group, is superior, subordinate or equal in questions of military planning, but not in questions of command. And all

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these bodies are theoretically subordinate to the political guidance of the NATO Council which would scarcely be capable of action in an emergency, since the permanent members, the NATO ambassadors, are dependent on instructions from their respective capitals. The said commanders, *e.g.* General Norstad for Europe, have no power of command whatsoever over the armed forces of the Alliance in time of peace, and but a limited power of command in time of war. A British battalion cannot even be transferred from North Germany to South Germany; this is due not only to lack of power of command but also to the fact that logistics lie within the sphere of national competency. That is, the equipment, weapons, vehicles, spare parts, ammunition, etc., stored in South Germany are suitable for the United States units but not for the German, British or French units under the same commander.

The longest distance between the Iron Curtain and the Atlantic Ocean is 500 miles. It can be covered by modern bombers in a few minutes. Yet, that narrow area is still subdivided into several air-defense zones under different commands, simply because national sensibilities have not permitted any other solution so far.

I have mentioned but two examples from a long list of deficiencies in the Organization. I do not intend to set forth the military problems in detail, but am only concerned with the political problem, namely, that our policy of deterrence cannot be very convincing or effective as long as we prepare and organize our defenses all too inadequately.

We have been all the more gratified, therefore, by the new conception of setting up a uniform NATO atomic force as proposed to the NATO Council in December last year by the United States Government as part of long-term planning. This would at last be a step towards creating a concentrated NATO power of command—or an integrated NATO force, if I may be permitted a frequently misused expression which I have so far purposely avoided. No final decisions have been made as yet. There are many grave problems to be solved first, perhaps not least in the field of United States legislation. The inescapable question of a reorganization of the command structure raises difficult political and military problems. It will be our task in the near future to solve them. One of these problems concerns the increase of European co-determination in the field of atomic defense. But we

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have to understand quite clearly that the answer to that question has to take account of one imperative necessity: it must under no circumstances lead to a weakening of NATO's military strength.

II

Let us now turn from the theoretical military battlefield to the very real battlefield of the cold war. Here a dramatic battle of truly historic significance is being fought between the two blocs representing antagonistic ideologies, one of them aggressive, expansionist and missionary—a struggle for men's souls and for the shaping of the national systems of all those territories which have not yet taken a definite stand or do not want to do so at all.

While we of the West can contemplate only defense in the military sphere, we should definitely take the initiative in the cold war. We shall not make any progress toward a better order in the world and the realization of our ideals if we seek illusive security behind a political Maginot Line and are content to await the enemy's attacks and only to react instead of acting.

We are indeed fighting in a good cause. Why do we always seem to be ashamed of it? Are not our ideas of freedom and justice and peace and prosperity noble and convincing? For more than two thousand years, many have suffered and died for those ideals. Are we no longer able to convey them to others? We should not be so proud as to consider political propaganda beneath our dignity. If the citizens of a newly created state are taken in by the most primitive Soviet propaganda and act accordingly, all our fine education is of no avail, and that state takes its stand with World Communism against the West. The members of NATO have to this day been unable to agree on any concerted action in a field which for want of a better term is called "psychological warfare," and this in spite of the fact that we would have the advantage of being able to make propaganda based on truth and reality without resorting—as the Communists must—to lies and slander. The makers of the North Atlantic Treaty were fully aware of that task when stipulating in Article 2 that the member States "will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions" and "by bringing about *a better understanding* of the principles upon which these institutions are founded."

It is in this light that we also have to look at one particular

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aspect of our relations with the less developed or, as we call them, the developing countries. It is certainly not incumbent on NATO to carry out joint actions in such countries. But it is definitely one of the urgent and typical tasks of our Alliance to subject to joint consideration every measure which seems likely to forestall Soviet activity and help the peoples in those developing countries to achieve and preserve true freedom.

This brings us to the question of political consultation, an obligation accepted by all but fulfilled consistently by only a few. Article 4 of the NATO Treaty lays down unequivocally that "the Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened." This text is both so clear and so comprehensive that practically all political questions of world-wide importance ought to be the subject of consultation within the NATO Council. And yet it happens again and again either that questions of vital importance to the West are not discussed within NATO at all, or that in spite of consultation, differences between NATO partners remain unbridgeable. It is no use tinkering with methods and trying, for instance, to introduce a binding obligation to consult. We are faced here with a dilemma which may be due to the fact that the actions and policies of a nation, a state, can in the last resort be determined only by its own innate forces which sometimes are intelligible to that nation alone and which, though certainly influenced by individual and collective decisions, have their roots in the national life of the people concerned. The subjective limit of loyalty to an alliance seems to be reached as soon as a nation feels that vital interests of its own are at stake; and this is particularly dangerous in the case of NATO, as that alliance is meant to secure the existence of us all. It is a matter of political wisdom not to formulate or construe agreements in so inflexible a manner that this limit will be reached or even drawn. Such political wisdom has been applied by the men who drafted the North Atlantic Treaty. We should not, in too perfectionist a mood, expect our allies to do more than they—or we—are able and willing to grant.

Awareness of the limitations of our Alliance may make it easier for us to find the place that NATO might occupy in the future system of peace that we are striving for. I am thinking, first, of the shaping of the free world, *i.e.* of the internal system of the West, and secondly of the future of the world in general.

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III

As regards the internal Western system, NATO is to us a wall protecting us from hostile interference so that we may shape and organize our internal situation according to our own ideas. We have not yet found a final pattern; indeed, we may never find one, but we should never tire of seeking better solutions. However, there have been a number of successes and results that may encourage us to continue on the road we have followed so far. In saying this I have in mind, among other things, certain developments in the Federal Republic of Germany. After the complete collapse of the ignominious Third Reich we have succeeded in establishing in Germany a solid democratic system. That was possible only because the free world was ready to admit Germany to the community of free nations, thus clearing the road for reconstruction by the German people. Today our Federal Republic is an integral part of the free world, and the German people are determined to strengthen that link and never again to let it give way. That there is an evil spirit of intolerance and injustice in the other part of Germany, that concentration camps still exist there, is, God knows, not the fault of the Germans. The régime there is instituted and maintained solely by the Soviet Union.

I am also thinking of the fundamentally new relations of friendship uniting the Germans and the French after centuries of feuds—a relationship that is based equally on feelings, rational considerations and conviction.

Let me mention also the bold idea of a supranational community which constitutes a first attempt at transforming and perhaps overcoming the ancient concept of the nation-state by introducing new and superior institutional forms of relationship between different peoples. The Schuman Plan, the Common Market and Euratom may not be perfect solutions, but they may constitute a solid foundation on which to erect the structure of a political community. In my view the contrast between the "Six" and the "Seven" that causes Americans and Europeans so much concern at present is not a proof of failure but a challenge to advance towards a closer union by means of new solutions. We are firmly convinced that the O.E.C.D. which has just been created will also serve this objective. In the final analysis all these endeavors are nothing but an attempt to give organizational form to an existing spiritual, political and economic reality.

As I have said, NATO in my view is not necessarily an element

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of the internal system of the West but rather a guardian to safeguard its undisturbed development. All the greater, on that account, is NATO's importance as a stabilizing factor in the endeavor of the free nations to shape the future of the world in general. In the Preamble to the North Atlantic Pact the following is laid down:

> The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments.
>
> They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. . . .
>
> They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

NATO's point of departure, therefore, is an avowal of faith in the United Nations. From the very first, the founders of NATO stated clearly that NATO was created in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and would be active only within that framework. This condition, by the way, was also given due consideration by the Federal Republic of Germany. Contrary to the wishes of its people and government, our Federal Republic is not a member of the United Nations; yet on its accession to the North Atlantic Treaty it solemnly declared its readiness to conduct its policy in conformity with the principles laid down in the United Nations Charter and to undertake the obligation contained in Article 2 of that Charter.

Some day when all the nations have made the Charter of the United Nations the basis of their policy, NATO may become superfluous; but at the present stage the United Nations urgently needs NATO and the balance of power it creates in opposition to the system that, as President Kennedy has stated, desires to make the United Nations an arena for the cold war.

However, the common attitude of NATO partners towards the United Nations is, as regards the political reality, not identical with a uniform attitude within the United Nations, where differences exist and have frequently been expressed. There are clashes of opinion not only between individual NATO states but also within these states. The divergent views about the future of colonial regions which have acquired freedom and independence are a typical example. Nobody will deny the fundamental claim which all peoples have to self-determination and freedom. But in

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political practice that claim is bound up with the necessity to safeguard the freedom of those peoples. We would fail to do justice to our responsibilities towards the emergent nations if we allowed them to pass from a state of misunderstood freedom into the total slavery of Communism. The fate meted out to the peoples in Eastern and Central Europe shows that Communism is, in fact, an atrocious form of neo-colonialism. Similar problems are presented by the question of what attitude we should take towards those European states still under Soviet domination.

Thus, in the end, it all leads up to the problem of the possibilities and limitations of political consultation. With all due recognition of the momentous factors governing the political views of individual member states, we simply cannot afford to be disunited. An argument that is not supported by other nations is of no use. We would do well in this case to support a view that, while perhaps not in complete conformity with our own view, points in the right direction and has prospects of being accepted. I have the impression that Western states sometimes oppose their allies more rigidly than they oppose their opponents. I think it would be a wiser policy to confront the opponent with a unanimous view even if unanimity has to be reached by means of a compromise with a friend.

No matter whether future summit conferences or other East-West negotiations are being considered or whether disarmament or United Nations problems are being discussed, the West will have to realize more clearly than before the danger inherent in its disunity. Every one of us should abstain from carrying his point to the last extremity if such a renunciation would make it possible to achieve the unity of the free world. We should be prepared at least to listen to the arguments of our friend; the arguments of the opponent we will have to face anyway. Therefore, we should not hesitate in NATO to bring forward for consultation particularly those questions on which we have to expect opposition and criticism.

Although we acknowledge the democratic principle of the equality of all members, which also is applicable in international organizations, it is nevertheless a fact that the Soviet Union recognizes only one power as being of equal rank to it, namely, the United States of America. That fact burdens the United States with a particular responsibility, but it also entitles it to an exceptional position among its allies. I do not suppose that

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this is denied by any of them. This circumstance entitles the United States to demand that its allies make the same sacrifices and efforts it is prepared to make itself. NATO certainly is not a club for the defense of Europe by the United States but rather an emergency community based on reciprocity. Throughout the years past we have seen impressive evidence of American assistance and loyalty to the alliance, which, of course, reflected at the same time a sound assessment of the American national interest—the Marshall Plan, the undertaking to station American forces in Europe, and, more recently, the declaration of the readiness of the United States to maintain American atomic weapons on the Continent as long as NATO is in force.

In April 1949, the former Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson, gave a clear definition of the term "mutual assistance" which might well be accepted by the other partners of the alliance. He said: "Article 3 [of the North Atlantic Treaty] does not bind the United States to the proposed military assistance program nor indeed to any program. It does bind the United States to the principle of self-help and mutual aid. Within this principle, each Party to the Pact must exercise its own honest judgment as to what it can and should do to develop and maintain its own capacity to resist and to help others." It is in this spirit that during the past months the German Federal Government has investigated in what way it could best contribute to aiding the United States to overcome its balance of payments difficulties.

Speaking in New York in 1955, I pointed out that "the Soviet version of détente policy has the attractiveness of all comfortable or, I dare say, all faint-hearted ideas." And I continued: "I think that, should the free world be so faint-hearted as to fall in with the Soviet plans, we would very soon enter a period of disintegration of the free world, and the efforts we shall finally have to make in order to safeguard our own vital rights will be many times greater than the efforts required at present to attain our objectives."

I fear that the situation is actually worse today than it was at that time, and that we all share in the responsibility for it. Great efforts are required of every one of us. We expect the United States to go ahead of us, not as a protecting shield behind which we can enjoy an easy life, but as the leader of a community of free nations which are eager to secure to coming generations a decent life in peace and freedom.

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IV

I shall now try to sum up my ideas in a few propositions.

1. NATO was founded as an answer to a distinct political and military threat; particularly the events in Prague and the Berlin blockade made the menace visible in its full significance. Perhaps the free world was only then becoming fully aware of what had previously happened in Poland, in Rumania, in Bulgaria and in Hungary.

2. The political and military threat to the free world has not diminished. The interpretation given by the Soviet Union to the concept of coexistence, too, shows that Moscow has not abandoned its aim of achieving world revolution. On the contrary, one is forced to conclude that the danger has increased. The military strength of the Soviet Union has increased many times over since 1949. In addition to the European "theatre of war," we now have, in Asia, Korea, Laos and Tibet; in Africa, the Congo; in Latin America, Cuba (to mention only a few examples).

3. NATO has proved its worth. The increasing strength of NATO has stopped the advance of Communism at least in Europe. Communism has ceased to make any progress in the area covered by NATO.

4. NATO will be able to do justice to its future task only if it is possible at least to maintain the balance in weapons technology. This requires unremitting and additional armaments efforts by the NATO partners.

5. The solidarity of the Communist bloc calls for a similar solidarity within NATO. Although NATO is based on voluntary coöperation between sovereign states, the armed forces of the Alliance will, in view of technical developments, be able to fulfill their defense function only if all those concerned are prepared to effect a maximum of integration.

6. Comprehensive integration presupposes within NATO the consummation of joint political intentions. Military strength cannot be an end in itself. The preparation and utilization of such strength requires unified political leadership. The critical remark formulated by a shrewd French politician during the discussions on the European Defense Community also applies to NATO. "There have been states without an army, but surely never an army without a state."

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7. If it is necessary to reorganize the command authority within NATO in order to ensure a maximum of integration, it is just as necessary to strengthen political coöperation within NATO.

8. This necessity also arises from the incontestable interdependence of political problems in all parts of the world. Whatever happens in Africa or Asia, first affects those states directly concerned there, *i.e.* for instance, the members of SEATO; but any such developments also indirectly affect every NATO member state, because every engagement involving one of them weakens NATO as a whole. Consultation should lead to a homogeneous political attitude among the member states.

9. This applies very particularly to the United States, which has undertaken world-wide commitments. We should all draw the logical conclusions from the clear, courageous statement by Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the effect that the power of the United States has restricted its sovereignty. He rightly emphasizes that any decision of the United States should take into consideration the needs and hopes of those who have cast in their lot with the United States. This demands, however, the same attitude on the part of all the partners in the Alliance towards the United States.

10. This consideration results logically in the right and duty of the United States, as the strongest power in the free world and the firmest link in the chain of defense alliances, to undertake more vigorously than ever the task of leadership.

11. The other member states consequently have the obligation not to do anything likely to weaken NATO. Thus, for example, European policy should lead only to a strengthening of the West. It is in this spirit and for this reason that the Community of the "Six" has come into being. Their task is not to develop a defense conception of their own; that task can and should be accomplished only within the framework of NATO. The growing economic potential and the increasing political importance of that Community is also at the service of NATO. The tension between the Community of the "Six" and the Free Trade Area of the "Seven" is a serious drawback. To eliminate this tension is one of the tasks of the O.E.C.D. Here, too, the United States has a specific function of leadership.

12. Development assistance is not one of NATO's specific tasks. But, on the other hand, it should be recognized that the

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free world is engaged in conflict with Communism in the less developed countries. Hence, development tasks should also be viewed from the aspect of foreign policy and coördinated accordingly. The O.E.C.D. should, then, in the common interest, undertake or arrange for the implementation of such measures bilaterally or multilaterally.

13. Another of NATO's tasks is to prepare disarmament negotiations or, to be more exact, all negotiations on effective armament controls. Even if such negotiations are carried out under other auspices, for example within the United Nations, as has been the case so far, NATO should participate in the preparations.

14. The necessity of such coöperation, however, applies not only to armament controls. Political coördination within NATO should as far as possible extend to coöperation with other alliance systems, *e.g.* with SEATO. I am thinking, for example, of the participation of the Secretaries-General of these two organizations in the respective sessions of the Councils of Ministers.

15. It seems just as necessary to extend political coördination to the questions that are discussed and decided within the United Nations. The NATO allies should not confront each other in the United Nations as opponents. The attempt by the Soviet bloc to abuse the United Nations in this sense must be frustrated. The United Nations should be, and should remain, an instrument for the use of the free nations of the world to secure and propagate freedom.

I am aware that the scope of a brief article enables me to give only sketchy answers to some of the questions confronting the Western world. But perhaps I shall succeed in initiating a useful discussion by this analysis of our present position and by raising provocative questions regarding future developments.

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THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET BLOC

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

THE declaration issued by 81 Communist parties in Moscow last December 6 marks a seminal date in the history of international Communism. For the first time in the history of the Soviet bloc a conference of Communist leaders ended not merely with the usual "unanimous agreement" but also with a silent agreement to disagree. For the first time in about 35 years the general strategy of the Communist parties scattered around the globe is no longer to be set purely in terms of Soviet estimates of what will most benefit the interests of the Soviet Union. Cast aside is Stalin's categorical dictum that "a revolutionary is he who, without arguments, unconditionally, openly and honestly . . . is ready to defend and strengthen the U.S.S.R. . . ." What is good for the Soviet Union is no longer automatically also good for the Soviet bloc and for International Communism.

The Moscow conference thus highlights a process of transformation of the Soviet bloc into a Communist one. This process was inherent in the shift of Soviet power beyond the Soviet frontiers. However, Stalinism, with its insistence on absolute centralization of power in Moscow and on Soviet ideological infallibility, involved a conscious effort to prevent such a transformation. In fact, Stalin did not fear only national Communism —he even rejected its much more subdued variant, "domesticism," *i.e.* the effort to make some domestic adjustments while accepting the principle of bloc unity and absolute Soviet leadership.

The Jugoslav break in 1948 was the first signal that an international Communist system could not work effectively merely by applying Stalinist domestic practices to the new Soviet bloc. The change became more rapid after Stalin's death. Several factors prompted it. The new ruling Communist élites in East Europe gradually—and not everywhere at first—became somewhat more confident of their ability to build "socialism," especially if given sufficient leeway to make some domestic adjustments. The presence of an indigenous and independent Communist régime in China "objectively" (as the Marxists would put it) strengthened the case of those within the ruling élites who felt

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that perhaps Stalinism should be viewed as a transitional phase leading to a more genuine Communist internationalism rather than as an enduring prescription. Another factor prompting change was the accumulated tension of popular, national reaction against Soviet domination—a sentiment which local Communist leaders could not afford wholly to ignore.

In response to these pressures, the post-Stalin Soviet leadership, particularly from the time of Khrushchev's ascendancy, began to search for a new formula for unity of the Soviet bloc. The years 1954–1960 can be said to have been dominated by this search. Khrushchev and Bulganin were the first Soviet leaders to visit China, where they sought to warm the frigid relationship created by Stalin's reserve. Later, the Soviet leaders attempted to repair the break with Jugoslavia. They talked of "many ways to socialism." However, the search for unity clearly did not mean that the Soviet leaders were prepared to preside over the dissolution of the bloc. It is evident in retrospect that Khrushchev hoped the bloc could be transformed into a comity of states led by the U.S.S.R. but not terrorized by it. Marxist-Leninist ideology would be the common bond and the source of unanimity.

These efforts were opposed at home and abroad. Some of Khrushchev's colleagues felt that Soviet leadership would be undermined. Others warned that too rapid reform could lead to crises. The vacillations in Soviet policy during this period reflected these conflicting assessments and the sudden pressures of unexpected events. The change in Poland, the eruptions in Hungary, Khrushchev's realization that Tito was not interested in shoring up the Soviet bloc but in sharing in its leadership, all resulted in hesitations and often in retrogressive steps. The secret circular letter in August 1956 warned the other parties not to follow the Jugoslav path, and after the Polish and Hungarian outbreaks the Soviet leadership began to seek some organizational device to substitute for the Cominform, which had been abolished in 1956 because it was thought to be outmoded.

From 1957 on, the focus of the problem increasingly shifted eastward. The Chinese leaders shared Khrushchev's desire to create a healthier camp. Just a year earlier they had encouraged the Soviets to improve their relations with the Poles, even while recommending the suppression of the Hungarian revolution. Subsequently the Chinese joined Khrushchev in containing Polish diversity and in November 1957 they helped Khrushchev

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obtain Polish recognition of Soviet leadership of the camp. Mao Tse-tung personally insisted that Communist unity required an affirmation of Soviet leadership. Yet helping to consolidate the bloc did not mean to the Chinese that they should remain silent on the various issues facing it. On the contrary, in the course of helping Khrushchev, they appear to have become convinced that the post-Stalin leadership needed further advice from experienced revolutionaries like themselves. Liu Shao-chi alluded to this last year when he is reported to have stated that Peking had been concerned for some years with the indecisiveness and vacillations of the Soviet régime since Stalin.

In the fall of 1957 an event occurred which quickly assumed overwhelming importance in the Chinese perspective on world affairs and which colored subsequent Sino-Soviet relations. The successful Soviet firing of the I.C.B.M., followed by the launching of a sputnik, was interpreted by the Chinese as signalling a decisive shift in the balance of military power between East and West. The east wind was prevailing, Mao Tse-tung proclaimed. In his view the Soviet Union now had the means to effect further revolutionary changes in the world, in spite of the militarization of imperialism. But if the means were available in Moscow, the will seemed strangely lacking. The Chinese, therefore, felt duty-bound to infuse international Communism with the will to prevail. Bloc unity was the essential point of departure but still a means and not an end. Nothing could be done without unity, but unity should not become a substitute for action. Indeed, vigorous action against the common enemy could forge even greater unity than reliance on increased Soviet economic aid to the various Communist régimes or the elimination of the more obtrusive signs of Soviet domination. The almost simultaneous shift in intra-party politics in China in favor of a more radical wing and the great leap forward provided the domestic underpinning for these views of the international scene.

The Chinese did not desire war *per se,* but they were convinced that increased pressure on the West, including that of local wars, was justified and that the West would yield step by step. Furthermore, the Chinese feared that fear of war would inevitably lead to the fear of revolution and hence to the extinction of revolutionary zeal in the international movement itself. As a result, they did not hesitate in 1960 to characterize the conception of "a peaceful transition to socialism," propounded by

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Khrushchev in 1956, as "stupid." They felt that continuous pressure by the militarily superior Soviet bloc would encourage revolutionary upheavals, particularly in the colonial areas. The disintegration of imperialism would soon follow.

The Soviets welcomed the Chinese aid in reconsolidating the bloc. However, in assessing the nature of the present phase of world history, the Soviets tended to see their opportunities in a somewhat different light. Their acquisition of nuclear weapons, and particularly of a delivery capability, forced them to rethink their earlier military assumptions and gave them a greater appreciation of the dangers of mutual annihilation. As a result, the Soviet leaders very carefully abstained from repeating Mao's claim that they had reached a turning point; they have merely reiterated that there is a definite shift in favor of "socialism." In their view, the military balance of destructive capabilities is in itself a new and important step forward. It makes possible the encouragement of revolutionary trends in Asia, Africa and Latin America and the deterrence of Western counter-actions in these areas. At the same time the I.C.B.M.s could be exploited politically: in recent years the Soviet Union has threatened nuclear destruction against its neighbors on at least 40 different occasions. In addition, under the protective shield of military power, the Soviet bloc could now bring to bear a new and vitally important factor—its economic strength and technical skill. The combination of mutual military paralysis, political revolutions and Communist economic power would prevail, without the risk of provoking a desperate reaction from the West.

These basic disagreements were reflected in a host of specific issues. In 1958 China urged a more aggressive attitude in the Middle East crisis and later ignited a new campaign for Taiwan; in 1959–60 there were agitated ideological debates on the significance of the Chinese pattern of revolution as a model for other nations; in 1960 China showed a distinct lack of enthusiasm for Soviet participation in disarmament talks; during 1958–60 there were growing divergencies concerning "revisionism" and its implications. Many of these conflicts were veiled in euphemistic terms, but it required no exegesis to recognize their meaning. They were accompanied by a marked decline in Chinese-Soviet cultural exchanges, and there were even hints of some uncertainties on the subject of the Sino-Soviet frontier.

It is obvious that different degrees of alienation and involve-

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ment in international affairs, the disparity in stages of economic, social and revolutionary development, as well as such specific matters as unsatisfied territorial ambitions (*e.g.* Taiwan) provided the environmental background for such differences. Furthermore, it is very important to realize that the conscious commitments of the two régimes to a jointly shared *Weltanschaung* makes any disagreement between them even more intense. The purposeful effort to define reality and stages of historical change makes consensus more difficult, especially in the absence of a powerful arbiter such as Stalin. In the Communist outlook, general questions of interpretation are usually the points of departure for more specific strategies and tactics. For that reason it is more difficult in some respects for Communist parties to reach consensus, once they are able to assert their independence, than for Anglo-Saxon nations whose approach is pragmatic and not so concerned with conceptualization or long-range goals.

At the same time these disagreements over appropriate strategy and tactics operate within the framework of a larger agreement—namely a mutual method for assessing reality and a common objective. In effect, the common ideology, which defines mutual ends and selects common enemies, and which can be a source of intense friction, also serves to limit the dispute and prevents it from erupting into an open split. In the case of the Sino-Soviet divergencies of the last three years, it would appear that the dispute was confined by three limits, consciously observed by the parties involved: 1) Both sides have recognized that both would lose by an open split, hence that unity must be preserved; 2) each realized that the other's leadership is firmly entrenched and that, for better or for worse, Khrushchev would have to deal with Mao Tse-tung and vice versa, a situation quite unlike the one which prevailed in 1948 when Stalin calculated that Tito would fall from power after an open split; 3) the Chinese, for the time being at least, have striven to reassure the Soviets that they are not trying to displace them as leaders of the bloc but are merely anxious to persuade them to adopt a different strategy. The Chinese presumably realized that they could not, at this stage, replace the Soviets as leader since they do not possess the means to enforce such leadership.

The foregoing limits, however, have tended to make the weaker party stronger and the stronger weaker in as much as the partner who is better able to demonstrate overtly his disregard

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for unity has the advantage of initiative. The burden of responding in kind, thereby further straining unity, or of compromising, rested on the more passive of the two. Furthermore, it can be argued that subjectively the Soviet Union stands to lose more by an open split than China since so much of the international prestige of the Soviet Union and the internal strength of the régime rest on its role as leader of a united bloc of one billion people marching together toward Communism. Indeed, with two partners desiring unity, the one who can appear to be less cautious about preserving it might well gain the upper hand. Thus in the internal bargaining that has recently gone on between the two parties, the immense military and economic preponderance of the Soviet Union has probably not been decisive. China has been able to persist in her views and even to voice them openly. At the Moscow conference of November–December 1960 and also at the earlier July session in Bucharest, the Chinese delegation openly assaulted Khrushchev's policies, despite obvious Soviet displeasure.

The Moscow conference, however, was not a Chinese victory. If, in terms of the crucial issues, the statement issued by the 81 parties is carefully compared with earlier Soviet and Chinese pronouncements,[1] one finds that by and large the Soviet formulations have prevailed, with some adjustments to meet Chinese objections. It may be surmised that the somewhat greater emphasis on the dangers of war and on the aggressiveness of American imperialism, on the relevance of China to the revolutions in Asia, Latin America and Africa, on the militant character of national liberation struggles, and the direct condemnation of Jugoslav revisionism, all involved adjustment to the Chinese point of view. But on a larger number of issues the statement bears greater resemblance to earlier Soviet positions. This is so with respect to such matters as: the decisive character of economic development and the role of the "socialist world system" in shaping our age; the destructiveness of war (its horrors were explicitly reiterated); the significance of peaceful coexistence and the possibility of the prevention of war; the importance of the 20th and 21st C.P.S.U. Congresses, and the universal relevance of

[1] For instance, O. V. Kuusinen's important work, "Foundations of Marxism-Leninism," published early in 1960, and Soviet and Chinese statements on the occasion of Lenin's anniversary last year. The Moscow statement itself was apparently prepared originally by the C.P.S.U. This preliminary draft was then reviewed in October by an editorial commission representing 26 parties (including all 12 from the bloc) before submission to the conference as a whole.

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Soviet experience; the peaceful transition to socialism, the character of "national democracy" and the evils of dogmatism. This impression is corroborated by the unusually frank account of the conference provided by Walter Ulbricht's speech printed in *Neues Deutschland* of December 18. In it he indicates clearly what the controversial issues were and how the various points were resolved.

There appears to be a twofold reason for the relative Soviet success. The first is rooted in the nature of the Chinese position; the second involves the bargaining process in the meeting itself. Because China is more radically hostile to the outside world, her freedom of action is more limited, even if initially the Chinese succeeded in putting the Soviet leadership on the defensive. Given their impatience in dealing with the West, the Chinese leaders would probably shrink from actually splitting the Communist bloc, since in their minds the chief beneficiaries of such a split would be the United States and "imperialism" in general. Thus the range of their bluffing is limited. Furthermore, since their overt support consisted only of the Albanians and a few of the non-ruling parties, a split, or even the threat of a split, could not bring about the desired Chinese objective: a change in the line pursued by International Communism.

The Moscow conference thus had the important effect of articulating a common line for the various parties, and of narrowing somewhat the cleavage between the Soviets and the Chinese. Explicit limits to unilateral action by any one party were adopted and the principle of interference in the internal affairs of member parties for the first time was formally established. Unlike the November 1957 statement of the 12 ruling parties, which stressed "non-interference in one another's affairs," the 1960 declaration states: "When this or that party raises questions about the activity of another fraternal party, its leadership turns to the leadership of the party in question and, when necessary, meetings and consultations are held." It goes without saying that the principle of interference is likely to benefit the stronger rather than the weaker parties. In his report on the conference, Ulbricht apparently alluded to the Chinese when he stated that "there were objections to the formulation 'general line.' However, if we abandon this principle of 'general line,' vacillations may occur in complicated situations, such as in border problems."

At the same time, the length of the conference and the appar-

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ently calculated ambiguity of some parts of the statement suggest clearly that while the Sino-Soviet relationship remains based on common, conscious emphasis on unity, an element of divergence is inherent in the fact that both parties are independent and organizationally distinct. While it is likely that henceforth disagreements between them will be more muted and harder to detect, the relationship of divergent unity between them is likely to persist and could easily erupt anew into an open dialogue. The different emphases put on the Moscow statement by subsequent commentaries in *Pravda, Trybuna Ludu* or *Neues Deutschland,* on the one hand, and in *Hsinhua* or *Zeri I Popullit,* on the other, portend continuing dissension.

II

The changes that have taken place, and are continuing to take place, within the Communist world have important policy implications for the West. In analyzing these changes, we should abandon the tendency to operate in simple and extreme terms. The bloc is not splitting and is not likely to split. Talk of a Sino-Soviet conflict, of even a war between them, merely illustrates a profound misconception of the essence of the historical phenomenon of Communism, which, while affected by traditional national considerations, has from its very beginning reflected a conscious emphasis on supra-national perspectives. Similarly, a change within the Soviet bloc should not be viewed as presaging its distintegration or, conversely, its soon becoming one Communist state. The tendency to see the bloc in terms of such extremes simply obscures the important, if less dramatic, changes within it.

For years the Soviet bloc was in effect an international system run by one national Communist party. Today, it is becoming a Communist camp, with the various member régimes participating more actively in the important process of defining the camp's "general line." The events of 1956 served to reassure the Communist chiefs that the West was either unable or unwilling to challenge their domestic power, while the Sino-Soviet "divergent unity" achieved within the bloc meant that opportunities have now been created for more manœuvre, without running the risk of expulsion or condemnation as a deviationist.

The last Moscow conference, as well as subsequent events, bear this out. The leaders of the smaller parties, as for instance,

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Gomulka, played a more active role than ever before and have been reliably credited with strongly influencing the Soviet course. Some leaders, like Togliatti, could afford to show their misgivings about the conference by staying away from it. Some of the Latin American representatives offered amendments to the draft of the conference. Others, like the Albanians, could choose to defy the Soviets, even at the risk of incurring the wrath of pro-Soviet parties. It is symptomatic of the new conditions that Ulbricht broke all precedents to accuse the Albanian party leadership in public and in print, of "sectarianism" and "dogmatism." Yet both Albania and East Germany remained bona fide members of the bloc. Similarly, on the occasion of the Chinese anniversary, the Chinese sent the Albanians greetings that were both warm and personal—qualities missing from similar messages to Moscow and elsewhere, and notably lacking in Moscow's New Year's message to the Albanians. Similarly, in the course of the recent Albanian Party Congress, the C.P.S.U. refrained from greeting Enver Hoxha, while the Chinese heaped praise on the Albanian leader. Still, the Soviet boycott of the Albanian party chief took place *within* the framework of the camp. The prolonged and successful defiance of the most powerful party by one of the smallest could have infectious consequences, irrespective of the specific issues involved in this case.

Apart from the more overt sympathies of some parties for Moscow or Peking, there are now pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese factions within most parties. Also, for the first time in the history of the bloc, the various national leaders can quietly exercise options within the bloc itself, rather than having either to choose unity, *ergo* subordination, or a split. In effect, the smaller parties can take advantage of the implicit agreement of the two major ones to disagree.

As a result, relations between the Soviet Union and the Communist states and parties vary greatly. In the past one pattern generally prevailed: close subordination or open hostility (*e.g.* Jugoslavia). Now, there is far greater diversity. In the Soviet-Polish relationship, state and party ties are good, while the Poles enjoy some domestic autonomy. On the other hand, East Germany and Czechoslovakia are completely subordinate to the Soviet Union, while state and party relations are also excellent. State and party ties with North Viet Nam are good despite its earlier dependence on China. With China itself there are good

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state relations but disagreements between the ruling parties. Finally, with Albania, there are correct state relations but apparent frigidity in party relations.

Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of a further change was the reversal of the Soviet attitude toward some organizational expression of unity, like the Comintern or the Cominform. Previously the Soviet leadership desired such an institution as a means of strengthening its hand. At the conference Khrushchev is reliably reported to have opposed the very thing he earlier promoted—precisely in order to protect Soviet leadership! In the days when Soviet freedom of initiative was almost unlimited—particularly in the international arena—a Cominform type of organization was useful in ensuring that the other parties followed loyally. The protracted discussions in Moscow made the Soviet leaders sensitive to the possibility that today such an organization could limit their freedom of manœuvre. They thus preferred to rely on ad hoc multilateral meetings of party chiefs, meetings which need not be called regularly and which would be less likely to interfere with Soviet international activity.

Furthermore, if Khrushchev's version of the conference can be trusted, it was the Soviet delegation which suggested that the conference no longer refer to the Soviet party as the leader of the camp. In 1957, the Soviets, supported by the Chinese, had insisted on this designation since the status of leadership helped to ensure automatic support for any Soviet initiatives. But today, as Khrushchev put it, "the fact that we are called the leader gives no advantages either to our party or to other parties. On the contrary, it only creates difficulties." One may surmise that the elimination of such a reference could forestall any Chinese claim to co-leadership of the camp. In fact, the Soviets might be arguing that if the Chinese want a united, militant bloc, they should respect in practice the Soviet line. Another difficulty which Khrushchev might have had in mind was the danger that the other parties could claim that the formal status of leader puts the C.P.S.U. under special responsibility to its followers, and perhaps Soviet freedom of action would be greater without such a formal designation. Finally, the status of leader implied responsibility for actions which the Soviets could not control (*e.g.* China towards India). In any event, the Kremlin could be certain that parties fully loyal to it would continue to do its bidding. The East Germans, for instance, have continued to make references

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to Soviet leadership even though the conference used the vaguer term "vanguard" to describe the role of the C.P.S.U.

This role should not be minimized. As Khrushchev put it in his January address: ". . . the Communist parties must synchronize their watches. When someone's clock is fast or slow, it is regulated so that it shows the correct time. Similarly, it is necessary to check the time of the Communist movement . . ." The emphasis in the statement of the conference on the fundamental importance of the C.P.S.U.'s experience left no doubt that its clock was to be the Greenwich Mean Time of international Communism. None the less, the absence of a formally designated leader, capable of acting as arbiter, is bound to complicate further the internal situation in the Communist world, even if abroad it makes the camp look more "democratic." While bringing to bear on any issue its own power, the Soviet leadership must now, to a far greater extent, anticipate the reactions of its followers, especially in view of some of the available options.

The Moscow conference may thus be the end of Khrushchev's search for a new relationship with the bloc. But he did not find what he sought. Indeed, there appears to be a curious and striking parallel between the Eisenhower and Khrushchev records. Both men strove to bolster the power of their countries by making more stable alliances. Yet, in spite of their efforts, or perhaps because of them, they each appear to have presided over a decline in the independent power of their respective nations. Nor did the conference fulfill Chinese hopes. Instead of achieving united militancy, they have contributed to greater heterogeneity within the bloc.

This heterogeneity involves both advantages and liabilities. By appearing less autocratic and more flexible, the Communist camp can now support more effectively the pseudo-Marxist régimes in Cuba or Guinea and encourage others in a similar direction. Thus a new type of expansion—indirect—may replace the old, direct type. Many of the new nations throughout the world are not only nationalistic in the nineteenth century sense; they are ideologically oriented and think in social and economic terms similar to those of Marxists. They use words like "imperialism" and "capitalism" much as the Soviets do. And modernization, which they seek, does not mean to them political democracy. The relationship of the Soviet Union and of the other camp members to these new states is already one of courtship and

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not of Stalin-like domination. In this relationship, the Poles, the Czechs, the East Germans, can be of great help to the Communist cause. They civilize Soviet Communism, their social and cultural level makes it more appealing, while the greater internal diversity within the camp makes Communism seem less threatening to the newly independent states.

At the same time, the new external strategy is likely to further the internal processes of change within the camp. One may increasingly expect Soviet allies helping to court a Cuba or a Guinea to seek a "most-favored-nation clause" from the Soviet Union, much the way the East Germans did when the U.S.S.R. was courting Gomulka's Poland in 1956, or the way that Latin American states have recently done with the United States, after watching our Marshall Plan aid going to Europe. This is all the more likely because of the new opportunities created for internal manœuvring by the various parties. And these opportunities will probably increase when China acquires a nuclear capability.

From a Western point of view, a prolonged situation of formal Sino-Soviet unity with some degree of divergence is distinctly preferable to an open rupture. A thoroughgoing split would bode ill for the world. The Soviet Union can afford to tolerate within the camp a dissident but lonely China. Thus a break involving expulsion from the bloc could occur only if China were sufficiently strong to threaten Soviet leadership and to carry with it a significant number of Communist parties. A China capable of unilateral action could be very dangerous. The danger is no less if China should feel strong enough to leave the bloc on its own initiative. Presumably it would do so only if its leaders felt confident of their ability to go it alone and to influence the course of events more effectively outside the bloc.

In either case, the Chinese would be in control of a significant portion of the international Communist movement. They could thus effectively develop a more actively militant line and presumably back it with their own resources. The Western reaction would necessarily involve a more militant posture also, perhaps the use of force, certainly higher military budgets. Under those circumstances, the Soviet Union would have to follow suit, lest the West gain an over-all military preponderance. Furthermore, the C.P.S.U. would inescapably be forced to condemn Western countermoves to Chinese initiatives, for not to do so would involve an insupportable loss in Soviet revolutionary prestige and

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probably precipitate further defections to the Chinese side. Hence, a break in the partnership would gradually push the Soviet Union toward more radical attitudes in an effort to regain leadership of the Communist camp. In a world polarized in open hostility between the United States and China, the Soviet Union could not afford therefore to be neutral, and certainly could not side with the United States.

The most advantageous situation from the Western standpoint is one which involves a gradual adjustment of the common Marxist-Leninist ideology to the divergent perspectives of its various subscribers. The existence of the Sino-Soviet dialogue has already forced the Soviet leaders to think through what was formerly only a generalized statement that a war would be disastrous; it has contributed a great deal to increased Soviet sophistication on the subject of nuclear weapons. Unanimity is often a shield for ignorance and, if for no other reason than to argue with Liu Shao-chi, Khrushchev probably had to read some RAND studies! In his emphasis on the destructiveness of a nuclear war he has come close to admitting that a purely subjective factor, such as someone's decision to start a war, can possibly interfere with an immutable historical process. This necessarily involves a gradual relativization of the formerly absolutist ideology.

Furthermore, divorced from a single power center, this ideology is more and more stretched to embrace the diverse experiences and perspectives of élites, whether on the banks of the Elbe or the 38th Parallel. Increasingly each party becomes confident that its interpretation of the common doctrine is the correct one. Ulbricht highlighted this dilemma when he stated in his account of the Moscow conference that "somebody has raised the question as to who is the one who determines what is truth, and what complies with the principles of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine." There is no easy answer. Stalin was once the ideological arbiter and he possessed the power to enforce his interpretations. Today, the alternative to splits between the parties is some form of adjustment. Yet such adjustments mean that the formerly absolutist ideology is becoming increasingly a relative one.

The Communist leaders are aware that relativization could lead to dangerous erosion. To counteract it they are promoting closer economic ties and integration of the various members of their camp. In his speech of January 6, Khrushchev gave special attention to the problem of unity, insisting that all parties must

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continuously strive for it and asserting that the C.P.S.U. has made "every effort" to maintain unity with the Chinese. The Communist leaders are seeking rapid external victories to keep afire the sense of an inevitable and worldwide triumph. But the changes that have taken place within the Communist world were inherent in its expansion and can be viewed as part of the process of differentiation which all large-scale social organizations experience. The West had little directly to do with the emergence of these changes and precipitous moves overtly designed to promote splits will only push the Communist régimes together.

The West can, however, strive to create favorable conditions for the further growth of the diversity which has developed within the Communist camp. We should, for instance, explore the possibility of recognizing Mongolia, thereby encouraging the growth of a sense of independent statehood which almost certainly would lead to more assertive nationalism. We should reexamine critically our policy of non-recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, since this policy helps to inhibit any Polish régime from "playing the game" of using the Sino-Soviet divergence for the consolidation of its domestic autonomy, and instead forces it to bolster its patron and only source of security, the Soviet Union. We should encourage some of our allies to exploit more the traditional bonds of friendship which have existed between them and some of the nations presently within the Communist camp. We should continue to address ourselves directly to the Communist-controlled peoples, thereby encouraging domestic pressures for change which each régime must now consider, given the greater flexibility of the camp. Finally, we should not make concessions to Khrushchev on such issues as Berlin, in the mistaken hope of bolstering him, but in effect depriving him of the argument which he has used against the Chinese—namely, that excessive pressure on the West might lead to a dangerous war. We should consider all these measures, and more. But perhaps it would suffice to note that the Soviet bloc is not immune to the flow of history in the name of which the Communists claim to act. The prophets of history may be gradually becoming its prisoners —and the time has now come for the West to prod history along.

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A POSITIVE APPROACH TO ECONOMIC AID

By John Kenneth Galbraith

IT IS now nearly 12 years since the provision of economic assistance to other countries on a regular and organized basis became an established feature of American foreign policy. Such assistance had previously been offered to Latin American countries and during and after the war to the devastated and distressed countries of Europe and Asia. With the promulgation of the Point IV offer in President Truman's Inaugural Message of 1949, the provision of assistance to other countries for their economic development lost its character of emergency relief. It became, instead, a settled arrangement for helping the less fortunate countries of the world to escape from poverty and to place themselves on a path to self-sustaining growth. The amounts being spent, if not huge, have at least become considerable: in the current fiscal year some $1.7 billion is available for loans, grants, technical assistance and administrative costs, and another $1.2 billion in surplus food and fiber. In addition, $250 million is provided for investment guarantees and $130 million for multilateral aid through the United Nations.

From the beginning, foreign aid has been sharply controversial. It has an aspect of goodwill and compassion that naturally arouses grave suspicion. Liberals, reacting to this, come automatically to its defense. Any criticism has been deemed to conceal some design for discrediting the policy. If results are not satisfactory, it is because we are not spending enough. The normal liberal formula for improving foreign aid is to spend about 25 percent more.

A much more careful view of foreign aid is now in order and, indeed, essential. Such a view does not lead to the conclusion that less should be spent. More money will be needed. But it does lead to the conclusion that much recent and present aid has been very ineffectually employed and for that reason has had gravely disappointing or even negative results. Without a substantial change in the whole view of economic development, the results in most cases will continue to be disappointing. The required changes will not perhaps be easily accepted here or abroad. Yet so great is the need for development and also the

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desire for it that we should not discount too severely the willingness to take the necessary steps.

The prime difficulty of present aid policy is that it is based on a convenient but largely erroneous view of the requirements for economic development. That economic development is a complex process will be agreed. When certain requirements for advance are present, advance will occur. If these are lacking, progress will be retarded. And if factors decisively important for progress are lacking, it follows that there will be no progress at all. As measured by movements in national income or product, the country will be stagnant.

In our present view of economic development, the missing element in all countries is assumed to be external resources—above all, capital. The country, being poor, has little national product from which to save and much need for current consumption. Accordingly, the chance for internal capital creation is small, and capital must, therefore, be supplied from the outside. This is the critical need. From the outside, also, must come technicians and specialists to advise in the use and development of internal resources—to improve agriculture, search for oil, guide the exploitation of other natural resources, identify industrial opportunity, protect health or plan education. The capital and the technicians, together with food should this be lacking, we supply. Thus, it is thought, we contribute the missing and critical component of advance.

The difficulty is that what we supply is, in many cases, only one of the missing and critical requirements without which there will be no progress. At least four other things are crucial.

(1) A substantial degree of literacy and that smaller number of people with the higher education and skills necessary to man a government and undertake the managerial and technical tasks associated directly or indirectly with economic advance. We may lay it down as a rule that there will be no durable, self-sustaining advance under conditions of widespread illiteracy and ignorance and without an educated élite of substantial size. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it was well understood—at least in the United States—that popular education was of first importance for releasing the initiative and energy of the people, enabling them to work efficiently and progressively and to give development a thrust or impetus from below. There is no modern reason to believe that this view was wrong.

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(2) A substantial measure of social justice. If the ordinary individual receives no share in the advance, he will make no willing contribution to it. And he can normally be counted upon to sabotage it—to be careless of the new machinery entrusted to his care or contemptuous of the new methods recommended to his attention. It is not always easy to get the individual in the underdeveloped country to see and pursue the path of his own self-interest when it involves a break with tradition. He will never do so if all the gains accrue to feudal landlords or employers or to tax-collectors, merchants and usurers.

(3) A reliable apparatus of government and public administration. Clearly, economic development can occur only in a context of law and order, where persons and property are reasonably secure. But even though this is not always present, it is a good deal less than the minimum that is necessary. Positive advance also requires a capacity for more difficult tasks—for planning and building roads and other communications, for importing capital and guiding its use, for the management of a fiscal system that makes adequate use of internal resources, for organizing education, and for many other essential tasks.

(4) A clear and purposeful view of what development involves. Development will not occur if it is believed to come automatically with escape from colonialism; if it is identified as a matter of course with faith in free enterprise or socialism; if it is regarded as the special magic that will be provided by a particular political personality; or if it is to be accomplished by some single stroke of genius such as the building of a particular road, the settling of a particular jungle, or the watering of a particular desert. In all instances, the result—not long deferred—will be serious disappointment.

In practice, one or more of these four factors is missing in most of the poor countries, and each is as critical as capital. Therefore, the only successful development will be that which supplies the missing elements. Since these will be somewhat different for different countries, there cannot be a common prescription for development; what works in one place will not work in another.

These conclusions readily survive empirical test. After a decade or more of effort and expenditure, we have a right to inquire whether the countries we have been aiding are on the way to self-sustaining advance. Has national income been increased?

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Has poverty been mitigated? Has the likelihood of disorder been lessened? So far as Central America, northern South America, the Middle East and some of Asia are concerned, the questions have a vaguely prejudicial sound. It is as though someone were preparing an indictment of foreign aid. In most of these regions poverty, ignorance and the potentiality for disorder are just as great as they were ten years ago. Ten years, it will be said, is too short a time. But this is a retrospective apology. When we announced our intention to "embark on a bold new program" to rescue the "more than half of the people of the world . . . living in conditions approaching misery," we had a better timetable in mind than this. And, in truth, a better one has been repeatedly promised to the Congress and the American people.

It may be true, as liberal defenders of foreign aid have argued, that the effort has been too small, but if other requirements for advance are absent, an increase in size would not insure advance. Were ample assistance all that is required, Iran and the oil-rich Arab countries would be exceedingly progressive. In fact, in these countries progress remains unsatisfactory, and it is because other requirements for advance are missing. No one supposes that, were the oil revenues of Iraq doubled, the rate of economic development would be appreciably advanced. Similarly, Venezuela, in spite of its massive oil revenues, remains in uncertain equilibrium. Nor would economic aid in larger volume have saved the situation in Cuba or Laos.

The matter may be tested on the other side. One country that has shown great advance since the war, including great capacity to make effective use of aid, has been Israel. It is singularly unendowed with natural resources. It has no oil wells, few minerals, insufficient water and not much space. But all of the four elements mentioned—high literacy and a highly educated élite, the sense and the reality of social justice, an effective government and a strong sense of purpose—are all present. So there is rapid progress. The Israelis, were they forced to it, would better do without their aid than without their education, their sense of shared responsibility and shared gain, their public administration and their clear view of their destiny.

India and Pakistan and perhaps also Ghana and Nigeria are other countries where the requirements of development other than external aid are present or largely present. Thus, India has a large literate minority and a highly educated élite, a consid-

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erable if still highly uneven measure of social justice, an effective administration and a fairly clear sense of direction. As a result, and despite the crushing problems imposed by tradition and population growth, India has been making a substantial measure of industrial progress. The fact that her agricultural progress has been far less impressive supports the point. In the agricultural villages literacy is low; the social inequality is high and many know that, come what may, they will live on the bare margin of subsistence; village government is decayed and ineffective and only recently have efforts at rejuvenation been made; and the Indian village is hardly inclined to address itself purposefully to economic advance. So even though India, of all the economically distressed countries, makes the best use of its aid, it too fails in the part of its economy where the other requirements for advance are lacking.

II

In our prescription for the improvement of other countries, we have a little-recognized but highly persistent tendency to advocate what exists in the United States, with no very critical view of its appropriateness to the situation or stage of development of the other country. In the early years of the Marshall Plan, an agriculturist was moved by divine fire to seek to establish a land-grant college in Bavaria; his motivation was not need (and certainly not the availability of land) but the fact that land-grant colleges had served the United States well. A few years ago another American was bent on organizing a market news service for the floating vegetable market in Bangkok. And in Bolivia our agricultural experiment stations are so elaborate that they are (it is said) too expensive for the Bolivians to operate; in the enthusiasm of the land reform of the early 1950s one of them was enthusiastically seized and divided up by peasants unaware of its function.

Our stress on the role of external resources has a similar bias. In modern times the supply of capital resources has been the limiting factor on our growth; the more capital, foreign and domestic, that we have had for investment, the more rapid our rate of advance. We even measure growth in part by our rate of investment in physical capital. We have tended to overlook the fact that at an earlier stage we had developed a system of popular education, and had achieved an effective system of public

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administration. We had established the principle that people should be rewarded in some reasonable, if imperfect, relation to their contribution or product. We also had a considerable sense of purpose. It was never imagined that by merely expelling the British we would automatically achieve paradise. But these early prerequisites of development, vital though they were, are largely ignored today. In drawing on our own experience, we are influenced by the later stage of our development when capital became important.

However, in our political and economic policy, we are much less often the victims of retarded intelligence than of convenient illusion. That is so here. It is doubtful that many of us, if pressed, would insist that economic development was simply a matter of external aid. But nothing could be more convenient than to believe this, for once we admit that it is not the case, we become entrapped in a succession of grievously complex problems.

Thus we would have to consider how a country can greatly increase its literacy rate and at the same time build a system of higher education. To organize a good school system, or reform a bad one, is far harder than to organize an equivalent outlay on dams, turbines, generators and transmission lines. This nevertheless may be the easiest of the barriers to pass. To develop a clear sense of purpose; to get an effective system of public administration when one must build on nothing; and to win social reform when great and perhaps even decisive power is held by those to whom reform would be costly—these are vastly more difficult. So the solution has been to pretend that these problems do not exist and that economic aid will turn the trick.

Present attitudes toward aid have a further consequence; they allow and encourage poor selection of the objects of aid, disperse the limited energies of the aided country, encourage a lack of continuity and preclude any real test of performance. This, to repeat, is not an indictment of aid as such and should not be taken for encouragement by those who are opposed on principle to the golden rule. It is very much an indictment of the present approach to aid.

Specifically, if external resources are assumed to be the limiting factor, any particular infusion of such resources is presumed to help. This means that the particular investment to be aided is not subject to any very rigorous test; it can be decided by bilateral bargaining between the representatives of the United

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States and those of the recipient country. This bargaining allows an almost incredible variety of irrelevant considerations to enter. Our representatives, governed by the imitative habits of mind just mentioned, assume that what exists in the United States has proven itself by the success of the United States. Therefore there is a strong presumption that it will be good for the aided country. "To the *campesino*'s desire for seed, land and water, the agricultural service has too often responded by offering insecticides, sprayers, fertilizers, and a school for training tractor mechanics. . . . The agricultural service has suffered from being too close a copy of the U.S. Extension Service."[1]

The United States has a great variety of developmental services appropriate both to its high state of development and its ability to finance things of secondary importance. The tendency to duplicate these leads to heavy burdens and a radical dispersal of energies. The particular dispersion will depend on the accident of personalities. The arrival of a specialist in plant-breeding will lead to a new enthusiasm for hybrid corn; a home economist will bear the torch for home economics; someone with a background in adult education will give revitalized leadership to a movement for adult education until he departs for the next country. These tendencies are unlikely to be resisted in the recipient country. Officials of a number of countries have said quite frankly that they do not hesitate to adjust their requests to the preferences or whims of current personnel in the American mission. Money talks. Nor are the insights and preferences of the recipients more acute. These are subject to the desire for monument building and the tendency for a new ministerial personality to decry the work of his predecessor and seek to memorialize his own intuition and magic. One form of aid being about as good as another, there is a strong temptation for the donor country to keep the peace and meet these requests. It helps to support the government and maintain its friendship.

The result is a measure of incoherence, discontinuity, dispersal of scarce energies and, inevitably, of waste. But—and this point must be emphasized—there is no remedy within the present framework. No one can be fired for selecting the wrong projects as long as all are assured to do some good and no one knows for sure which do the most good. There will be improvement only

[1] Richard W. Patch, "Bolivia and U.S. Assistance," in "Social Change in Latin America Today." New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1960, p. 163.

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when we begin seriously to ask what is needed—when targets are established and attention becomes focused on what is required to reach them. Then it will be impossible (or anyhow difficult) to avoid thinking about the missing elements. And once targets are established and effort becomes purposefully directed toward achieving them, we shall have measures of success—or of failure. Then, conspicuous failure will at least have to be explained, and responsibility for a wrong decision assigned. There can surely be no feature of present aid programs that is so unsatisfactory as that by which much aid brings little or no progress and no one gets blamed. Public life was not meant to be that easy.

III

One rather more general observation may help to bring this problem into focus. The underdeveloped countries of South America, Africa and Asia can be thought of as the products—and also the victims—of a great historical discontinuity. Colonialism brought them in each case to a certain stage of development. It supplied capital and, in most cases, did this very well. By its nature it supplied a government and the related elements of administration, and in most instances it provided the rudiments of an educational system. Some part of these, at least, was left behind. But given the goals of colonial rule and its tendency to superimpose a small external élite on the social and economic life of the colony, colonialism rarely left a satisfactory system of social justice. And the resentment and antagonisms it aroused, together with some of the social theory that it often provided, led to a partly heroic and partly romantic view of development which has not ordinarily been consistent with serious purpose.

The task of development has been to pick up where colonialism left off—sometimes, as in the case of many of the Latin American countries, after a long interim period of stagnation. In a few countries, as we have noted, colonialism in its day provided a number of the essentials of development, and there the discontinuity is not total; the requisites for continued advance are present. But in other cases colonialism did not provide even the minimum elements for development. In Haiti, for example, it is unlikely that in terms of per capita income there has been any advance since the French were expelled in 1804; that there has been deterioration is far more probable. In a considerable

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number of the former Spanish countries, income (and literacy, health and general well-being) cannot be appreciably higher than at the time of independence. The Peruvian Indians are probably worse off than under the Inca. And as the Congo sufficiently emphasizes, a number of the new African states are gaining independence with no more, and possibly fewer, of the requirements for advance than were possessed by the Western Hemisphere colonies of Spain.

It is because we agree that colonialism left some of the countries without the requirements for independent advance that we are providing aid today. But we have not reflected on what is missing. In assuming that capital is the missing element, we are continuing to provide the one thing that colonialism provided. This perpetuates the unviable structure left by colonialism and—not surprisingly—it brings down on our heads some of the discredit and dislike which accrued to the colonial powers.

We are face to face, then, with the disconcerting need for new thinking about economic development. This is embarrassing not alone because it is difficult but also because a reputation for soundness in our day continues to rest on a zealous avoidance of novelty, while no one is so admired for his wisdom as the man who reacts sympathetically to change and then explains why it is unwise. Yet there is no escape. The specifications are clear. We *must* have a design for economic development which extends to *all* of the barriers to advance; it must be adaptable to the situation of the individual country; and we must have some objective tests of progress. We can no longer allow ourselves to assume progress where, in fact, there is none. If we are contributing to development, we need to know it and stick to our course. If we are on the wrong path, we also need to know it and change.

Finally, what we do must be reasonably accommodated to the financial and administrative resources of the United States and must be considerate of the sensibilities of the newly emerged countries. Nevertheless, we should be aware that excessive sensibility can serve to protect present barriers to progress and that here, as so often in the economics of the impoverished, choice is inescapable. What to do?

IV

For purposes of designation, we may let a new system of organizing foreign aid be called The Positive Development Plan.

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The positive features are two: it sets achievable but firm goals for the country seeking development, with provision for measuring progress toward their attainment; and it seeks the removal of *all* of the barriers to advance in the particular country.

Specifically, the Plan envisages a small but talented group of men assembled in Washington under the aegis of a new agency which may be called the National Development Institute. Its purpose, first, is to help countries seeking development under this Plan to establish the targets or goals which they can reasonably hope to achieve over, say, a seven-year period and to devise the steps for achieving these goals; and second, to help the government, not only to execute the program, but to develop the permanent administration required to achieve these goals and continue on the path of permanent and independent development. Acceptance of the Positive Development Plan and of the assistance provided by the National Development Institute would be voluntary, and failure to do so would not exclude a country from other aid programs. Once accepted, the United States would be committed to support the plan and to pursue it for a specified period. For reasons to be mentioned presently, this does not of itself imply a greater aggregate outlay by the United States.

By way of more detailed illustration, a Central American or newer African state would formally seek the help of the National Development Institute in formulating seven-year targets and the measures for achieving them. A small panel would then be constituted consisting in approximately equal numbers of representatives of the Institute and the recipient country. Working partly in Washington and partly in the recipient country over a period of six months, the group would draw up targets, determine the requisite steps and promulgate the plan. American members of the panel would remain in close informal communication with the Institute as a way of sharing and developing experience, of checking the validity of proposals and making the most of scarce personnel resources. Again for purposes of designation, we may call the panel the Planning and Development Authority.

The targets should be both economic and cultural. Four may be sufficient: a specified gain in national income, a specified improvement in its distribution, a specified advance in literacy, and improvement in other areas of education. A multiplication of tar-

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gets—always a temptation in such planning—must be avoided, and those that are set must be capable of realization. This is subject to a measure of internal control; the targets must be consistent with the measures recommended for reaching them and these, in turn, must be consistent with the measures—external and internal—which will be available.

By establishing targets and agreeing upon the steps to achieve them, all of the barriers to development will be brought into view. Education, social reform and development of public administration will each command its appropriate share of attention —along with economic investment. In this way attention can be focused on the barriers that inhibit advance in the particular country.

The formulation of a plan of this kind is not a matter of great inherent difficulty. The principal problem is to resist the temptation to be grandiose and to avoid things that belong to far later stages of development. But to carry out even the simplest plan is another matter. If a government itself must be built, who is going to establish an educational system, guide an investment program or carry through social reforms—and by what means? The circle is closed, especially as resistance to indispensable reform and to outside help and advice can be expected. Somehow the country must be helped to get the administrative machinery, leadership, organizing ability, technical and professional knowledge, clarity and consistency of purpose to escape from the self-reinforcing bind of backwardness, and it must be persuaded of its need. In the past, planning missions have offered detailed instructions as to what should be done, and then have left the country with the far more difficult tasks of execution.

The only possible procedure is for the Planning and Development Authority to remain in the country in charge of development. If the Plan is acceptable to the recipient country, the Planning and Development Authority will become, in effect, a Development Ministry. Existing government agencies which have development responsibilities—in education, industrial development, agriculture, internal revenue—will become subject to its over-all directions. This arrangement is indispensable, for it is idle to set targets and not provide the essential machinery for reaching them. Yet no one should disguise the fact that on this point the proposal will encounter its most critical objection. The Planning and Development Authority, led in part by foreigners,

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will seem an invasion of sovereignty. Nations that have won political freedom at what seems to them great cost and peril will be quick to sense a possible threat to their independence.

However, the fact that our intentions are not imperialistic has considerable, if by no means universal, credence. We are contending not with an intention that must be disguised but with a myth that must be dispelled. The difference is considerable. Then there are certain measures of reassurance which we can provide. In the execution phase of the plan, the chairman of the Planning and Development Authority should be the most competent national of the recipient country. And during the period of development the American members should be gradually withdrawn as trained and competent replacements become available. This is in keeping with the design for progress toward fully independent development. United Nations personnel should be closely associated with the work; perhaps a U.N. observer should be invited to be present. And while there must be a strong presumption that the enterprise will be carried through to the target date, it is revocable. In the end, however, acceptance must depend on the deep desire for effective development. This is strong and may grow stronger as dissatisfaction with present progress increases.

Our own undertaking must also be firm, which means that Congress must accept a fairly long-range commitment to this general design. This will not come easily. However, there are features that should commend themselves to any legislator who is concerned with economy. Under this plan, everything that is spent is purposefully directed to the goal of self-support. Resources will be used in accordance with an organized system of priorities. Tighter administration through the Planning and Development Authority could also be a source of economy.

Finally, there will be targets and, for the first time, a way of measuring the return on outlay. There will be annual reports of progress and detailed explanation of any failure to maintain scheduled advance. Responsibility for failure will be pinpointed. We have here the first requirement for sound economy.

Total costs must not exceed a realistic appraisal of what the United States can be expected to spend. And this amount may set the level of the targets. But given acceptance of the Plan, the commitment must be sufficient to achieve targets that will catch the imagination and attract the energies of the country. Acceptance is an indication of serious intent all around.

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The Plan envisages a close articulation between the Planning and Development Authority and the National Development Institute. The latter would provide personnel from what, it may be hoped, will be a small but highly trained and expert cadre available to the Authorities for specialized tasks and subject to prompt reassignment when replacements have been trained or their task otherwise completed. The National Development Institute would also supervise training of nationals in the United States and arrange for procurement in this country. This close articulation would mean that our resources were committed directly to the Planning and Development Authorities so that, without ostensible tying of aid, the adverse effect on the balance of payments would be much smaller than in the case of ordinary dollar aid.

Under the Positive Development Plan, it is important that funds be available for those measures of social reform no less urgent than education or capital investment. As noted, feudal institutions are as great a barrier to advance as illiteracy and capital shortage, and in the long run they are probably more important. Land reform under the aegis of the Planning and Development Authority helps assure, to some degree, its practicability, for it avoids the obstacle that landlords are either unwilling to entrust their fate to arbitrary valuation procedures and uncertain compensation, or they assume charge of the operation themselves which ensures that planning never gives way to action. The Planning and Development Authority provides the hope that land reform can be done equitably, and hence that it *will* be done.

V

Commonly in the underdeveloped country two powerful political forces are in opposition. On the one hand, there is the drive for modernization and advancing real income; on the other, there is vested interest in backwardness which, in practical manifestation, is usually a system of great landlords and landless tenants. The first thrust is by no means weak in relation to the second. The political strategy of development is to capitalize on it to overcome the vested resistance of the second, and to guide it into channels of orderly change. Perhaps the most serious indictment of present attitudes toward development is that we have failed utterly to find a formula for obviating this potential clash. Then,

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when it occurs, as in Cuba, we can react only with distraught surprise.

No country should be forced or even persuaded to enter the Positive Development Plan. Failure to do so would not prejudice access to other forms of aid. It might be desirable if the first response were modest—one or two Caribbean or Central American countries, a newer African state—so that the initial experience might be on something of a pilot scale. Moreover, it should be made clear from the outset that there are some underdeveloped countries—such as India, Pakistan or Mexico—to which the Positive Development Plan is not applicable. These countries do not use their aid perfectly, but unlike others, they have a positive approach to the problem of development, or (as in the case of Mexico) they have broken through the main barriers to advance.

Objections to this Plan will not be difficult to discover, and it is assuredly open to modification and amendment. But the ability to discover deficiencies in a proposal involving social innovation is not—in the absence of suggested alternatives—the most challenging test to which the social scientist or public official can address himself. Nor is the ability to identify reasons why something should not be done the quality which the American people sought most in the Administration they brought into office last autumn. Above all, it must be borne in mind that the present procedures on foreign aid in a very large number of countries are acceptable only because we have so resolutely avoided measuring the results.

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A TRADE POLICY FOR THE 1960s

By Raymond Vernon

THE savant who first observed that politics is the art of the possible said much less than seems to meet the eye. The *ex ante* and the *ex post* concepts of "the possible" are disconcertingly different. One might better say that politics is the art of enlarging the possible. And one could well add that an indispensable step in the process is to have a view of the goals beyond the possible for which one is reaching.

Our exploration of a trade policy for the 1960s, therefore, will not proceed from the premise that a democratic government is the captive of the parochial interests it represents; on that assumption, we are slated for the dinosaur's fate. Instead, our general frame of reference is this: What trade policy does the decade of the 1960s demand for survival and growth? And what could a determined President hope to achieve, at the outside, if he exploited every possibility in his position of leadership?

In the past decade or two, a deep-seated change has occurred in the traditionally protectionist views of the more highly developed countries of the world. During this period, it has been possible for the twoscore members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to cut deep into their import barriers. The Organization for European Economic Coöperation managed to implement an unprecedented Code of Trade Liberalization. A European Coal and Steel Community has been achieved and a European Economic Community and European Free Trade Area have followed.

Each of these programs constituted a minor miracle of a sort, patently impossible before it actually occurred. The fact that the miracle none the less occurred can be ascribed to various forces. One of these forces—one which can easily be underemphasized—has been the persistent advocacy by most professional economists in the advanced countries for the reduction of trade barriers and the broadening of markets. The wartime emergencies and postwar problems precipitated economists into posts of key importance, not only in the United States but in many other advanced countries as well. In these posts, influenced by fresh professional analyses, the economists-turned-administrators have supported various programs of trade liberalization.

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The basis of the economist's espousal of trade liberalization schemes, it is well to note, has undergone considerable change. Prior to World War II, the United States economist usually based his argument for reduction of trade barriers on some version or other of the comparative-advantage doctrine and, using all the antique illustrations of the virtues of specializing in wheat or cloth, saw the possibility of significant gains for the United States arising out of increased international trade. As the years went on, the economist's views changed somewhat. The underdeveloped areas began to be treated as a different case, demanding their own kind of trade policy. And the rationalization for liberal trade policies in the developed areas of the world grew substantially more complex. Comparative advantage was still regarded as relevant doctrine in many quarters. In addition, however, there is the notion that many efforts of research and production, like those in the field of atomic energy and rocket aircraft, involve such giant fixed costs that development would be impeded unless a huge internal market were available to the developer. Finally, there is the related worry that the control of the industrial structure in some countries and in some products has become so highly concentrated in a few hands that competitive pricing, competitive cost-cutting and competitive product development can be achieved only by merging a number of national markets.

These instincts—they are hardly more than this—have been fortified by various experiences in the postwar world. Extensive reduction of trade barriers by the developed countries through the GATT, the O.E.E.C. and the International Monetary Fund seems to have been a boon to most economies. Even more extensive schemes such as those embodied in the European Economic Community appear to have tripped off a considerable wave of investment and innovation in the countries concerned. And the economic pain associated with the displacement of hitherto protected national interests has not been anywhere near as great as had sometimes been feared.

But the economist's views on trade liberalization would not have been sufficient by themselves to move the mountains which have been shifted during the last decade. Economic rationalizations may have been a necessary condition for progress, but political considerations have provided an essential condition sufficient in itself. In the 1930s, it was a popular political notion that trade bred understanding and interdependence; that as countries

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expanded their trade, their hostile intentions contracted. This was an article of faith with Cordell Hull and it remains as a thread of conviction in some quarters. But as a galvanizing principle for action, it never had much vitality. Instead, the political justification for the major trade-liberalization projects today relates to the closing of ranks and the mobilization of power against outsiders. So, for instance, the justification to which the United States has been most responsive in opening up its markets to Japan is that the move forestalls Communist China from developing a foothold in the Japanese economy. The main political justification for the European Economic Community is the need to forge a unit so strong that it can bargain effectively with the United States, the Soviet Union or the British Commonwealth. The justification for the EFTA is to present an adequate countervailing force against the strength of the E.E.C.

There is not much doubt that the principal contribution which an appropriate trade policy for the United States has to make in the 1960s is political rather than economic. A critical problem for the United States in the decade ahead is by one means or another to maintain a sense of cohesiveness and common purpose among the advanced countries outside the Soviet sphere. Between 1950 and 1960 there has been a shift from an atmosphere capable of generating a Marshall Plan and a NATO to one in which the Western powers seem unwilling to maintain even their excessively modest commitment to the defense of Europe. British public opinion appears more confused and confusing than at any time since the war's end; some elements seem seized by a mood of pacifism and isolation, while others are so fearful of being isolated from the markets of the European Continent that they are prepared to accept a major reorientation of Britain's external relations. Belgium is licking her Congolese wounds, frustrated and unhappy about the equivocal support of her NATO partners. France is absorbed in the play of her Algerian tragedy, unable to turn to other problems while this one remains unsettled. And the confusion of Europe can easily grow worse before it gets better.

One reason for the confusion and uncertainty of Western Europe —not by any means the only reason—has been the fact that the United States has allowed its own policies to grow blurred and distorted. Our policies in the field of foreign trade and foreign aid illustrate the point in an acute way. An unending series of little concessions to domestic pressures has turned our trade legislation into

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a group of ambivalent statutes which hamstring the President in any effort to reduce the trade barriers of the United States and which constantly threaten to force him to increase the existing restrictions on imports. Today, his nominal statutory power to reduce tariffs up to 20 percent by negotiation can in practice be applied to a limited range of products. The statutory admonition to the President that he must avoid "serious injury" in the process is couched in such sweeping terms that it takes on a special meaning. It is not enough for him to protect an industry against serious loss or serious unemployment; he must also "protect" its market position in every product it manufactures. It is not enough to guard the industry against an absolute decline in sales volume or employment in each product; the industry must also be ensured that its share of the market will grow along with that of its foreign competitors. And it is not sufficient to authorize the President to restore earlier tariff cuts toward these ends; he is also admonished to raise duties further in some cases or even to lay on import quotas if necessary to achieve the needed level of protection. The same ambivalence has crept into our foreign aid programs, obscuring and confusing their objectives. On the basis of what they see, many countries suspect that our foreign aid programs are principally designed to collect adherents to our side in the cold war, to increase the influence of American business abroad and to get rid of unsaleable surplus products in our economy.

It seems unnecessary to argue the point that the need to maintain a common sense of purpose and of possible success among the Western democracies is more imperative than ever. To contribute to that unity various things will have to be done. First, we need to reëstablish unequivocally the fact that there is a clear direction in our long-run policy—a long-run commitment to the continuous reduction of our trade barriers for as long as other developed countries will agree and as rapidly as the problems of internal adjustment permit. The reëstablishment of this image is needed not only for the general reassurance it is likely to give other countries but also for a much more immediate and insistent reason. If the President can cut United States tariffs considerably, it may be possible for a time to ensure that the two rival trading blocs of Europe—the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Area—will also hold down their external trade barriers. It may be possible to ensure, for instance, that as France and Germany reduce their tariffs on automobiles in favor of each

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other in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, they will also reduce their common automobile tariff as it applies to British and Swedish cars and to American and Japanese cars. And if they do, the economic schism between the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Area will not grow so swiftly and so deeply as to present a formidable problem for the early future.

To secure the necessary powers to bargain for the reduction of these trade barriers, however, there would have to be great changes in the scope of the President's power to reduce American tariffs and in the way in which he exercised that power in tariff negotiations. If the President had the power to reduce our tariff by 50 percent over a five-year period, without the usual restraints of the present escape clause and peril-point clauses, this might be sufficient to bargain effectively with the European blocs; but any power of much narrower scope would almost surely be insufficient.

At the same time, the President could not sweep under the rug the problems of internal readjustment for the American economy which such tariff reductions might entail. On grounds of both equity and national growth, these problems have to be dealt with. One approach to the problem of adjustment is to give some sectors of the economy more time to make the adjustment if necessary. On that theory, the President could be empowered to restore a tariff rate if a reduction was causing serious difficulty, provided that the reduction would then gradually be put in force again over a specified span of years.

Another approach to the problem is through a trade adjustment program. Displaced labor or capital which needed redeployment could be given an assist by programs of retraining, by providing moving expenses and capital loans, and by technical assistance—operations of a sort well within the experience of the United States Government and of various governments in Europe. The capital and labor which could not be successfully redeployed—the housewives who could not move to another area to find a different job and the capital which was so irretrievably frozen or so highly specialized as to be lost to other pursuits—might require the payment of indemnity; but the United Kingdom, for instance, has handled precisely this problem with remarkable success in shrinking back the size of its cotton textile industry. Programs of this sort do not eradicate the adjustment problem. They can blunt the edge of it sufficiently, however, to

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ensure that the gains generated from increased trade are not offset by the losses involved in the cost of shifting resources.

Assuming that the problems of trade adjustment can be dealt with, one is entitled to ask whether the current balance-of-payment difficulties of the United States may be a reason for holding back from added steps of trade liberalization. The answer is a fairly unqualified no. On the contrary, it seems quite clear that the United States stands to gain from trade liberalization with Europe in balance-of-payment terms. European firms have had easy access to the United States market for some years. Firms in the United States have just begun to acquire equivalent access to European markets as import licensing systems have begun to be dismantled; and such firms have made only a beginning in the exploitation of these markets. Whether American firms will take full advantage of this recent surge of dismantling depends on their long-run expectations regarding access to these markets. If the present drift of events continues without some new initiatives in liberalizing trade, sellers face more and more discrimination in Europe as the common-market schemes move to completion. If the trend is muffled by measures such as those proposed here, sellers can be counted on to exploit their new opportunities.

Apart from resuming reciprocal reduction of trade barriers, the United States can develop a score of other measures which create a clearer image of its purpose. It would have to amend its disingenuous "national security" provision, which authorizes the President to impose import restrictions whenever imports threaten to impair our national security. Much more to the point as a national security measure would be a statute which granted the President the power to suspend existing import restrictions for some limited period in specified products whenever our national security would be materially strengthened by such a step. Such a power might afford the means for admitting products like Icelandic fish or Egyptian cotton at those critical moments when such a step could ward off the possibility of Soviet penetration into the economies of friendly countries.

Even if we were to make these changes, however, there is a clear risk that two or three years hence we may conclude that we were trying to clean the Aegean stables with a demitasse spoon. What if the crisis of purposelessness in the Atlantic alliance should persist and deepen? What if the European Free Trade Area and the European Economic Community can find no basis

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for bridging their growing differences? What if France-after-de Gaulle and Germany-after-Adenauer prove so confused in direction and so torn by internal conflict that what is left of the Atlantic alliance seems scarcely worth another ministerial meeting? Then we shall have to offer much larger and more challenging goals to the remnants of the alliance. Taking a leaf from the volumes which Europe has written in the last ten years, we may find that it is our turn to propose a customs union or a free trade area to the other developed countries—one in which the members of the E.E.C., EFTA and possibly Japan, Australia and New Zealand could share.

If this were what political unity demanded, the capacity of the United States to make the decisions essential for its survival would be tested to the utmost. It is hard to envisage a Congress which before the fact would authorize the President to negotiate such an arrangement, or which after the fact would ratify his agreements. We can only hope that, at that stage, our political system would function as effectively as that of France or Germany when they decided to create an economic community.

II

However one envisages the shape of future trade relations among the developed countries, the smell of trouble for the less-developed countries is fairly strong. Europe may be organized around the European Free Trade Area and the European Economic Community or around a new arrangement which embraces both; or the United States may be associated in an even wider arrangement among the developed countries. In either case, unless the implications of these arrangements for trade with the underdeveloped areas are fully considered, these areas may suffer great loss.

There are two segments in the trade of the underdeveloped countries which are especially likely to be sensitive to the creation of economic unions among the developed nations. One of these is trade in manufactured products of a certain type—those based on a comparatively simple, self-contained technology, involving a significant labor cost content and requiring comparatively low transport costs when shipped across international boundaries. Textiles are the classic example of such products. Transistors are a latter-day illustration. It seems inevitable that products which will fill this bill of specifications should be produced in swiftly

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growing volumes in underdeveloped areas. The costs of transmitting technology across national boundaries are declining rapidly —especially as travel time for key executives is reduced and as better communication makes them constantly accessible to the home office. The costs of transmitting products across national boundaries are also falling swiftly as delivery becomes swifter and more certain; these are critically important factors in the purchase of products for assembly or the purchase of products for consumer merchandising.

The other type of product in which the underdeveloped country has an export potential is, of course, raw materials in either their pristine state or in some form of early fabrication. Advanced countries not uncommonly are also major producers of raw materials; what one of them does not produce, another may. A customs union or other preferential arrangement among them could squeeze underdeveloped areas out of their accustomed markets.

Assuming—as we are doing here—that it is critically important not to impede the development of the laggard areas of the world, we are obliged to tailor the trade agreements among the developed nations to fit our objectives vis-à-vis the underdeveloped countries. The policy of the industrialized West must be that of granting unilateral concessions to these countries in order to keep our markets open to their products.

Once again, we are obliged to ask if we dare pursue this policy in light of our balance-of-payments position. And once again the answer is that the balance-of-payments problem need not represent a deterrent. When underdeveloped countries are offered a chance to sell more goods, their inevitable response is to buy more goods—not to hoard gold or to build up overseas balances. Their import wants are so great that they cannot fail to bring their imports up to exports in a very short order. At the same time, however, the expanded export opportunities offered to these countries are best provided by all the developed nations in concert, not by the United States alone.

Our trade policy toward the underdeveloped countries must do more, however. Through all the haze of embattled statistics, the fact remains that the instability of raw material prices and export earnings constitutes a major obstacle to the sustained development of many of the less advanced countries. A perennial answer to the problem has been commodity agreements of one sort or another. But commodity agreements are notoriously difficult to

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negotiate. Once negotiated, they typically accomplish less than was hoped for. To a degree and for a time, they may muffle the fluctuations of prices. But when the demand for industrial raw materials falls off or the supply of agricultural products suddenly changes through natural causes, export proceeds inevitably suffer. And when agreements go wrong and seek to impose too high a price on the consumer, as they so commonly do, substitutes swiftly develop or new sources of supply come in. The result is often an irreversible setback for the producers of the product.

We must, of course, continue to study the possibility of reaching agreements to stabilize commodities. But we know enough already to suspect that they will carry us only so far. As a supplement, therefore, we must consider how best to stabilize the supply of foreign currencies of the countries concerned. In theory, the International Monetary Fund can do this; indeed, if pressed, its officials would insist that they do this already. In point of fact, however, no raw-material exporting country can lay its future plans upon the assumption that the I.M.F. will help make up any deficit generated by year-to-year changes in raw material prices or supplies. I.M.F. extensions of credit are commonly hedged about with conditions which countries vulnerable to the raw-material problem find it most difficult to meet—the requirement, for instance, that steps to balance budgets and curtail foreign exchange expenditures must be instituted concurrently with the grant of assistance. So countries may be forced to curtail their imports of fertilizer or their expenditures on irrigation as a condition precedent to I.M.F. aid.

Conditions of one sort or another will always be indispensable to a credit-granting institution. But the conditions imposed by the I.M.F., seen through the eyes of the outside observer, have run too much in the tradition of the banker and too little in the tradition of the entrepreneur. They have too easily subordinated the objectives of growth to those of stability. There are times, of course, when stability of some sort is a prerequisite to growth. But there are times, too, when growth is the instrument through which balance is eventually achieved.

Finally, we need to participate more actively and constructively in the development of regional trade arrangements among the underdeveloped nations. The nature of our participation should be shaped by the recognition of two or three hard facts. One is the pervasive role of monopoly or oligopoly in the modern

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sector of most of these countries, a situation which runs from the granting of credit through to the marketing of products. The other is the insufficiency of individual national markets to support many types of modern industry or to encourage the various specializations so necessary for increased output.

Regional trade arrangements do not automatically solve this sort of problem. On the contrary, they can be used to extend the scope of existing monopolies; they can force some member countries to shift from efficient outside sources for some of their critical products to inefficient inside sources; and they can spread stagnation a little further by creating tight little communities of nations insulated from the effects of outside competition. One can say of these regional trade arrangements, therefore, only that they offer an opportunity for the speed-up of growth, but not an assurance that the speed-up will occur. If in their development they offer wider markets, more opportunities for specialization, more diversified sources of credit and a multiplication in sources of supply, the growth objective will be closer at hand. The influence of the United States should be used to ensure that the arrangements work in that direction.

III

So far we have been looking at the trade relations of the United States with countries outside the Soviet bloc. What is more, we have been assuming—while well aware of the rashness of that assumption—that the countries concerned conduct their foreign trade more or less on a pattern followed by the United States, a pattern in which individual consumers and traders determine the flow of goods across national boundaries. What about our trade relations with the state-trading countries of the world—particularly those which comprise the Soviet bloc?

This is not altogether a new question for the United States, but it presses for a reply today with heightened urgency. Though the United States groped for a solution from time to time in the prewar period, it never really found more than half a solution. Then in the postwar period the problem arose again; but at first it took a form which could easily be handled. In some cases, such as those of Britain and France, state trading was confined to just a few commodities, representing an exception to a general rule. In these cases, the United States sought to apply rules analogous to those which would apply in private trade: the import mark-ups of state-trading entities were thought of as analogous to tariffs,

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hence negotiable between the selling and the buying countries; the selection of supply sources by the state-trading entities was deemed analogous to the application of rules against discrimination, hence subject to scrutiny and complaint; and so on.

But the problem of dealing with economies fully committed to state direction within and to state trading without posed a very different set of issues. Here, "price," "mark-up" and "discrimination" acquired totally different meanings and all the analogies with private trading began to crumble. Since our political relations with practically all such countries were crumbling as well, there was no real need to face the issue. The United States allowed only a trickle of trade to take place with such countries, over the barriers imposed by our Export Control Act. And under the statutory mandate of the Battle Act we tried to persuade other friendly countries to pursue parallel policies, using the leverage of our foreign aid programs wherever we could.

Today, it is clear that other friendly countries have every intention of expanding their trade with state-directed and state-trading economies such as those of the Soviet bloc, in spite of the feeble United States pressures still being exerted on them. There is reason, therefore, to turn back to this baffling problem of trade between state-directed and free-enterprise economies. Moreover, the desire to find a solution by now seems fairly widespread. Discussions in the Economic Commission for Europe and in the GATT over the past two or three years indicate that many other countries, some of one type, some of the other, would like to find a better means for handling such trade.

The first step for the United States ought to be that of clearing its statutory decks for constructive action. While there is not the space here to debate the point in detail, it seems reasonably clear that the approach pursued in our Export Control Act and in our Battle Act is almost a dead letter. In administering these acts, the United States has assumed that trade with the Soviet bloc in a broadly defined range of products is inevitably harmful, on balance, to our side and that the denial of these products to the Soviet bloc contributes to our security. Two things begin to be distressingly clear, however. In the prevailing mood of the world today, an effective system of denial of industrial goods no longer is possible; there are too many uncontrollable sources from which such goods can come. Besides, there is grave doubt if denial would make much sense even if it could be achieved; the outcome of

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modern warfare surely is not affected to any extent by holding down the supply of industrial goods to the Soviet bloc. Accordingly, the Export Control Act and the Battle Act should be used only for the control of arms, ammunition and implements of war in trade with the Soviet bloc, not for that broad range of industrial products to which we now attempt to apply it.

Once we have put the security objective in proper perspective, we ought to be clear as to our objectives in attempting to develop a *modus vivendi* for trade with state-trading economies. Two objectives in particular seem important. First, we want to protect our multilateral system, with its emphasis on nondiscrimination, declining trade barriers and maximum choice, from the corrosive and debilitating effects which are generated when any country in the system tries to accommodate itself to the bilateral, discriminatory patterns of the state trader; that is, we want to check the use of quotas, inconvertible currencies and discriminatory pricing which are the usual stock-in-trade of a state trading entity. Second, we want to be sure that the state trader cannot exploit his monopoly power to such an extent that he walks off with the bulk of the gains from trade.

In order to develop such a system, we need the coöperation of other countries. To get that coöperation, we must make it crystal clear that our objectives are not a part of cold-war military or political strategy—at least not in the usual sense. The amendment of the Battle Act should go some distance in that direction. But to make the point clearer still and to give the President the necessary powers to develop a *modus vivendi,* it would also be useful to amend the Trade Agreements Act so that the President was authorized in his discretion to suspend the provisions requiring trade discrimination against the Soviet bloc.

With these powers in hand, the President could aggressively try to develop reasonable trade relations with the bloc. In all likelihood, he would have to move on two fronts. He would need to learn what ground rules our friends are prepared to accept as a basis for such trade; and he would have to try to learn the enigmatic intentions and desires of the Soviet bloc in the trade field. As far as our friends were concerned, those with convertible currencies and open trading systems might be expected to agree that they would avoid the use of discriminatory trade measures favoring the Soviet bloc, including the use of clearing accounts, import licensing systems which reserved some share of the domestic mar-

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ket to Soviet products, and so on; that they would consult on problems of serious market disruption generated by Soviet pricing practices; and that they would try to develop joint countermoves with us in cases in which the Soviet bloc was using the threat to cut off its trade or the promise to expand it as a means of political penetration of some friendly country.

What the Soviet bloc might agree to as appropriate rules of the game in the trade field is much less clear. In contacts with Soviet representatives on trade matters thus far, one gets the disconcerting sense that an enormously wide gulf exists in the communication of basic points of view on the subject. Any system in which governments guarantee neither markets nor sources of supply is one which the Soviet side seems to have genuine difficulties in comprehending. Whether they understand the system or not, Soviet trade representatives seem to find it hard to believe that governments cannot really reassert a directive role over their trade if they choose; the question, as the Soviet side sees it, is whether they choose. The chances of developing an early *modus vivendi* with the Soviet bloc, therefore, does not seem high. But it may not be too early to launch the long process of communication which must precede an agreement.

A common thread runs through all these proposals, coloring our suggestions regarding trade with Western Europe, trade with the underdeveloped nations and trade with the Soviet bloc. As a nation, we have been of two minds. We have had no real doubts where our destiny was pushing us—toward greater and greater economic and political involvement with the rest of the world. Yet, from time to time, we have cast a wistful look back to the times when economic and political isolation were available as a real alternative. We have punctuated our bold moves of engagement with incongruous counter-moves of disengagement; we have reduced our tariffs while imposing import quotas on products like lead, zinc and oil; we have increased our aid while enlarging the conditions on its use which would protect our agriculture and our textile industry. As a result, we appear the reluctant dragon—powerful yet afraid. What we have to shed is fear—fear of the loss of foreign exchange, fear of the ability of our domestic industry to respond to its opportunities and its problems, fear of the tactics of the Soviet trader. If economic engagement is a battle, then the battle is inevitable. And we had best be getting on with it.

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FINANCIAL POLICY AND AMERICAN PURPOSE

By Henry G. Aubrey

THE United States emerged from the Second World War as the strongest power, militarily and politically, the largest exporter and importer of goods and services, and the most important source of public and private capital. After an all-too-optimistic period of one-sided disarmament, this country was obliged to face up to the realities of the cold war and to give a lead to the free world in building an unprecedented arsenal of nuclear deterrence. At the same time, the mounting aspirations of the developing areas for political and economic independence confronted this country with a rising tide of demands. Within little more than a decade the United States found itself the fulcrum of the forces of change in a tumultuous world, the West's chief protagonist in the cold war and competitive coexistence, and the largest purveyor of military and economic, especially financial, assistance.

These facts are well known but their consequences—the scale of our involvement and the full weight of the resulting burden—have only recently begun to emerge clearly. At first, the realization of our new range of responsibilities was perhaps tempered by a wishful impression that we could control the rhythm of developments without placing an undue strain upon our resources. More recently, however, the pressures have multiplied as the Communist bloc has spread its activities over the entire globe and as the self-assertion of the poorer countries has brought in its wake a flood of new demands. As a result, the role of economics in world affairs has become more crucial; and by the same token the importance of the financial instrument of foreign policy has emerged with unprecedented clarity.

After many years of vast expenditure we are now face to face with a twin set of limitations, one old and one new. The battle of the budget has always meant an annual confrontation of the question of what we can afford for arms and for foreign assistance. But only now is there also a need to pay close attention to that portion of our expenditure which is to be spent abroad; for over the past decade an excess of international payments over receipts has diminished our stock of gold and increased our for-

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eign indebtedness to a point where, rightly or wrongly, the strength of the dollar has been called in question.

This is a new situation, one that poses new policy questions. The excess of payments—commonly known as the balance of payments problem or, as some have it, the dollar crisis—is a financial issue, yet the deficit does not simply stem from financial improvidence. Even a cursory view makes it evident that payments which are primarily motivated by our relations with our allies and the less developed areas bear a large, if not a lion's share, of responsibility. In fact, in replenishing the depleted reserves of our allies and friends the deficit has served a deliberate objective of our postwar economic policy—until recently when the rapid piling-up of foreign liabilities made it painfully evident that the flow had got somewhat out of control. Clearly, this deficit and its implications are not just a financial matter but a corollary of much broader economic and political developments. For this reason it will not do to discuss this issue on a technical level alone. What is at stake is the place of the dollar in world finance; and this, in turn, reflects the American position in the world economy and cannot be dissociated from the role of the United States in a rapidly changing world.

This wide spectrum of issues calls for a comprehensive approach. The overriding need is to formulate a general policy that takes account of the interrelationship of diverse problems which, perhaps in happier days, could be treated in isolation. To accomplish this, we need to reappraise the balance and consistency among various policies and in the use of various tools. In particular, the financial instrument has been coming to the fore, partly because finance is now so pervasive a factor, partly because it now bulks so large.

The growing need for financial resources—both dollars spent at home and dollars flowing abroad—has aggravated the ever-present problem of scarcity. In economic terms this means a quest for better allocation and better utilization. In political terms it suggests the need for a set of priorities and an awareness of the consequences of denying those with a low rating. In international terms this problem calls for more collaboration and perhaps a better division of labor among the relatively developed countries. It also implies a special place for finance in policy formulation. As finance cuts across virtually all issues its various strands need to be gathered together in a consistent manner; and

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for the same reason financial policy deserves to be recognized as an integral part of general policy.

II

In order to see the extent of the American involvement, it may be useful to sketch the background of the present policy dilemma that arises from too many demands upon limited American resources. The Second World War appears as the watershed between an era of non-involvement and the road to closer international collaboration. But it is well to recognize that the new American sense of mission was primarily directed to a rather narrow field, one that was closely related to the experiences of the Great Depression: international stability, the restoration of multilateral trade, and the free exchange of the world's major currencies—convertibility.

Notwithstanding the support of economic development by the United States in bilateral and international programs, many political leaders in the developing countries have never rid themselves of the notion that rapid economic betterment stands a poor second in the priorities of American foreign policy. This is regrettable because it is precisely the issue of development that has been building up such a strong head of steam in the awakening non-Western world. And it is the Russians and the Chinese Communists who have been able to pose as the real champions of rapid economic growth made possible by large-scale industrialization; they point to their domestic record of achievement as evidence. This has indeed become a major issue of "competitive coexistence."

East-West economic competition in the underdeveloped world is one of the major causes of greater American involvement abroad. It spells a *broader geographic* involvement, for the gospel of economic development is spreading like wildfire. True, this would have been the case even without Communist interference, but the pitch of expectations would not have risen so high nor so fast without backing by those who cultivate frustration as an instrument of policy. Competitive coexistence also means a *deeper* involvement because the time for gradualism is running out in an atmosphere of relentlessly rising pressures. And this in turn means a *faster rate* of involvement, for the rhythm of events has been speeded by Communist needling of nationalistic anti-Western sentiments; by the same token it has increasingly placed the

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tactical advantage of initiative in the hands of the Communist bloc.

Thus competitive coexistence pursued by the Kremlin with increasing vigor has meant a *rising level* of American involvement. For, in addition to the economic task, the military involvement has also grown in magnitude and complexity. Providing simultaneously for a strategic deterrent and for the ever-present danger of brushfire conflicts has required mounting resources, while at the same time the emergence of economic assistance as a major instrument of policy has extended our foreign policy interests to ever broader areas of the world economy.

This means that the nature of our involvement has also been shifting. Our relationship to Europe is no more, as it was after the war, that of guardian to ward. The United States is no longer the depository of most of the world's gold and hard exchange, the single pivot of international financial policy on which the welfare of most other countries seemed to depend to an extraordinary degree. Europe, now our largest customer, is also becoming a formidable competitor. And, as Western Europe moves to resume its old position as a prime exporter of capital, it can become either a competitor or a partner in many ventures.

As the need for development capital elsewhere in the world rises there are calls for a greater European contribution. While some countries, notably Western Germany and Italy, can certainly afford more, France and Britain are already giving nearly as much non-military assistance per head of population as we, and rather more than we in terms of per capita national income.[1] Even with a rising contribution from Europe, the mounting magnitude of requirements makes it likely that the United States will have to remain the largest supplier of capital, a role it can reject only at great political peril. Quite naturally, the demands of the less developed areas will continue to bear most heavily upon the United States as the main protagonist of the free world and the nation to which the Communists primarily address their political and economic challenge. Even if we can look forward to having more active partners in the development task we cannot hope to escape the main responsibility. And finally, if we really want to be and remain the standard bearer of the capitalist system, we cannot escape the economic consequences of this prominent role.

[1] See the author's discussion of this issue in "Sharing the Burden?" *Challenge*, March 1960.

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III

Seen in this broad perspective, the American balance-of-payments problem takes on a significance far surpassing the predominantly technical terms in which it has generally been discussed. It is already becoming evident that a number of remedies that are commonly applied to conventional balance-of-payments difficulties are not available to the United States on account of our international responsibilities; these we can share with others but we cannot reduce them below a point which is compatible with our position of world leadership. And since our problems are really those of the entire Western community of nations, it would be futile to try to solve the balance-of-payments problem without tackling the underlying issues of trade and aid by a truly comprehensive collaboration among all interested parties.

Our balance-of-payments problem has been amply discussed elsewhere.[2] The basic fact is that our foreign payments have exceeded receipts, on an average by about $3.5 billion a year over the last three years, of which about one-half has been taken out by foreign countries in the form of gold and the rest has been accumulated as dollar claims. The total of our dollar liabilities now exceeds our gold stock and there is much talk about the consequences of any large-scale attempt to convert these claims into gold. This is unlikely, and the real problem is not any immediate danger but the fact that no end to the deficit is yet in sight. True, our trade position has been improving greatly in recent months, but the resulting export surplus still falls far short of covering the outflow for military and economic assistance. While it may be futile to attribute the responsibility for the deficit to any one specific group of items, it is relevant to note that the sum of all private transactions—trade, services and investment—continues to yield a surplus, while government transactions—military expenditures, grants, loans minus repayments—by far exceed the surplus on private account. This does not mean that a reduction of such payments would automatically eliminate the deficit, because it may well be offset by a decline of receipts in the private sector, for example, through smaller exports. But it is evident that the deficit is intimately linked to government policy and to the purposes and needs of that policy.

This, then, is the crux of the matter. We have been pursuing

[2] See, *e.g.*, Robert B. Anderson, "The Balance of Payments Problem," and Richard N. Gardner, "Strategy for the Dollar," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1960.

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deficit policies in order to further the overriding objectives of our foreign policy. And as long as the pressures of the cold war and competitive coexistence and a growing sense of responsibility for world economic development continue, we cannot be optimistic about our ability to eliminate this deficit in short order. The problem is how we can contrive to do what general policy demands without arousing the spectre of bankruptcy which overanxious observers profess to see around the corner.

It is no accident that most thoughtful discussions of the deficit produce a list of policies we should *not* adopt and the various avenues of exploration usually reach a dead-end. A good many theoretically available measures are self-defeating because they would backfire upon a country which looms so large in the world economy and is so closely linked with its welfare. If we were to place restrictions on our imports, our exports would be reduced by countries which could no longer afford to buy American exports so freely. If we were to reduce foreign aid, there is a good chance that our exports would also suffer, since most of this aid goes to buy American goods anyway. If we "tie" our foreign aid to American purchases, we may gain in the short-run, but some countries would lose; if they in turn were to cut their purchases of American goods our dollar savings would be reduced. In its final months the Eisenhower Administration took actions which promise some stemming of the dollar outflow but with little assurance that the eventual saving would really be very large. It is significant that President Kennedy seemed to acknowledge the long-range nature of the problem in his balance-of-payments message to Congress; and the measures he listed address themselves to the positive rather than to the restrictive elements of a solution.

Once we realize that there are so many measures we cannot take alone without harmful effects, it follows logically that we must act jointly with like-minded partners. In other words, the common problems call for joint action. This line of thought appears even more compelling if we bear in mind that the dollar is not just one currency among many but, with gold, the most important medium of international exchange and reserves. It is literally true that the strength of the dollar is not a matter of concern for the United States alone but for the rest of the world as well. Hence whatever ails the dollar calls for a truly international cure.

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Only an unduly narrow view of the problem—and, ironically, one that runs counter to our own professed multilateral views—could have singled out bilateral remedies for our deficit, even though the Anderson mission to Germany sought it from the one country where the largest surpluses have occurred. Thus our demand on Germany for a greater contribution to lighten our balance-of-payments burden would seem to have been ill-conceived, even if the timing and the implementation had been better. It may have appeared natural enough simply from the foreign exchange angle, but the Germans had a point if they retorted that this involved more than a disbursement of dollars. In their search for defensive arguments they may have sensed better than the American Administration the complexity of this problem, for it is one that really encompasses the entire Western community and cuts across the entire range of its problems—military, political, economic and financial.

Once more we are driven to conclude that discovering a solution to our balance-of-payments problem means finding a more genuinely international approach to all the underlying issues. If they can be successfully disentangled, the chances are that the deficit problem can also be resolved, for the American balance-of-payments is a composite expression of all real and monetary resource flows and a function of the operational efficiency of the international monetary system.

This approach also offers a better perspective on the various plans for international monetary reform that have recently been widely discussed.[3] These schemes have the virtue of not confining themselves to spot remedies designed merely to mitigate or postpone the pressures upon the American balance-of-payments. They acknowledge the fact that our dollar deficit increases the world's reserves, but also that the dollar's function as a reserve currency depends on the continued confidence in its stability and security. Yet they fail to recognize that a partial solution—and this goes for a monetary scheme as for any other—cannot succeed unless the underlying economic *and* political problems are tackled simultaneously.

Moreover, the special role of the dollar in international finance

[3] See Robert Triffin, "Gold and the Dollar Crisis" (Yale University Press, 1960); Edward M. Bernstein, "International Effects of U.S. Economic Policy," Study Paper No. 16, *Study on Employment, Growth, and Price Levels,* Joint Economic Committee, 86th Congress, 2nd Session; and, by the same author, "The Adequacy of United States' Gold Reserves." Paper presented to the American Economic Association in St. Louis, December 30, 1960, to be published in *The American Economic Review,* Papers and Proceedings, May 1961.

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involves another issue that is singularly our own. In the wake of its economic and political ascendancy the United States has become a primary financial center. This country, therefore, needs to think twice whether the internationalization of the world's reserves (particularly of dollar reserves) that some of these schemes envisage would be a desirable solution if it were to jeopardize our new and still untested place in the financial world.

IV

Right now, in the present irksome phase of worrying over "deficits," "burdens" and other discouraging symptoms of our world-wide involvement, we tend to overlook their positive counterpart. Even if we were capable of sloughing off the onerous responsibilities that are now looming so large in public awareness, it is doubtful that we would want to discard the related benefits. For the United States to be such a large factor in the world economy involves much that is economically valuable. The growing magnitude of American trade is one piece of evidence—not only exports but imports as well, which can be considered undesirable only from a very narrow viewpoint. Similarly, our emergence as a primary center of world finance is both a reflection of the dollar's growing role and a valuable opportunity for the future. It is surely not accidental that the westward gravitation of international finance from the old-world centers has run parallel to a similar shift in trade and in relative weight in world affairs.

The United States today is indeed the largest and the most flexible capital market of the world. In many transactions American funds have been progressively linked with other national or international participants. One postwar feature of particular importance has been the catalytic effect of international institutions in promoting a new form of collaboration between international public funds and American and foreign private capital. American foreign finance has been intimately connected with the function of the dollar as a medium of exchange and a vehicle of capital transfers.

In the light of these expanding activities and their invigorating effects at home and abroad it hardly seems appropriate to be overly concerned with the balance-of-payments effect of capital flows—even to the point of toying with the idea of subjecting them to controls, a temptation the Kennedy Administration has wisely resisted; we must also recognize the advantages of our

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possessing a financial apparatus that can serve as an instrument of future growth. Similarly, while foreign investment may lead to competition with domestic industry at certain points, it is also an instrument of economic interaction and an opportunity for benefits that can be expected to accrue to a primary financial center in many tangible and intangible ways. Conversely, policies that would block these channels for the sake of short-term considerations may cripple a process of evolution that has hardly run its course. In other words, what is at stake is the future of the United States as a financial center.

Policy formulation must take account of the increasing role of American finance in the international order. As a continent-sized economy like that of the United States increases its weight in international trade and investment, political consequences are bound to follow, no matter whether intended or not. By the same token, the greater American weight in international affairs is reflected in a more prominent place in the world economy. And if our financial policies are not made consistent with this broader context, they may endanger rather than further the over-all pattern of international policy of which they ought to form an integral part. Financial policy is not only a branch of general policy that deals with the use of financial instruments; it must also concern itself with the effects of general policy on the nation's financial capabilities and institutions.

In attempting to plan the best use of our financial resources to support the broad objectives of national policy, we must look at the various alternatives open to us and at the indirect and often seemingly remote effects of each policy decision. It is only through examining these multiple and complex interactions that we can formulate a consistent financial policy. In the future, if we are to use our limited resources with tolerable effectiveness, we must first arrive at a clear and unified view of the problem.

The point of departure in seeking such a unified approach is to understand the new and unaccustomed fact of the central position of the United States in world affairs, the largest trader, the biggest capital market and the holder of the strongest—still the strongest—currency. These unrivaled capabilities and our exposed position as the foremost Western protagonist in the cold war and competitive coexistence are responsible for unprecedented demands on the nation's foreign finance. While the American capital market has been responding with unexpected vigor,

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considering the novelty of the situation and the handicap of earlier defaults, much of the pressure is felt most urgently in the public domain. And since policy decisions are apt to affect all economic operations, the making of financial policy has to be raised above the piecemeal approach that has generally prevailed over the past two decades.

Because the demands are so great and the challenge to optimum performance with limited means so critical under ubiquitous Communist pressure, the United States cannot "go it alone." In the field of foreign aid this has already been recognized and it has led to demands for a more equitable sharing of the burden with the rejuvenated economies of Europe. Yet, a broader collaboration than a mere sharing of costs is required for a common task of such immense magnitude. This will demand a greater effort on our part as well. Financial policy on the national level now must be made consistent with our need for international coöperation; and, conversely, international collaboration must be harmonized with the bedrock requirements of national policy. The United States, while still prominent, is no longer so predominant in economic terms and is now more dependent on coöperation with its peers; long and hard thought will therefore have to be given to the essential adaptations that will be needed in both the foreign and domestic fields of economic policy.

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PORTUGAL IN AFRICA

By James Duffy

TODAY small Portugal is still mistress of three African territories which are the oldest European colonies (or, as the Portuguese insist, "overseas provinces") in the world, and with a little luck she may soon regain an earlier distinction of being the only colonial power in Africa. In the course of her long history in Africa, Portugal has survived at one time or another every manner of crisis, and from Prime Minister Oliveira Salazar ("This is the mission of our life") down to chiefs of post in the remote Angolan bush, the Portuguese seem serenely confident that they will once more ride out the storm.

The stakes are high. No other European nation has been so long accustomed to possessing an African empire, and for the majority of the Portuguese people the thought that their small country owns African territories equivalent in size to the area of Western Europe has always been reassuring. Nor is the attraction only sentimental. In recent years the two largest of the colonies, Angola and Mozambique, have come to occupy an important position in the nation's total economy. The Portuguese colonies are not as materially prosperous as some neighboring areas, particularly the Congo, the Rhodesias and South Africa, but they are not as naturally poor as many of the new independent states. Angola and Mozambique are paying their own way, in spite of the reluctance of Portuguese capital to invest in Africa and the relative lack of investment capital from abroad. A large part of Portuguese exports, notably wine and cotton goods, is destined for Africa, and increasing percentages of Portuguese African products—coffee, tea, sisal, copra, diamonds—go into the world market. The economic picture is not entirely favorable, but it has never been better, and without the African provinces continental Portugal's economy would suffer seriously.

But, as the Portuguese themselves acknowledge, the problems which must be solved have never been greater and the room for manœuvre has never been less. The relative tranquility of Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea is not necessarily an accurate indication of political reality. But it is certain that outside the colonies, Portuguese African opposition groups, particularly those in Leopoldville and Conakry, grow daily in size and influ-

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ence. Elsewhere in the continent African national sentiment is united against the continuing presence of Portugal in Africa. Abroad, Asian and Communist nations, with the support of anti-colonial groups elsewhere, have taken up the attack against alleged Portuguese repressions, and each United Nations session rings with denunciations of Portuguese policy. This concerted opposition lost Portugal a seat on the Security Council last December. There is a question how much longer Portugal may count on even qualified support by Britain and the United States. Finally, in Portugal itself, where there are unrest and dissent and the Salazar era may be coming to an end, the turn of political events could have unpredictable repercussions in Africa. To devise an African policy which can meet even several of these challenges will test the capacities of any Portuguese Government.

The first, and easiest, task which the Salazar Government has recently undertaken has been to strengthen Portugal's sense of solidarity with the African territories. Not since the 1930s, when the régime in a moment of imperialist zeal concocted the concept of the Third Empire and created an overseas mystique which is still the basis for its African policy, has the Government labored so conscientiously to develop and sell the spirit of Lusitanian identity at home and overseas. The purposes of the program are three: to assure popular support for the Government's position in Africa; to distract attention from unrest at home; to convince the growing number of Portuguese citizens in Africa that the mother country has not forgotten them and stands ready to meet the emerging crisis.

Twice before, in the years following the Conference of Berlin in 1885 and again in the 1930s, Portuguese governments were successful in creating and exploiting a consciousness of Africa in order to solidify the Portuguese position in Angola and Mozambique. The technique is by now a familiar one. Speeches, colonial congresses, exhibits and postage stamps keep Africa constantly in the public eye. High officials make publicized visits to the territories. Journalists, teachers and students are sent on government-sponsored tours of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique, and groups of old colonists are brought back from Africa to visit—and be seen—in Portugal. A steady diet of colonial news is fed the controlled press and radio. Street rallies are organized to demonstrate popular support for Portuguese colonial solidarity.

In 1960 the campaign reached an extended climax in the cere-

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monies attending the five-hundredth anniversary of the death of Prince Henry the Navigator, the man most responsible for Portugal's overseas expansion. In Portugal and Brazil, in Africa and the remaining fragments of the vast sixteenth-century empire, the particularly Portuguese contribution of Prince Henry was extolled in thousands of speeches and articles. The words had a certain sameness, for one of the calculated purposes of the celebrations was to abstract from Henry's life and works the traditional ideals of Portugal's overseas conduct: Christianity, racial tolerance and human idealism. Dr. Pedro Theotónio Pereira, Minister of the Presidency (Dr. Salazar's administrative assistant), spoke at the formal opening of the commemorative sessions in these familiar phrases: "We live in an age of renascence which links us with the past and which we will try to project into the future . . . Our national values are more vigorous and rejuvenated than ever. The unity and solidarity which hold together the pieces of Portuguese territory have never been stronger, and the sentiment of all the peoples has never been more unanimous."

To give greater substance to the claim that the Portuguese world shares a unique cultural tradition, the Salazar Government has begun to talk of a Lusitanian community made up of continental and overseas Portugal and Brazil. Although a treaty of friendship and consultation has been signed by the two nations, the new Brazilian Government of President Janio Quadros may not be altogether sympathetic to Portugal's aspirations. Certainly, the *Santa Maria* affair has demonstrated that Quadros will not dance to Salazar's tune. However this may be, it is apparent that for the Portuguese the creation of a Portuguese-Brazilian commonwealth would be a resounding demonstration of their claims for the spiritual unity of the Lusitanian world. Brazil, whose population is in large part Negro or Mulatto, has long been heralded as the success story of Portugal's overseas policies, and her presence in a commonwealth would, Portuguese planners hope, offer a convincing argument against anti-colonial attacks. While for the moment the creation of a Lusitanian community would be exploited by the Portuguese primarily for diplomatic and propaganda purposes, ultimately the commonwealth could be Portugal's last trump in Africa; it could provide a framework in which Portuguese Africa could be granted independence.

To achieve the maximum benefits from what will at best be an amorphous commonwealth, and to heighten the implied anal-

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ogy between Brazil and the African territories, Portugal must make Angola, Mozambique and Guinea overseas provinces in fact as well as in name. Historically, the three areas have always been colonies, no matter whether they were called "overseas provinces," as in the nineteenth century, or "colonies," as in the early days of the Salazar régime, or, as in the 1950s when the régime began to build up its case for remaining in Africa, "overseas provinces" again. The fact is that more than 95 percent of the population of Portuguese Africa are not enfranchised citizens of Portugal; they have no civil rights and are legally regarded as wards of the state governed under a *regime do indigenato* administered by officials of the Overseas Ministry, formerly the Colonial Ministry. At the United Nations, Portugal has been increasingly harassed by African and Asian delegates who argue that the African territories are colonies, no matter what they are called, and that Portugal has a responsibility to report on conditions there to the General Assembly's Trusteeship Committee. Although the Portuguese delegate responds that "Portugal is a unitary state with the overseas provinces and the homeland considered as a single entity," Portugal's vulnerability to this attack grows each year, and present indications are that the *regime do indigenato* will soon be modified, or even abolished, and a substantial portion of the African population granted token rights of citizenship or possibly even the same civil rights as the white and assimilated Portuguese citizens possess.

The formation of a Lusitanian community and the granting of meaningless citizenship to Portuguese Africans are gestures intended to bolster the persuasions of Portuguese diplomacy. Portugal has survived in Africa during the last 100 years chiefly through the skill of her diplomats, and recently she has effectively used the political leverage derived from her membership in NATO. For the last eight years the United States, and usually England, has sided with Portugal on almost every issue touching the Portuguese colonies. But this close association is coming to an end. One of the more important repercussions of Captain Galvão's seizure of the *Santa Maria* may be that it precipitated a change in Portugal's relations with her three major allies, Brazil, Britain and the United States. Portugal deeply resented the hasty about-face of the British and American Navies and began to speak, *sotto voce,* of "reëxamining the NATO Alliance." Early in its life the Kennedy Administration took a public stand

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which embarrassed Portugal, and she must sense that this was the beginning of the United States' reëxamination of an alliance which has already cost us a great deal in Africa.

Within the continent of Africa, Portuguese diplomacy, to be successful, must face in two directions—toward the free African nations and toward the white governments of the Central African Federation and the Union of South Africa. The former must be conciliated while the bonds with the latter must be strengthened. The second task is the easier, for it seems clear that Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Portuguese Africa will be the last white pockets in a black continent, and the simple question of survival has in recent years led the three governments to exchange numerous ceremonial visits and to emphasize the firm bases of their economic and political associations. With the African countries, the problem is quite different, and Portuguese diplomacy has followed a course of discretion and, where possible, coöperation. Criticism of the leaders or policies of the independent nations seldom appears in the Portuguese press; Emperor Haile Selassie has been welcomed to Lisbon. Portugal diligently takes part in all African conferences on health, education and economic matters to show that she is a reasonable and good neighbor. So far, Portugal has been rebuked by African governments mostly in the United Nations. But as the frontiers of independent black Africa are extended, it seems certain there will be a burgeoning traffic of men and ideas into Angola and Mozambique, a traffic which diplomacy alone will be hard put to contain.

II

The intent of all Portuguese policy in Africa itself is to preserve the status quo. Tradition rests heavy in the Portuguese African world. Over the centuries, colonial attitudes have formed which dominate Portuguese life in Africa and the making of overseas policy in Lisbon. The attitudes include a kind of racial tolerance, a self-acknowledged Christian paternalism toward the African, suspicion of outside interference in the colonies, the notion that the African must be obliged to work, and the simple faith that the Portuguese way is the right way, perhaps the only way. At one time or another in the last century these concepts have been written into Portuguese colonial legislation, and to a large extent they explain the present state of affairs in the territories.

That the administration of the African colonies is paternalistic

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the Portuguese themselves admit. The chain of authority passes in unbroken succession from the Overseas Ministry in Lisbon down to the hand-picked village chiefs. Political rights for Africans do not exist. Nor has paternalism brought measurable material benefits to the African population. The imbalance between the cost of living in Angola and Mozambique and the average wage (about $6 a month) is extreme. Education for the Africans, less than 3 percent of whom are literate, is totally inadequate; the possibilities for the African child to obtain more than three years of so-called rudimentary education are remote. Beyond the cities, large towns and several mission stations, health services scarcely exist. Partly by necessity, but also partly by intent, the African has been maintained in a world of medieval ignorance and isolation.

The Portuguese admit that such conditions do exist, but they argue that the spiritual advantages of their traditional policies more than compensate for material shortcomings. They refer repeatedly to the good will and understanding between the races. They boast that there are no real political or racial problems in Portuguese Africa. They insist that independence has led to Communism in Ghana and Guinea, to bloody chaos in the Congo, and to African racism in the rest of the continent. They speak of the Mau Mau terror in Kenya, uprisings in the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, armed strife in several of the new African republics, and of the "American-controlled dictatorship" in Liberia. We Portuguese have been here a long time, they say; we know Africa and we know the African. Whether or not the recent bloody rioting in Angola has shaken Portuguese faith in the rightness of their policies, it is certain that it will be increasingly difficult from now on to advertise the colonies as peaceful multi-racial paradises.

The Portuguese have indeed been in Africa a long time, and their policies have consistently been distinguishable from those of other colonial powers. Since the fifteenth century the Portuguese have followed an informal policy of individual assimilation —that is, the social and political acceptance without strong prejudice of Africans who were able to obtain an education and who chose to accept Portuguese cultural values. Although this easy relationship never affected more than a small percentage of the native population—hardly more than the number of settlers or traders who were assimilated by the African—it did provide a

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safety valve for potential resentments and it has given the Portuguese a basis for justifying their presence in Africa. On the other hand, a massive slave trade (which in its day took from four to six million people from the lands of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique), various forms of forced labor within the colonies and the destruction of tribal institutions have contributed to the subjugation of the African will.

Now, as Portuguese Africa enters the most critical decade of its history, Lisbon's goal is to reconcile the two opposing characteristics of Portuguese practice in Africa—the simultaneous acceptance and exploitation of the Africans. The reconciliation is to be accomplished by the assimilation of the Africans into a Portuguese world. What in essence the Government proposes to do is to convince the Africans that it is better to be Portuguese than to be independent.

This new policy is intended to go far beyond the rigorously selective assimilation of the past 30 years. In numerical terms selective assimilation has been an admitted failure (there are about 35,000 *assimilados* in Angola, out of an African population of some 4,500,000, and about 5,000 of Mozambique's 5,500,000 Africans are *assimilados*). The African who chooses to become assimilated, that is, to be governed by Portuguese common law instead of the *regime do indigenato,* is obliged to demonstrate, among other things, that he has severed all tribal contacts, is self-supporting, and can read and speak Portuguese with facility. The requirements have been stringently applied. Several *assimilados* have recently reached the upper echelons of the colonial and military services, still more have distinguished themselves in the professions, while others, to Portugal's dismay, have become leaders of opposition groups in exile. The Portuguese African intellectual is naturally viewed with suspicion in these troubled days, but at the same time the Salazar Government needs to encourage, if only for propaganda purposes, the emergence of a responsible élite committed to the Portuguese cause in Africa. In consequence, it is willing to permit the training and education each year of a handful of Africans.

But total assimilation means something else. What colonial theorists have in mind might be called psychological integration, and what the Government hopes to achieve in a few years is to transform African society into a semblance of Portuguese peasant society: devout, diligent, semi-literate and politically conserva-

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tive. To an outsider, the proposal to make more than 11,000,000 Africans into loyal Portuguese citizens before the winds of change sweep across the colonies seems visionary, but the Portuguese are apparently undisturbed by the scope of the task. They regard it as the next logical step in their overseas history.

The elaboration of the Salazarian mystique of faith, toil and family into a practical program of change in Africa is not yet accomplished. The policy was vaguely formulated, however, in a speech made in July 1960 by Adriano Moreira, Under Secretary of State for Overseas Administration, whose appointment to the key administrative position of the Overseas Ministry has generally been interpreted as a positive step toward a more liberal course in Africa. Sr. Moreira points out that while the number of *assimilados* is insignificant, the number of African Catholics in Angola and Mozambique is nearly 2,000,000. He emphasizes that although "political loyalty does not depend upon Christian qualifications . . . Catholic missionary activity is inseparably linked to patriotism" and that the formation of Christian qualities leads to the formation of Portuguese qualities. According to Sr. Moreira, the Catholic Church can play a vital role for Portugal, as historically it always has, in developing and consolidating national institutions and in helping to confront materialistic influences with spiritual values.

Christianity and the family are, in the Portuguese view, interdependent, and the Under Secretary goes on to stress the need for social action among African women as a second important aspect of the policy of assimilation. Instead of being a reactionary force within the society that passively resists the process of acculturation, the African woman must be made a dynamic force whose interests center in the home and the family. "The effort for integration must be directed . . . toward attracting native women to our culture, for they are simultaneously a stabilizing factor . . . and precious agents for accelerating the integration of [African] men into the social forms which correspond to the objectives of our action." Sr. Moreira envisages various programs of assistance and education for African women.

The more spiritual side of the new African program is to be accompanied by changes in the contract labor system, although there does not for the time being seem to be any real change in the deeply rooted belief that the African must be obliged, one way or another, to work. The moral justification for the obligation has

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been, and still is, that through work the African's traditional mode of existence is altered and he is made a productive member of his society, responsible to his family and his country. But a minimum wage law has recently been introduced into Portuguese Africa, penal sanctions for breach of labor contracts have been abolished, and sentences of forced labor for political crimes forbidden. It remains to be seen whether these changes are implemented—for it is axiomatic in Portuguese Africa that only the repressive clauses of the labor code are carried out—and whether they will lead to a more enlightened labor legislation. Finally, Sr. Moreira speaks of large-scale advances in health and social programs to assist the work of assimilation. These are, of course, desperately needed in Portuguese Africa, as in fact they are in most of the continent. But progress can only be slow.

III

Will the Portuguese succeed? Can they convert Angola, Guinea and Mozambique into overseas provinces which are patriotically, as well as legally, extensions of the mother country? Can they convince 11,000,000 Africans to resist the tide of nationalism which has swept the continent? Can they lead them to believe that they are Portuguese, not Africans? Leaving to one side such imponderables as a change in government in Portugal (and there is no reason to believe that another government, even a democratic one, would immediately cast off the African provinces), and the possibility of an invasion of the colonies from neighboring nations, it is difficult to see how Portugal can prevail in Africa on her own terms.

There are several crucial factors working against Portugal. The first is time. One senses that history is at last catching up with Portuguese Africa. Portuguese policy for the future is, with some modifications, only an intensification of policies which various governments, liberal and conservative, have tried to effect for the last one hundred years; and the Africans are not appreciably closer to assimilation than they were in the 1850s. Does Portugal have another hundred years in which to inoculate the African people against the fever of independence? In the last several years, sporadic open resistance has flared up in all three colonies. The resistance has now reached dangerous proportions.

A second reason is economic. Portugal, even if she wanted to, cannot afford to carry out any large-scale program of social and

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educational reform. Portugal is a poor country. She has the lowest per capita income in Western Europe—slightly over $230 a year —as well as the highest illiteracy rate, about 45 percent. A considerable portion of her people live on a subsistence level. The infant mortality rate is very high, as is the incidence of tuberculosis. These conditions in part explain why colonial spokesmen in Africa refer constantly to spiritual values and deprecate the materialism they see dominating life and thought in the rest of the continent. Social reform in Africa, of course, carries implicit dangers, as the Portuguese well realize, but human poverty and ignorance are no less dangerous fuel for the fires of resentment. So far, there has been no African leadership to fan them, but the isolation of the colonies from outside influence and the containment from within of dissident elements cannot for long continue.

A part of the economic picture of Portuguese Africa is the perennial problem of contract labor. Angola and Mozambique, and, to a lesser extent, Guinea, are committed to a policy of economic growth. Large sums are being spent on development projects. Most of the funds go for dams, port facilities, expansion of transportation systems and colonization projects, from all of which the white population obtains the greater benefit. To carry out the program of development, and to work the plantations, fisheries and mines, a steady supply of cheap African labor must be assured. Forced or contract labor has been the answer. Every African male must prove that he is productively employed six months out of the year. Those who cannot—and many of those who can—are rounded up and taken to work for the Government or for private employers. The system leads to abuse and corruption. The Portuguese speak of the African's obligation to learn the dignity of labor, but as countless critics have declaimed, the disruptive influences of the contract labor system more than counteract the theoretical advantages. The effect of the system on African life can scarcely be measured. Each year hundreds of thousands of African workers cross the frontiers into the Congo, the Rhodesias and even into the Union of South Africa to escape the labor draft. Contract labor is the most obvious form of human injustice in the colonies; it provides the focus abroad for the condemnation of Portuguese rule, and in Africa itself it is becoming the source of growing African unrest.

Another factor working against the Portuguese is racialism. The white population of Mozambique and particularly of Angola

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has shown an extraordinary increase in the last 20 years, from about 45,000 to approximately 160,000 in Angola, and from about 27,000 to 70,000 in Mozambique. White immigration is to a large extent the success story of contemporary Portuguese Africa. It explains the growth of the colonies' economic life, the emergence of cities and large towns along the coast and in the interior, and the urgency of development programs. Poverty and overpopulation in Portugal are driving more and more peasants and laborers to try their luck in Africa. Although in Mozambique the local administration has attempted to be selective, in Angola the door is open to all. The Government has expanded its program of colonization projects for Portuguese peasants in both provinces. The pressures of the white influx are already being felt. The economic mobility of the African worker, never high, is now being contained at a low level by Portuguese skilled or semi-skilled workers.

But the ultimate effect of the white immigration is not merely economic. It is also racial. The Salazar Government apparently has assumed that the Portuguese lack of racial prejudice, so evident in Portugal, would keep tensions to a minimum between the new white population and the Africans. What has happened is that the Portuguese are creating exclusively white communities in the colonies and that racist tendencies are now intruding into what was once a situation of relative tolerance. The Portuguese peasant or worker often has little with which to justify his presence in a strange land, and his fears and uncertainties lead him to assert a racial superiority. Life in Angola and Mozambique has begun to follow sharply segregated patterns. The Portuguese speak of cultural and economic distinctions, but these are not very meaningful arguments, and the Portuguese will discover, if they have not already, that white racialism creates its opposite image in the African.

The Salazar Government is perfectly aware that the direction of Angola and Mozambique is toward a Rhodesian, if not a South African, way of life. Such a possibility does not seem to upset Portuguese colonialists. Since the Conference of Berlin, the Portuguese have smarted under a sense of inferiority; they have seen their neighbors in Africa prosper while their own lands and resources remained undeveloped. Now it is Portugal's turn, and it appears that nothing will be allowed to stand in the way. The Portuguese are sincere when they talk about assimilation, but it is doubtful that they intend the assimilated African popula-

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tion to have any more voice in national affairs than does the Portuguese peasant. And what meaning can assimilation have when the Government permits and encourages the establishment of two worlds in the provinces, one white and one black, with an ever-deepening frontier between them?

The policy of total assimilation cannot work. At its best it is paternalism, at its worst it is obscurantism. Portuguese policy is implicitly founded on the time-worn concept that the African is a child with no culture or civilization worthy of recognition. His language is forbidden in schools, his traditional chiefs have been subverted or eliminated. The majority of the Africans are landless; African agricultural production is sharply controlled, and even exploited, as in Mozambique where African-grown cotton is sold at a fixed price, processed in Portugal and sold in the colony at a price few Africans can pay. Corporal punishment for Africans is common procedure; suspected trouble-makers are jailed or exiled. Portuguese Africa, like Portugal, is increasingly dominated by police action. These repressions are hardly the way to persuade Africans of the advantages of assimilation.

For centuries the Portuguese have been able to contain discontent in the African territories and to ignore sporadic humanitarian protests from outside. Now the protests are constant, they are louder and they reach a larger, more sympathetic audience. Two important African organizations have been formed to work for the independence of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea. The first, the "União das Populações de Angola," has its headquarters in Leopoldville where it publishes a newspaper and is attempting to organize the Angolans living in the Republic of the Congo. The second group, the "Frente Revolucionaria para a Independencia Nacional das Colónias Portuguesas" (FRAIN) is a combination of four opposition groups. It has its headquarters in Conakry. Both are growing in size and importance. They have the support of a number of African nations, and they maintain representatives at the United Nations and in several world capitals. They have begun to talk of underground activities in Portuguese Africa, of sabotage and reprisals against collaborators.

The Portuguese Government is preparing for whatever may come. Beneath the optimistic phrases about assimilation and brotherhood there is determination to resist. "We are not," said President Américo Thomaz last November, "in Africa . . . like so many others. We will continue as always our policy of integra-

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tion. . . . To this end it is necessary for us to be what we have always been, and we will not change." The present Government is not bluffing. Military garrisons have been augmented; naval patrols are posted along the Angola coast; paratroop and bombing manœuvres have taken place; military plans have been made for emergencies; pistol-shooting clubs have sprung up among the Portuguese population. There is nothing conciliatory in the Government's attitude or in that of the white residents. In a recent speech in Mozambique, Dr. Castro Fernandez, head of the National Union, Portugal's ruling party, said bluntly, "Portugal is in Africa and Portugal will remain in Africa."

On November 30, 1960, at the peak of anti-Portuguese sentiment at the United Nations, Dr. Salazar chose to address the National Assembly on the subject of "Portugal and the Anti-Colonialist Campaign." His stern remarks were the most extensive statement he had made in recent years on Portugal's overseas policy, and they reveal that his government has no intention of abandoning its position.

> Surely they [the Portuguese people] are not going to suppose that the fate of millions of men, the order and peace of their way of life, the fruit of their work, the principles of the civilization they have adopted, can be handed over to the emptiness of speeches at meetings and the anarchy of the so-called movements of liberation. . . .
>
> A multi-racial society is therefore possible, whether of Luso-American stock, as in Brazil . . . or Luso-African stock, as we see in Angola and Mozambique. . . . It would be most unwise for us now to innovate with practices, feelings and concepts different from those which have been the secret of the work we have achieved and which are still the best safeguard for the future. . . .
>
> I do not see that we can rest in our labors nor can we have any other care than to hold with one hand our plough and with the other our sword. . . . Great sacrifices will be called for, as well as the most absolute devotion and, if necessary, also the blood from our veins.

In the face of such unyielding attitudes it is difficult to foresee any area of compromise. Certainly the Portuguese are not following the example of the English, and they looked upon Belgium's action in the Congo with a mixture of scorn and disbelief. Their words and deeds find a closer parallel with Afrikaner policy in South Africa. Perhaps a concert of international pressures would persuade Portugal to change her course in Africa. Perhaps popular uprisings would have the same effect. But such possibilities are speculative. In Portuguese Africa there will be no easy answer.

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NEW POLITICS IN NEW STATES

By Kenneth T. Young, Jr.

DURING the past few years "the erosion of democracy" has been spreading in many of the newly independent states of Asia, the Middle East and Africa. This weakening of Western-style representative government has baffled and alarmed many of us. We do not understand it, and we often condemn it too quickly. Fortunately, a more sympathetic study of the problems of government in these countries has begun. Having concentrated so much academic research and assistance on economic development, we are realizing that we have failed to pay enough attention to political development. For if we fail to understand the dilemmas and challenges of the new politics, American diplomacy will be even more ineffective than it has been so far in the huge segment of the world where over a billion people are experiencing the difficulties and trials of new nationhood.

As is noted somewhat shrilly these days, the political globe is trisected into the Atlantic, the Communist and the Asian-Arab-African, with the third part contested between the other two. The political institutions of Asia, the Middle East and Africa can thus become a decisive factor for creating either world progress or world conflict. If they grow strong, they will help to maintain peace; if weak, they will open the way to situations as precarious as those we have seen develop in the Congo or Laos.

At the very time that the governments of these new states are struggling to get on their own feet and set their own course, they are overwhelmed by competing ideas, people and organizations descending upon them from the Atlantic and Soviet worlds. They have little or no time to reflect upon issues of national policy or to study new programs. Of course, the contest of which they are the object is also advantageous to them. It gives them an importance out of proportion to their strength; they can play one side off against the other to get more aid and to increase their own freedom of manœuvre in foreign and domestic politics. Nevertheless, this contest as to who shall aid them complicates their political development; they are compelled to make basic political decisions in conditions of tension and turmoil. And the hazards are increasing as Moscow and Peking now begin a new contest

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between themselves on how to win the new states over to Communism.

These alien and competing influences of the Atlantic, Soviet and Sinic worlds reinforce those national voices which demand complete modernization. But they do not show the way. Nor can the new states break wholly away from politics derived from traditional institutions. The new politics must seek to solve the problems arising out of the abrupt dislocation of ancient and static societies suddenly thrust into a turbulent, fast-changing world.

Three kinds of problems must be solved: environmental, operational and conceptual. Our task is to identify which of these problems is unique or highly particular to newly independent states. We are not dealing just with the immemorial question of politics in the Aristotelian sense that government is by definition a controversial issue—its problems strewn between the opposite poles of liberty and order. We know that the new states confront these historic dilemmas; they also face a special combination of new factors.

II

There are four environmental factors which produce unique or at any rate special problems of government for the approximately 60 new states which have recently come into being. These are the aftermath of the past, the demands for modernization, the threats to national unity, and the phenomenon of one-man prestigious leadership.

In dealing with the first, the new politics begin with the nation's effort to recover intellectually and spiritually from the painful effects of colonialism, imitation and tradition. Colonialism hands on several particular difficulties to new governments. For one thing, the West is under such suspicion that foreign experts often must clear away an atmosphere of reserve and sensitivity before they can be helpful. Yet these experts are indispensable in the first years of freedom. Colonialism, with a few exceptions, left the new nations such a paucity of trained nationals that they found themselves with only a handful of competent planners, administrators, engineers, businessmen, economists, doctors and other specialists. Each new government starts with high hopes, ample blueprints and low capacities to cope with the difficult system of centralized controls which has been in-

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herited. It finds difficulty in removing this dead hand of the past, not so much out of inertia as because there is a lack of new leaders capable and strong enough to replace the obsolete and alien forms of administration. Failure to modernize the administration often leads to overloading the handful of dedicated men who must try desperately for a while to make the old system work, despite increasing frustration and criticism.

Another aspect of the aftermath of the past is the tendency to imitate the West. The leaders of new states, having been exposed to European and American liberal tenets and inspired by great documents like the American Declaration of Independence or the French Bill of Rights, usually took over Western forms of government *in toto* from the very start of nationhood. Ironically, in view of their struggle against colonialism, they adopted carbon copies of the colonial power's parliamentary or presidential form of government, complete with constitution, universal suffrage, political parties and national elections. Unfortunately, this wholesale borrowing without adaptation merely proved the "futility of facsimiles." Old societies with ingrained habits and very high rates of illiteracy could not understand the intricate process of political competition at the national level. The new system eventually broke down.

Leaders in many new states have pointed out for us the cause of the trouble. Alien institutions were suddenly grafted onto the traditional structure without adequate understanding of their proper functioning and without suitable synthesis with national characteristics. The results have been often chaotic, for the capacity to govern in a totally foreign style never really existed.

In actuality, the political mores of the past begin to assert themselves soon after the first flush of freedom has subsided. The Western party system breaks up into personal cliques. People follow strong personalities rather than platforms. Officials begin to rule by fear and to profit from graft. Ritual, custom and myth resume their powerful role in public affairs. Leaders abandon parliaments and parties in favor of direct rule in a more traditional authoritarian pattern. The age-old needs of the community take priority over the rights of individuals or minorities. Western-style opposition is leashed and in some cases even moderate dissent is muzzled. The population as a whole returns to its ancient detachment from political affairs. Thus, the order that has always been sought displaces the liberty that was never quite known.

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What new synthesis will come out of the operation of these historical factors no one can yet tell. But at least the futility of facsimile is now being recognized. An experimental approach is being welcomed in Asia and in many of the Arab States. In Africa, on the other hand, there is so little political tradition of contemporary value to fall back on that there may be no way of avoiding the imitation of Western political institutions at the start. But Africa can learn much from the political experiences of Asia in dealing with the deficiencies left from colonialism, as well as about the dangers of overdone and automatic imitation and the distortion of tradition.

The demand for rapid modernization places an intolerable burden on the managerial capacities of the new governments. Can they produce "progress" overnight? They have been trying, and often succeeding, as witness the rebuilt cities with their modern-style schools, factories, office buildings, hotels, hospitals and airports. But in the wake of nationalist revolutions, progress and freedom are sometimes found to be contradictory goals. The faster the people demand all of the first, the sooner they must let go some of the second. When both are sought at once, the entire national structure has to be overhauled and revamped in a short time. It falls to governments without adequate staff to tackle this total national transformation; the environmental pressures deny them time for adequate preparation or careful execution.

New governments in Asia at first tended to overreach themselves in setting goals, depending too much on perfecting blueprints and neglecting to consider their capacities for execution and management. At first political leaders decided hastily which kind of economic institutions to set up, what emphasis to put on industry, how the creation of new human resources could be generated, where to integrate foreign concepts and assistance, and whether to show preference for rural or urban groups. In trying to cope with these major decisions, the new Asian states were immediately caught, as the Africans now are, in the pincers of time: the people expected everything good to turn up immediately, but in practice everything took time. Neither the Western-trained leaders nor their Western advisors fully understood the nature of the profound changes they were launching. Sooner or later the rhythm of modernization broke into different tempos. The radical changes produced new social groups; there were university graduates without jobs, factories without technicians,

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and plans without managers. The new leaders were operating in different decades or even centuries from the mentality of nearly the whole population. And on top of this, modern medicine and other factors touched off a population explosion. Where will the food, the houses, the schools, the jobs come from to meet the nation's future needs for today's outpouring of children?

For modernization to succeed there must be a unified nation. This is the third environmental challenge: after independence is attained, can a nation in fact be formed? New nations often express their nationalism more by the volume of lung power than by the value of discourse; but this does not prove their national unity. Unfortunately, most of the new states cannot start off as cohesive, homogeneous societies in which some popular consensus is feasible, because they are ripped by so many centrifugal forces —racial, ethnic, linguistic, regional, tribal and economic. All the energy and resourcefulness of the political leadership must often concentrate just on keeping the nation from disintegrating. The processes of modernization add new social strains to the old. Traditional and modern groups clash. The feudal, landed interests in the countryside oppose the new economic interests of the city. Old-guard officials resent the influx of young administrators and technicians. The professional élite are torn from their cultural past and removed from the people, disoriented to an extent Westerners seldom realize. Corruption and nepotism rot good intentions and retard progressive policies. When the familiar village way of life disintegrates, the majority of the rural people can come to feel so neglected, so alienated and confused that they embrace a magnetic personal leader of the old type or turn to the Communists. Many of them, disenchanted with rural life, flock to the cities, demanding homes, schools, jobs and goods on a large scale. Urbanization—with its own political dynamics—is spreading fast everywhere in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

And, finally, all these various pressures bring forth the phenomenon common to almost all new states: the leadership of some towering personality. One of the figures who led the people to independence stays on to mold the new nation, interpret its will, act as its spokesman and consolidate its statehood. Without him, it must be said, most of them would collapse immediately. Because of him the new states tend to combine all executive and legislative authority, and sometimes even juridical functions, in the hands of the one man and his régime. And to increase this

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authority he may bring to bear his personal will, his vision of destiny, his appetite for empire, or his greed for greatness. The result is not only the excessive centralization of power, but the erosion or overt destruction of the opposition.

Yet sooner or later, the régime runs into trouble. New men with new ideas appear. The old leader and his party have come to lean on their prestige and the glory of their past achievements to ensure popular support. The leader is a national fixture—too indisputable to dislodge, too venerated to criticize, too hardened to change. No provision is made for a successor. The unitary party loses its revolutionary dynamism. It does not welcome the new approaches or the new faces. The dialogue between the older revolutionary generation and new political forces breaks down. Modernization and urbanization, however, are generating new associations which demand full expression of their points of view. Unions, faculties, business enterprises, professional societies, organized civil servants, the officer corps, cultural groups, and new voluntary associations of contemporary urban, suburban and even rural life all want a voice in the future.

As a result of the various pressures of the past and the present a political cycle is created, which typically appears to have six phases: the establishment of independence, the creation of modern institutions, the promotion of national unity and development, the appearance of contradictory factors, the collapse of leadership and political solidarity, the forming of new lines for the reëstablishment of stability. Among the most urgent questions before the free world are: Why does this cycle so often occur? What can be done to alter its course? These are problems which deserve greater attention by Western scholars, as well as by those in the new states who are themselves trying seriously to find a synthesis of liberal goals and traditional values.

III

Who are the new faces and new voices seeking better ways to govern and to avoid breakdowns? They are the civilian and military graduates of the postwar era—the "trained élite," the "new nationalists," or the "revolutionary intelligentsia" in and out of uniform. By whatever name, this professional group will determine their country's political destination, the route to be followed, and the detours to the West or East that may be taken. Already this group of young professionals is starting to emerge

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in positions of influence and power in politics, the civil service, the military establishment, business, education and private groups. They represent a new type of nationalism: pragmatic but mixed with a touch of idealism; cosmopolitan without loss of patriotism; and modern, yet tolerant of tradition. Whether trained abroad like most of the preceding revolutionary generation, or in the new schools at home, the new nationalists have quite a different outlook from their elders. The young Asian professionals seem more interested in action and results than in the dogma and ideology of their elders. For them, integrity and competence count more than kinship, status or wealth. The test of public policy is the national interest and practical efficiency.

This is especially true of the young military officers. They are helping to modernize Asia and the Middle East, and sometimes hold the country together when it appears headed toward breakdown and chaos. The officer corps, where it exists—and this excludes most of Africa—is often specially qualified to help develop and preserve the nation. It provides the only available organization of young professionals in a country which lacks an adequate administrative service. The civilian graduates are just as able and patriotic as the military, and they may have a better and more rounded education. But civilians are unorganized; they are scattered individuals, sometimes disoriented. As a whole, they lack the discipline, responsiveness, esprit de corps and physical resources which the military establishment can often provide. We have seen instances of officers reorganizing a nation, stamping out evils, cleaning a city or running a province more popularly and effectively than party government or a diffuse bureaucracy. Consider the various experiences of Korea, Viet Nam, Thailand, Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey, Sudan, Egypt and Syria—a long list. However, the conclusion to be drawn from these experiences is not that we should magnify the mission of the military but rather that we should mobilize civilian professionals to do the job instead.

What is it, then, that the new politics seek to accomplish? What are the objectives of the new nationalists, through which they hope to improve the capacities of their states to govern and to represent the people? While the new politics are still in the formative stage, it may be said that they are searching for a new ideological and cultural identity, an indigenous constitutionalism, a strong executive and a responsible legislature, a coherent

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system of representation, a modernized and democratic civil service, a flexible development of the economy and a regional diplomacy.

A visitor to Asia, the Middle East or Africa cannot but be impressed by the persistent search for an ideology and culture which are both indigenous and modern. Dissatisfied with an initial nationalism crossbred by so many alien strains, the younger leaders believe that a new synthesis is needed. In his collection of addresses entitled "Freedom, Nationhood and Culture," Raul Manglapus of the Philippines has eloquently pointed out that the new politics must seek a new set of values using words, images and ideas reflecting the "genius of the people" and representing an authentic consensus. Everywhere in Asia, the Middle East and Africa the inward search for a national character probes the whole culture of a nation—its language, literature, folklore, art, customs and religions. Not only a renaissance but a national discovery is taking place in many former colonial territories. Thus, the new politics take on more local coloration as the findings of the archeologist, anthropologist and historian begin to expose the heritage hidden by years of alien rule. Out of national consciousness may come national confidence and cohesion. The home-grown "ism" is strong because its roots are deep. But the new soil could breed a warped variety of impulsive, emotional, destructive ideology if badly treated.

The rising leaders still seek an authentic constitution for the country. While the practice of Western-style representative government has dwindled or collapsed because it was either premature or misunderstood, there still remains a desire for constitutional government and the preservation of its juridical sanctity. Despite the ravages of corruption and the oppression of officials in so many new states, a hard core of constitutionalism and rule of law is germinating slowly. It needs nourishing.

A flexible, easily-amended constitution is preferred. The major question is how to combine a strong executive, which is traditional, with an effective national legislature, which is modern. As Mr. Nguyen Phuong Thiep of the Viet Nam National Assembly noted in a remarkable report to the recent session of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Tokyo: "Many Asian countries are making efforts to separate clearly the respective roles of parliament and government and simultaneously to insure a harmonious collaboration between these two organs." He suggested

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that, in Asia at least, the legislature's function is to make the executive more effective in governing throughout the country.

Coherent political representation is thus another objective of the new politics. As Mohammad Hatta of Indonesia pointed out during his visit to this country, the difficulties of operating Western party systems in new states cause a "crisis of democracy." To improve representative government and strengthen executive leadership, the new countries are experimenting with new forms of political organization, such as functional councils or social groups with elected leaders, and indirect representation for provincial and national assemblies. A democratic electoral process functions more readily today in urban centers than in the countryside. But as land reform and rural development loosen the authoritarian grip of landlords and tribal chieftains, the large rural population will stand a better chance of using elections wisely both to choose their representatives freely and to hold them accountable. The invigoration of village democracy and community development provides an outlet for the energy of young professionals, and by encouraging local initiative, new leaders can be found at the "rice-roots." One of the advantages of urban and rural reform is that it increases the people's participation in affairs of state so that government is not something merely imposed from the top.

But the new "pros" often encounter the opposition and negativism of old-fashioned officials and party henchmen. Bureaucracies dating from the pre-independence or pre-modern period cannot or will not apply advanced techniques; they tend to rely on traditional forms of coercion, and seldom take risks or initiative. In contrast, the young nationalists press for modern methods of management, imaginative projects to build up the nation, and civil liberties.

And finally, in economics and diplomacy, the new politics seem to be veering toward a more pragmatic approach. The economic dogmas concerning heavy industrialization and state ownership are being questioned, and in many parts of the world suspicion of private initiative and foreign investment is decreasing. Interest is growing in developing light industry, diversifying agricultural production, and improving village life. There is a more realistic attitude toward problems of economic growth, a willingness to extend timetables if need be, instead of rushing through impossibly rapid target dates, and an acceptance of partial planning

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in some sectors of the economy instead of total planning for the whole nation.

In diplomacy, the new professionals incline towards regional associations and the avoidance of too close a political identification with East or West. In seeking to achieve an independent, or at least a complementary, diplomacy, they will try to strengthen bilateral relations with their neighbors, explore economic and cultural coöperation on a regional basis such as the Nagreb in North Africa or the Mekong Commission in Southeast Asia, and take common positions on issues before the United Nations. Such regional diplomacy does not necessarily mean "neutralism." It reflects the search in the new states for a national and cultural identity, the will to be on their own and the desire to be different. The new nationalists are likely to be very independent people to deal with, for both the West and the East.

These are some of the political innovations emerging nebulously in Asia, the Middle East and Africa. They may or may not produce effective and democratic government. It is too early to tell whether the new professionals will be able to bring about stable modernization or whether the "classroom rebels" and angry young nationalists will force a faster and more violent pace.

Nevertheless, American diplomacy should seek fresh concepts and new means to strengthen this rising group of professionals by encouraging the new politics and the search for authentic institutions. We can do more to befriend the new faces in and out of public office—particularly the "outs"—who, sharing our values, wish to modernize their country without political breakdown. We can learn much more about their political problems in order to help them find acceptable means to reverse in their own way the practices that erode democracy. We can help energetically to expand basic education. We can organize programs for the development of democratic leadership. We can back regional diplomacy, and a new strategy of national economic build-up. Above all, we can support an "open-world" policy in the United Nations which will allow each new state to mature at its own tempo, to diversify in its own style, to receive a free flow of ideas from the outside, and to decide its destiny without alien compulsion.

Such is the challenge of making new democratic governments effective and secure in our trisected world. On their success rests our security. Here is a "new frontier" to inspire us towards a sympathetic and creative effort in the decade ahead.

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THE NEW GUINEA QUESTION

An Australian View

By F. J. West

FOLLOWING a trip abroad in June 1960, the Prime Minister of Australia stated that he favored independence for New Guinea "sooner rather than later." Although he subsequently explained that a precise timetable could not be laid down, his statement aroused widespread interest for several reasons: it represented a change of mind from his earlier view that Australia was in New Guinea to stay; it seemed to be inconsistent with the statement of his own Minister for Territories a few days earlier that the question of independence was 30 years away; and finally, it could be interpreted as an initial response to the request of the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations that Australia set target dates for the development of New Guinea towards self-government. Australian newspapers began to publish leading articles about the Territory, which has seldom received much public interest or comprehension, and to dispatch special correspondents there. The leaders of the Opposition departed on a tour of inspection, which led to the supposition that a bipartisan approach to the New Guinea problem was contemplated. While the Minister for Territories began to issue a stream of policy statements, the Legislative Council of Papua-New Guinea was reorganized in October to include, for the first time, a number of elected Papuans equal to the number of elected Europeans. An emergency program to recruit primary school-teachers was launched. And in New Guinea, European settlers expressed varying degrees of alarm and despondency, using such words as "walk out," "abandonment" and "betrayal."

While increased public interest has its value, it is no substitute for accurate information interpreted against a background of colonial experience in the South Pacific and elsewhere. It is not enough to utter vague warnings that another Congo, another Cyprus, another Kenya is in the making. It must also be recognized that New Guinea is not solely an Australian problem, but is equally a question of international politics.

It is important to be clear about what the New Guinea "question" involves —both for the purposes of Australian policy and for its implications in international politics. Some of the confusion is a matter of nomenclature and of the different status of the separate units which compose the island of New Guinea. Australia holds Papua, the southeastern section of the island, as a colony in her own right; it was originally the Crown Colony of British New Guinea, transferred to Australia by the British Government in 1901. Papua is separated by a largely artificial boundary from the northeast portion of the island which constitutes the Trust Territory of New Guinea. This is the former German colony of Kaiser Wilhelmsland, captured by Australian forces in 1914, retained (somewhat contumaciously) as a Class C mandate under the League of Nations, and placed by Australia under a Trusteeship Agreement at the end of the Second World War. The western part of the island, separated from the Australian portions simply by a line of longitude, is of course

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Dutch. It was formerly part of the Netherlands East Indian empire and is now claimed by Indonesia primarily on the legal ground that, having been part of that empire, it was included in the Dutch surrender to the Indonesians. The island is thus composed of three territories, two of which use the name of the whole, and each having a quite different status in international law.

Since the end of World War II, Papua and New Guinea have, with U.N. approval, been administered by Australia as a single unit. Nevertheless, their separate status remains—symbolized by the destination of the Annual Reports, of which one is presented to the U.N. General Assembly, the other to the Australian Parliament. The validity of the Papua-New Guinea union has recently, but unsuccessfully, been challenged by some European settlers resisting a proposed income tax, and a dissenting judgment in the High Court of Australia once argued that each of the territories was held under a different section of the Federal Constitution and must therefore have a



different political future from the other. The prevailing legal view is that Australia has plenary power to administer the territories together and to offer them a common political future. But the difference in status may plainly be a source of political conflict in any decisions about the future of Papua-New Guinea, especially because, as a Trust Territory, New Guinea is involved in the international dispute of "colonialism" versus "anti-colonialism."

II

The present Australian Government has declared itself in favor of independence or self-government for New Guinea not because it is convinced that independence would be a good thing, but because of the political complications which would arise if it did not. Australia does not want to be the last colonial power, with all that would imply for her relations with other nations, especially in Southeast Asia. Nor does she want to invite the international complications which might arise if frustrated nationalism inside Papua-New Guinea turned to violence.

Against this reasoning the Opposition party and various interested groups

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offer two sets of arguments—one strategic, the other economic. It is asserted that, for Australia's safety, Papua-New Guinea must always be under Australian control. This belief has a long history. It played a part in the original acquisition of the territory, and it seemed strikingly vindicated when the Japanese attack was turned back there in 1942; it draws additional strength from the emotional involvement of Australians who fought in New Guinea and from the memory of those who died there; and it is reinforced by the present dangers which seem to threaten from the north.

The economic arguments, in sum, are that Papua-New Guinea has been built up by the efforts of Australians who have risked their money and sometimes their lives to do so; Australia has therefore an obligation to protect and preserve the interests of these pioneers, settlers and entrepreneurs, not to sacrifice their interests by granting independence. The strength of these arguments, and the power of the interested groups behind them, should not be underestimated, but on the issue of independence itself they are unlikely to prevail.

To both sets of arguments there are obvious answers. Whatever strategic value New Guinea once had has been much reduced by changes in the nature of war and weaponry. Even in the last war, it can plausibly be maintained, what defeated the Japanese attack was not the unquestioned gallantry of Australian and American troops but the petering out of the enemy's momentum. Economically, it may be said that the interests of a small group of Europeans (less than 2 percent of the population) cannot be upheld as paramount in a colony which, to use a familiar phrase in colonial literature, is one of exploitation, not settlement; most European enterprise is carried on by a transient group, not by permanent settlers. Neither line of argument, therefore, is likely to change the Government's decision. When opponents have failed in their initial purpose, pressures are certain to concentrate on the question of timing and the conditions under which independence may be granted.

III

No more difficult problem exists than the timing of the transfer of power to new nations, because there are no simple criteria by which readiness for independence can be measured. The problem is aggravated, of course, when it becomes a matter of domestic and international political dispute. The Australian Minister for Territories and his critics are agreed that economic development must have priority, and that political development is dependent upon it; but the point at which the former becomes sufficient for the latter is one of the major issues in the controversy.

Readiness for independence can obviously be challenged on the ground that Papua-New Guinea is not economically viable, although the actual resources of the territory may be considerable. At present, the Trust Territory has a total volume of trade of about $55,000,000, with a slight excess of exports over imports for the first time since 1954/5, while Papua, with a total trade of $25,000,000 has, over the same period, consistently produced an unfavorable balance of up to half the total. These conditions are largely due to an undiversified economy. The main export crop is copra, although timber and

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cocoa in the Trust Territory and rubber in Papua have assumed significance. This dependence on a very small range of agricultural produce exposes the economy to severe effects from any price fluctuation.

The cost of government is largely borne by Australia, for the revenue from export and import duties amounts to barely a third of expenditure, the rest being provided from an interest-free, non-repayable grant of about $27,000,000. Economically, therefore, Papua-New Guinea is dependent upon Australia, from which it receives by far the greatest proportion of its imports and to which it sends the largest single part of its exports. The great bulk of trade derives from the enterprise of Australians who have developed the plantations producing export crops and provided the capital investment, while the Australian Government has paid for social and welfare services. The principal contribution of the indigenous inhabitants has been in supplying unskilled labor. From these facts there is a plausible argument to be made that, since any substantial change in this economic pattern will be very slow, and since the economy by its very nature may not be viable, independence must recede to a distant and unpredictable date.

A second criterion by which readiness for independence can be challenged is the level of education and the absence of an adequately educated leadership among the indigenous people. The number of those who can read and write is simply not known, but the size of the present school population does not suggest any widespread literacy. The Trust Territory has a population officially calculated at about 1.3 million, of whom 10,500 are elementary pupils in government schools; at higher stages of learning there are perhaps 800 pupils. In a Papuan population of rather less than 500,000 the corresponding figures are 5,250 and 600. The major part of educational activity, however, is not undertaken by the government but by the missions, whose syllabus is at least as much religious as vocational, and whose schools the government will subsidize and register only at an approved standard. Of the 111,000 mission-school pupils in the Trust Territory, more than 80,000 attend unrecognized schools, and in Papua, out of 40,000 such pupils, more than three-quarters attend sub-standard schools. What proportion of these relatively small numbers subsequently slip from standards of literacy is a matter of guesswork, but it is quite clear that education of a reasonable standard reaches only a very small fraction of the population; and at the secondary level the numbers are minute. The largest single group of relatively educated people is the teachers who number about 5,500, of whom perhaps a thousand are in government or registered schools, followed by 1,500 medical and dental assistants, of whom some dozens have attended the Central Medical School (a training college, not a school for graduating doctors) in Suva, Fiji. A few indigenous people are being educated in Australia, but none has yet graduated from a university.

An "educated" class of a few thousand is not much of a leaven in a population of nearly two million, especially when their standard of education is generally well below university entrance standards in Australia. The absence of a literate population and the paucity of trained leadership, then, will be used to maintain that Papua-New Guinea is not ready for independence. In addition, of course, critics will point out that several hundred languages are

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spoken in the territory and that the indigenous society is composed largely of small, self-contained social groups which have no organized pattern of rank and authority, and are often hostile to one another. These conditions, it may be argued, mean that independence or self-government can be foreseen only in a very remote future.

This case is very difficult to answer on its own terms and premises—the more so because the Minister for Territories has insisted upon "uniform development." He has generally refused to accept the conception of an indigenous élite or to encourage rapid development in those areas which have been in contact with Europeans for 70 years or more. Of necessity, this has meant slow over-all development which, if it were to continue at its present pace, would make independence a distant goal. The Prime Minister's change of mind in regard to timing requires a different policy. And an answer to the social and economic arguments against self-government must be provided by starting from different assumptions. For the implications of his "sooner rather than later" statement are that political development is quite as important as economic; certainly the one cannot wait upon the other, if only because economic development in such a society as Papua-New Guinea does not have the effects expected of it. Because the indigenous society is composed of a series of small self-contained units, economic measures taken in some few of them do not necessarily have an impact throughout the whole of society.

Economic development encounters another barrier arising from the separation of the European section of society. In a plural society of the New Guinea type, economic development can be effective only if there is a common social will expressing the interests of the whole society. This can be created most readily when there is a sense of common nationality, which is essentially a result of political development. Thus, although economic development is undeniably important, it does not precede the political, but is rather a condition of it. Even if this proposition is denied, there is another reason for believing that political development is quite as important as economic. The independence issue has been publicly raised, and it has already released political aspirations among the more educated Papuans. The first Workers' Association has been formed in Port Moresby under the leadership of an assistant medical practitioner trained in Suva, and various indigenous leaders have publicly expressed views about political development. This demonstrates that an educated élite need not exist before such aspirations are asserted. In Papua-New Guinea, as in other colonies, any degree of education can produce a self-styled élite which will assert political aspirations as firmly and as forcibly as one which is deemed educated by Western standards.

The urgent need is to make sure that the politically active element in the population has scope for its ambitions, and is capable of understanding both what New Guinea requires and what the outer world requires. This means that much greater resources must be devoted to education to enable relatively large numbers of indigenous people to attain university standards as quickly as possible. It means the abandonment of the policy of "uniform development" in favor of one which will produce an educated leadership capable of recognizing the fact that economically Papua-New Guinea is dependent upon Australia, and capable, too, of stimulating the growth of some sort of common

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purpose and identity among the people. Such an élite policy, extended to economic development as well as education, is essential if independence is to be attained within a generation. The goal is possible.

Important as these internal factors are in progress towards self-government, it is the external forces which give it urgency. Australia has assumed the obligation to work towards self-government or independence for both Papua and New Guinea, and there is no lack of critical eyes fixed upon her performance. It is often pointed out that Australia has been in Papua-New Guinea for as long, or almost as long, as Britain has been in some of her colonies now achieving independence. Yet Australia appears to have made comparatively little progress, due largely to the small resources devoted to these territories. Before the last war, the Mandated Territory received no grant, and Papua existed on a subsidy which ranged from $55,000 to $148,000 a year; even now, it may be said, a grant of about $27,000,000 is still a minute fraction of the Australian budget, and less than 10 percent of the appropriation for defense. Rapid development requires greater resources and perhaps a better allocation of them.

No doubt some of this criticism is unfair, because Papua-New Guinea presents particularly difficult problems of colonial rule and because Australia is itself an underdeveloped country with a capital shortage. Whatever the rights or wrongs of the colonial record, Australia has international obligations whose non-fulfillment or inadequate fulfillment can be very embarrassing, not only in her relations with Asian countries but with her partners in the various regional organizations to which she belongs.

IV

More serious domestic and international complications are likely to arise in the third stage of the New Guinea question, when, having settled the general objective and the timing, the precise political future of Papua-New Guinea must be decided. The matter is already in dispute because to some extent the outcome will be shaped by Australian policy and practice in the years immediately ahead. Ultimately, of course, the indigenous people will have to decide for themselves what course they will follow, but almost certainly Papua-New Guinea will become a single unit; it is difficult to see, except as a legal quibble or bargaining counter, how separate states could seriously be considered. Beyond this, there are three main alternatives: a state within the Australian Commonwealth; a federation with other Melanesian territories; or an independent state perhaps within the British Commonwealth. Each of these solutions would be consistent with Australia's obligations; each has its advocate in Australia.

The first of these alternatives has been pressed on the grounds that an independent state would be a weak "coconut" republic, a danger to itself and its neighbors and alarming to Australians who are sensitive to invasion from the north. Papua-New Guinea's economic dependence upon Australia is used to bolster the strategic argument. Incorporation of territory within the federation as a seventh state has obvious attractions, but advocates of this plan have failed to come to grips with the implications of such a course. Unless there were to be second-class citizens of a kind Australia's international obligations

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rule out, a large black and brown population would be at liberty to move and to settle where it pleased within Australia. Most Australians would accept this only if the economic and social standards of those people were equivalent to their own. Anything less would raise acute difficulties in, for example, employment conditions and wages. And even this would not prevent the creation of a color problem. To raise their standards adequately would be an immense task which, if it were accomplished, would itself remove one of the main objections to independence, upon which the argument rests. The strategic justification for incorporation would remain, but the change in the nature of war makes it a very tenuous basis for the policy.

To avoid the dangers of a weak, independent state, Melanesian federation has been advocated, apparently in the conviction that union makes for strength. "Melanesian" in its anthropological sense is not a very useful criterion because some islands, like the New Hebrides or New Caledonia, are under different political control from others, such as the Solomons or Fiji, and they are in any case far apart. (Fiji is more than 2,000 miles east of Port Moresby.) The most recent exposition of the case for federation has therefore taken geographical considerations as the determinant and proposes a federation of Dutch New Guinea, Papua, the Trust Territory and the Solomons—that is, a federation of the whole island of New Guinea plus the major offshore islands which physically and ethnically form a clearly recognizable group. It is difficult, however, to see that such a federation would avoid the weakness which, it is alleged, would attach to an independent Papua-New Guinea. The economies of the different parts would not be strengthened by combining them; indeed they are rival rather than complementary and together would simply make up a larger (but not appreciably larger) economy based on the same few products.

Instead of creating strength, federation would increase the problems of political development, creating rivalry between the units in terms of their contribution to the whole and in terms of their past history and traditions. The Solomons by themselves could without difficulty be included in a Papua-New Guinea state (the Trust Territory already includes one island of the group), but their addition would be insignificant; the most important addition would be Dutch New Guinea, and it is precisely at this point that differences of tradition and interest would arise to weaken a federation. Even an agreed policy between the Dutch and the Australians could only partially remove them.

No doubt the real argument for federation is political: it would seem to be a possible solution of the difficult problem arising from Indonesia's claim to western New Guinea, for it would presumably satisfy both the demands of Melanesian nationalists and anti-colonial critics in the United Nations. Since such a federation would necessarily have the closest economic ties with Australia, its security would be more promising than that of an independent state which had an artificial border with a territory disputed between two other nations.

Such a political argument is misconceived, however, because the Indonesian claim is not racial but legal, and a Melanesian federation which included what the Indonesians regard as legally part of their country would at once embroil

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Australia in the dispute. A federation, which could be established only with Dutch and Australian consent, would very probably be regarded in Indonesia as a colonialist conspiracy against them. Indeed, the suggestion has already been attacked in the United Nations—although so, too, has the union of Papua with New Guinea. A federation, unless it had the prior agreement of the Indonesians—an unlikely event—would invite international complications instead of assuaging them. Even with such coöperation, federation would not promote economic viability, and it would create new problems.

There remains the third alternative of an independent state, perhaps within the British Commonwealth. Granted the economic weakness of a Papua-New Guinea state, it may be pointed out that many such weak states exist under some form of protection and assistance from larger powers. Western Samoa, a New Zealand Trust Territory having neither the population nor the resources of Papua-New Guinea (though it does possess greater social unity), will become independent this year and will join the British Commonwealth. It will enter into a treaty relationship with New Zealand which will provide for defense, the conduct of its external relations and financial aid for some social services and capital works. The future of Papua-New Guinea will probably have to be worked out along similar lines. This solution appears to avoid the grave difficulties of the other proposals, although it will not be devoid of its own. But these are difficulties which will attend any scheme of independence.

The objections to independence in this form are that it will not protect Australian interests, that a treaty relationship can be broken in favor of adherence to some neutral or Communist bloc, that independence may not be in the best interests of the indigenous people. These objections could be met in only one of two ways: permanent dominance by Australia, a solution which the Government has renounced, or incorporation in the Australian Commonwealth, which is wholly impractical. Hence the risks involved will have to be taken. Australia can choose from among limited alternatives, and with all the weight of evidence favoring the third, the aim of policy must be to hasten development in Papua-New Guinea of an educated leadership which will share its vision of the goal.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

GOALS FOR AMERICANS. Englewood Cliffs (N. J.): Prentice-Hall, 1960, 372 p. $3.50.

This volume, the product of President Eisenhower's Commission on National Goals, comprises a formal report plus some 16 essays by prominent authorities covering the wide range of issues confronting the United States in the 1960s. While the recommendations are not radical, and may indeed be regarded as too modest for the times, the book reflects a wealth of experience, insight and sober sense.

ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR. By HERMAN KAHN. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, 651 p. $10.00.

This is an exceptionally important book on some of the most critical issues of the next decade. Comprising three "lectures"—in the sense that Goethe's "Faust" can be called a "play"—it is an extended, informed, perceptive and often brilliant exploration of the problems of central war, deterrence, national strategies and objectives. Long associated with the RAND Corporation, Mr. Kahn has succeeded in thinking concretely and imaginatively about a range of questions too frequently avoided in much discussion of the prospects for war and peace.

THE NECESSITY FOR CHOICE. By HENRY A. KISSINGER. New York: Harper, 1961, 370 p. $5.50.

Arguing that the United States "cannot afford another decline like that which has characterized the past decade and a half," Mr. Kissinger examines a number of the tougher problems confronting American foreign policy, weighs the alternatives and offers his own prescription. The topics covered include the strategy of deterrence, the modes of limited war—including some revision of his own earlier views in "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy"—and U.S.-European relations, negotiation and arms control. On the whole he feels that there has been little creativity in facing or even defining these intractable issues.

A FORWARD STRATEGY FOR AMERICA. By ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ AND OTHERS. New York: Harper, 1961, 451 p. $5.95.

A sequel to the authors' "Protracted Conflict" (noted here October 1959), the present book undertakes to provide a general strategy for the United States. As the title suggests, the book proceeds from the premise that "we cannot tolerate the survival of a political system which has both the growing capability and the ruthless will to destroy us."

WHO WANTS DISARMAMENT? By RICHARD J. BARNET. Boston: Beacon Press, 1960, 141 p. $3.50.

An effort, as suggested by the title, to discover the relationship of disarmament to American security and to Soviet goals, and to examine the types of proposals that have sought to achieve some form of arms control.

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IN PLACE OF FOLLY. By Norman Cousins. New York: Harper, 1961, 224 p. $3.00.

An appeal for disarmament under world law as the only means to prevent a universal thermonuclear, chemical or biological catastrophe.

A HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR. By John Lukacs. Garden City: Doubleday, 1961, 288 p. $3.95.

In this brief but stimulating and original book Mr. Lukacs offers a review and interpretation of the major events and also a deeper exploration of the interaction of American and Soviet cultural, political and national currents. The author offers much to reflect upon and argue with.

SOCIALISM AND WAR. By Edvard Kardelj. Belgrade: Jugoslavija, 1960, 209 p.

This book by the Foreign Minister of Jugoslavia is of real significance both for the ideas it puts forward and for its role in the continuing and at times acrimonious debate between Jugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Communist China. The central theme of the essay is a critique of the Chinese position on war and coexistence, argued, on the whole, within the framework of Marxist-Leninist categories and expectations.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. By Lincoln P. Bloomfield. Boston: Little, Brown, 1960, 276 p. $4.75.

This book seeks answers to the questions: What is the American national interest with respect to the United Nations as we go into the 1960s? What are the capabilities and limitations of the U.N. with respect to serving these interests?

THE PURPOSE OF AMERICAN POLITICS. By Hans J. Morgenthau. New York: Knopf, 1960, 359 p. $5.00.

In these critical and somber essays Mr. Morgenthau seeks, as others have recently, to define or rediscover the American goal and to get us back on its track.

SPAIN AND DEFENSE OF THE WEST: ALLY AND LIABILITY. By Arthur P. Whitaker. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1961, 408 p. $6.00.

In this study, Arthur P. Whitaker, professor of Latin American history at the University of Pennsylvania, looks into the evolving relationship of the United States and Spain under the defense agreement made in 1953. A major conclusion is that because of a narrowly military concept of strategy we have assumed an unnecessarily heavy political and moral liability.

NO CARTE BLANCHE TO CAPRICORN. By Edouard Le Ghait. New York: Bookfield House, 1960, 114 p. $3.95. (Paper, $1.25.)

A former Belgian diplomat's critique of a nuclear strategy for NATO.

RUSSIA, AMERICA, AND THE WORLD. By Louis Fischer. New York: Harper, 1961, 244 p. $4.50.

Observations and reflections of a seasoned student of world affairs on contemporary international issues.

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PREDICAMENT. By H. C. Allen. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960, 241 p. $6.75.

A tract, addressed to the British and American peoples, arguing for the imperative need to create a federal Atlantic Union.

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THE EDGE OF WAR. By James David Atkinson. Chicago: Regnery, 1960, 318 p. $6.00.

An effort to delineate the peculiar and novel features, both military and moral, of the contest between Communist and democratic governments.

THE JUST WAR. By Robert W. Tucker. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1960, 207 p. $5.00.

In this interesting study the author inquires into "the justification that has formed a part of the American response to the prospect of employing force in the nuclear age."

STRATEGIC PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Robert T. Holt and Robert W. van de Velde. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960, 243 p. $5.00.

A study of "the use of the psychological instrument of statecraft." Examples include American psychological operations in wartime Italy and during the 1948 Italian elections, and some of Radio Free Europe's operations.

DIE MILITÄRISCHEN VEREINBARUNGEN DER KLEINEN ENTENTE 1929–1937. By Rudolf Kiszling. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1959, 91 p. DM. 7.50.

A monograph on the effort to give military teeth to the Little Entente in the 1930s.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND THE SHAPE OF TOMORROW. By William M. McGovern. Chicago: Regnery (in coöperation with Foundation for Foreign Affairs), 1961, 191 p. $4.00.

A primer on the variety and utilities of strategic intelligence.

LA SOMME ET LE RESTE. By Henri Lefebvre. Paris: Nef de Paris Éditions, 1959, 2 v. NF. 20.

This book, by a leading French Marxist thinker, contains all manner of things—philosophical reflections, memories, poems, political essays. There is some question whether "le désordre lyrique" is actually matched by "une pensée rigoureuse."

NATIONALISM: A RELIGION. By Carlton J. H. Hayes. New York: Macmillan, 1960, 187 p. $5.00.

A leading authority on the history of nationalism here briefly sums up many years of reflection on this important theme in modern life.

NATIONALISM. By Elie Kedourie. New York: Humanities Press, 1960, 151 p. $4.50.

An essay on the mixed philosophical components of modern nationalism.

STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER. By Myres S. McDougal and Associates. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960, 1,058 p. $15.00.

A hefty harvest of essays on contemporary international issues, the unity of which is rather appallingly defined as "that of a contextual, policy-oriented jurisprudence, postulating as its overriding goal the dignity of man in an increasingly universal public order."

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS. By Quincy Wright. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1960, 134 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $3.75.)

A lecture series by a leading student of international law.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS. By Sydney D.

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BAILEY. New York: Praeger (for the Carnegie Endowment), 1960, 337 p. $5.00.
An exposition directed more to the procedures and operations of the General Assembly than to political issues.

THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES. By J. A. LAPONCE. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960, 236 p. $5.00.
A dissertation dealing with the claims of minorities and with the constitutional and political means of protecting them.

THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS. By MILTON KATZ AND KINGMAN BREWSTER, JR. Brooklyn: Foundation Press, 1960, 863 p. $11.50.
A text, containing cases and materials, relating to the legal status of persons abroad and the reach of legal systems.

PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE, 1910–1960. New York: Praeger (for the Carnegie Endowment), 1960, 202 p. $3.00.
Essays by a number of the world's leading statesmen, in observance of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, NUMBER TWO. EDITED BY G. F. HUDSON. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1960, 139 p. $3.75.
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, NUMBER ONE. EDITED BY RAGHAVAN IYER. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1960, 155 p. $3.75.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM. EDITED BY DAVID FOOTMAN. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1960, 151 p. $3.75.
These are the seventh, eighth and ninth volumes of the series of papers produced under the auspices of St. Antony's College, Oxford.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, 1961. EDITED BY WALTER H. MALLORY. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1961, 243 p. $4.50.
Brought up to date as of January 1, 1961, this standard annual reference work gives the composition of the governments of all countries; sums up party programs and lists their leaders; lists newspapers indicating their political affiliations and editors; and includes facts on the United Nations and associated international agencies.

THE WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS. New York: Worldmark Press; Harper, 1960, 1,456 p. $30.00.
A massive nation-by-nation handbook of geographic, historical, political and economic information. Part II covers the United Nations and associated agencies.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

THE DIPLOMACY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By EUGENE R. BLACK. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, 74 p. $3.00.
A concise and illuminating statement of the goals and experiences of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, by its president.

THE CRISIS WE FACE. By GEORGE STEELE AND PAUL KIRCHER. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960, 220 p. $4.95.
The authors argue that we have misused automation, in both our defense production and in business, and have created hypercomplex and overorganized systems that are costly, dangerously vulnerable and ineffective.

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THE EXPORT ECONOMIES. By Jonathan V. Levin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, 347 p. $6.75.

A study of the fluctuations of export economies devoted primarily to production of raw materials. Case studies include Peru's guano boom in the nineteenth century and Burma's rice-marketing board.

THE ATTACK ON WORLD POVERTY. By Andrew Shonfield. New York: Random House, 1960, 269 p. $5.00.

The author, a staff member of the London *Observer,* is chiefly concerned in this stimulating and often unorthodox book in seeing how economic aid for undeveloped countries can be made more effective in achieving the hoped-for results.

THE COST OF FREEDOM. By Henry C. Wallich. New York: Harper, 1960, 178 p. $3.75.

A well-stated presentation of the case for economic conservatism.

DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, 536 p. $12.00.

Papers delivered at a conference on the interrelations of demographic and economic change in industrialized countries.

LABOR COMMITMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN DEVELOPING AREAS. Edited by Wilbert E. Moore and Arnold S. Feldman. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1960, 378 p. $3.75.

Studies on the problem of labor motivation in unfamiliar tasks in a newly developed area.

SEL'SKOYE KHOZIAISTVO KAPITALISTICHESKIKH STRAN: STATISTICHESKII SPRAVOCHNIK. Edited by A. Petrushov. Moscow: Izdatel-'stvo Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi Literatury, 1959, 829 p. Rubles 18.

A volume of statistics on land and agriculture in "capitalistic countries."

LE COMMERCE EN MATIÈRE AGRICOLE ENTRE L'EUROPE DE L'OUEST ET L'EUROPE DE L'EST. By Grégor Lazarcik. Paris: Rivière, 1959, 278 p. NF. 12.

A study of agricultural commerce between Eastern and Western Europe before and after the Second World War.

MANAGERS FOR SMALL INDUSTRY. By Joseph E. Stepanek. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1960, 245 p. $6.00.

This book deals with problems of recruiting and training managerial personnel to build small industry in newly-industrializing countries.

The Second World War

HITLER CONFRONTS ENGLAND. By Walter Ansel. Durham: Duke University Press, 1960, 348 p. $7.50.

In this book Admiral Ansel examines the abortive German plan to invade England—purpose, development and eventual abandonment.

THE GREAT SEA WAR. Edited by E. B. Potter and Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1960, 468 p. $7.95.

This account of naval action in World War II is an adaptation from the authors' earlier "Sea Power" (noted here January 1961).

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The United States

THE SECRETARY OF STATE. Edited by Don K. Price. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1960, 200 p. $3.50. (Paper, $1.95.)

Prepared for a meeting of the American Assembly, these seven background essays by Paul H. Nitze, Dean Acheson, Robert R. Bowie, Henry M. Wriston, William Y. Elliott, John S. Dickey and Don K. Price deal with the execution of foreign policy, the organization of the State Department and the Secretary's relations with the President, the Congress and the public.

PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP. By Richard E. Neustadt. New York: Wiley, 1960, 224 p. $5.95.

In this book, which seems to be serving as a *vade mecum* for the present incumbent, Professor Neustadt, who uses the experience of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, undertakes to discover how the President actually gets things done in our political system.

PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS. By Laurin L. Henry. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1960, 755 p. $7.50.

A solid study of four presidential transitions—Taft to Wilson, Wilson to Harding, Hoover to Roosevelt and Truman to Eisenhower—with a view to appraising problems involved in the transfer of powers after an election.

THE ULTIMATE DECISION: THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF. Edited by Ernest R. May. New York: Braziller, 1960, 290 p. $6.00.

A symposium of essays dealing with responsibilities of the President as Commander in Chief in the cases of our war Presidents—Madison, Polk, Lincoln, McKinley, Wilson, F. D. Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower.

THE MOULDING OF COMMUNISTS. By Frank S. Meyer. New York: Harcourt, 1961, 214 p. $5.00.

This study in the series "Communism in American Life" deals with training and indoctrination of the party's cadres, an effort to see from within how the movement forms its members.

COMMUNISM AND THE CHURCHES. By Ralph Lord Roy. New York: Harcourt, 1960, 495 p. $7.50.

This volume, another in the series "Communism in American Life," is a serious and careful study of the question of the degree to which the Communist Party attempted to infiltrate American churches, through fronts and other devices, in the years since 1920.

ENERGY IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, 1850–1975. By Sam H. Schurr, Bruce C. Netschert and Others. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (for Resources for the Future), 1960, 774 p. $12.50.

An extensive study of the domestic energy position of the United States, the growth of energy consumption over the past century and our likely needs and supplies in 1975. The author concludes that our natural resources should, in principle, suffice to meet our needs at that date.

A PRESIDENT'S ODYSSEY. By Merriman Smith. New York: Harper, 1961, 272 p. $3.95.

An account of President Eisenhower's trips to Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America in 1959–1960.

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AN AMERICAN EPIC. VOLUME II. By Herbert Hoover. Chicago: Regnery, 1960, 489 p. $6.50.

This second volume of Mr. Hoover's narrative of American food and medical assistance (Volume I noted here January 1960) deals with the activities to meet food shortages and famine in the war years and their aftermath, 1914–1923.

HENRY A. WALLACE: QUIXOTIC CRUSADE 1948. By Karl M. Schmidt. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1960, 362 p. $5.50.

An interesting and generally well-written history of Henry A. Wallace's Progressive Party and its tumultuous campaign in 1948.

UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Robert Renbert Wilson. New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1960, 381 p. $6.50.

A discussion of the implications of commercial treaties, especially the "establishment" provisions, for public international law.

Western Europe

THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND THE GATT. By James Jay Allen. Washington: University Press of Washington, D.C., 1960, 244 p. $6.00.

DIE EUROPÄISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT UND DIE DRITTLÄNDER. By Paul Erdman and Peter Rogge. Basel: Kyklos; Tübingen: Mohr, 1960, 337 p. DM. 24.

L'AGRICULTURE AU SEUIL DU MARCHÉ COMMUN. By Bernard Oury. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1959, 364 p. NF. 24.

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET: A LEGAL PROFILE. Edited by Eric Stein and Thomas L. Nicholson. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Law School, 1960, 2 v. $25.00.

These are specialized studies that are part of the growing literature on the Common Market.

DAS ZOLLRECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN FREIHANDELS-ASSOZIATION. By Max Baumgartner. Basel: Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft, 1960, 206 p. Swiss Fr. 28.

DIE FREIHANDELSZONE ALS MITTEL DER INTEGRATIONSPOLITIK. By Walter Hesberg. Frankfurt/Main: Knapp, 1960, 191 p. DM. 21.80.

THE EUROPEAN FREE-TRADE ASSOCIATION. By F. V. Meyer. New York: Praeger, 1960, 140 p. $4.00.

THE FREE TRADE PROPOSALS. Edited by G. D. N. Worswick. Oxford: Blackwell, 1960, 142 p. 30/.

Specialized studies adding to the growing material on the European Free Trade Area.

LES PROBLÈMES DE LA PONDÉRATION DANS LES INSTITUTIONS EUROPÉENNES. By Bora Ljubisavljevic. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1959, 199 p. Florins 10.25.

The problem of representation and weighted voting in European international institutions.

LES MONARCHIES PARLEMENTAIRES. By Raymond Fusilier. Paris: Éditions Ouvrières, 1960, 657 p. NF. 24.

A study of the political systems of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, with particular attention to the survival of the monarchy as an institution.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
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FOOD, LAND AND MANPOWER IN WESTERN EUROPE. By P. Lamartine Yates. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961, 294 p. $7.00.

This analysis, by a leading authority, of Western Europe's agriculture in relation to food requirements is the first of a series of forthcoming monographs dealing with resources and needs in that area.

FRANCE, EUROPE AND THE TWO WORLD WARS. By René Albrecht-Carrié. New York: Harper, 1961, 346 p. $7.00.

A review, with the advantages now of perspective, of the problems and ambiguities of French responsibilities and French power in the inter-war period.

MÉMOIRES. II. By Marshal Juin. Paris: Fayard, 1960, 380 p. NF. 12.

This second volume of Marshal Juin's memoirs covers his activities over the years 1944–1958—the liberation of France, the coming of the Fourth Republic, Morocco and NATO.

HAUT COMMANDEMENT: GOUVERNEMENT ET DÉFENSE DES FRONTIÈRES DU NORD ET DE L'EST 1919–1939. By General Paul-Émile Tournoux. Paris: Nouvelles Éditions Latines, 1960, 352 p. NF. 16.50.

A study of the genesis of the Maginot Line.

HISTOIRE POLITIQUE DE LA TROISIÈME RÉPUBLIQUE. TOME QUATRIÈME: CARTEL DES GAUCHES ET UNION NATIONALE (1924–1929). By Édouard Bonnefous. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1960, 412 p. NF. 20.

This is the fourth volume of a projected six-volume parliamentary history of the Third Republic.

FORCES ET FAIBLESSES DE L'ÉCONOMIE FRANÇAISE 1945–1959. By Jean-Marcel Jeanneney. Paris: Colin, 1959, 362 p. NF. 18.50.

A review with numerous charts and statistics of the strengths and weaknesses of the French economy in the 15 postwar years.

LE RÉFÉRENDUM DE SEPTEMBRE ET LES ÉLECTIONS DE NOVEMBRE 1958. Paris: Colin, 1960, 390 p. NF. 26.

Essays relating to the establishment of the Fifth Republic: the electoral campaign, public opinion and the results of the election.

DIE V. REPUBLIK: FRANKREICHS NEUES REGIERUNGSSYSTEM. By Gilbert Ziebura. Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1960, 333 p. DM. 19.75.

A useful volume of selected texts.

LES PAYS DU BENELUX. By André Mast. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1960, 368 p. NF. 21.20.

A study of the constitutions of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.

ECONOMIC POLICY IN PRACTICE: THE NETHERLANDS 1950/1957. By C. Weststrate. Leyden: Stenfert Kroese, 1959, 212 p. Florins 14.50.

An appraisal of Dutch economic policy during the 1950s in respect to full employment, price stability, balance of payments and equitable distribution.

EIN LEBEN IN BRENNPUNKTEN UNSERER ZEIT: WIEN, BERLIN, NEW YORK: GUSTAV STOLPER, 1888–1947. By Toni Stolper. Tübingen: Wunderlich, 1960, 501 p. DM. 28.50.

Although Gustav Stolper was born in the old Habsburg Monarchy and spent his last years in America, his life was closely bound to the vicissitudes of Germany. Indeed, this admirable biography by his wife offers many insights into the political and intellectual climate of post-Versailles Central Europe.

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ADENAUER AND THE CDU. By Arnold J. Heidenheimer. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960, 259 p. Guilders 19.

A monograph on the growth of the Christian Democratic Union, in the years after the war, with particular attention to party conflicts and party integration in 1947–1949.

DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK DER NACHKRIEGSZEIT. By Wilhelm G. Grewe. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1960, 539 p. DM. 36.

A substantial and serious survey of the foreign policy of the Federal Republic, a foreign policy in sharp contrast to the traditional lines of German diplomacy.

DIE NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHE MACHTERGREIFUNG. By Karl Dietrich Bracher and Others. Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1960, 1,034 p. DM. 59.

A major scholarly study of Nazi seizure and consolidation of power in 1933–34 and the beginnings of the totalitarian state. It serves as a sequel to Professor Bracher's "Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik."

DAS ENDE DER PARTEIEN 1933. Edited by Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1960, 816 p. DM. 42.

An extensive documentary history of the destruction of the various German political parties in the earlier months of the Hitler régime.

TENDENZEN UND GESTALTEN DER NSDAP. By Albert Krebs. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1959, 245 p. DM. 16.80.

Useful information on the early years of the Nazi movement. In the 1920s the author was party *Gauleiter* in Hamburg.

GEWERKSCHAFTEN IN DER POLITIK. By Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber. Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1959, 170 p. DM. 18.50.

On German trade unions and the postwar struggle for co-determination.

THE SHAPING OF POSTWAR GERMANY. By Edgar McInnis and Others. New York: Praeger, 1960, 195 p. $4.00.

This volume comprises four related studies by Canadian scholars: "The Search for a Settlement" and "Germany in the Postwar Balance," by Mr. McInnis; "Divided Germany," by Richard Hiscocks; and "The Berlin Dilemma," by Robert Spencer.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE EAST GERMAN ECONOMY. By Wolfgang F. Stolper with the Assistance of Karl W. Roskamp. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, 478 p. $10.00.

This study is of interest for at least three reasons: as an inquiry into a relatively unstudied area of the Soviet orbit, as an analysis of Communist achievement in an advanced economy, and as providing a comparison in the performance of the East and West German economies. The authors' conclusion is that "the East German economy has performed more poorly than the West German economy by whatever tests one wishes to apply."

THE CROSS AND THE FASCES. By Richard A. Webster. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960, 229 p. $5.00.

A history of the Christian Democratic movement in Italy, and its relations with the Church and the State.

ITALY: SCHOOL FOR AWAKENING COUNTRIES. By Maurice F. Neu-

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FELD. Ithaca: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1961, 589 p. $9.00.

A general history of the Italian labor movement since 1800. The author is professor of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell. It is not quite clear that the experience can serve as a very positive "school for awakening countries."

STORIA DELLE CAMPAGNE OCEANICHE DELLA MARINA MILITARE. VOLUME IV. Rome: Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare, 1960, 595 p. L. 2500.

An official account of the oceanic cruises of the Italian Navy between 1922 and 1937.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

THE TRANSFORMATION OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY. EDITED BY CYRIL E. BLACK. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, 695 p. $9.75.

A massive symposium of studies on changes in Russian society over the last century. The 38 contributions range from law and politics to social stratification, education and religion, family life and social values.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AFTER STALIN. BY DAVID J. DALLIN. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1961, 543 p. $7.95.

Long a student of the Soviet Union, Mr. Dallin here examines "the constants and variables in the Soviet international course after Stalin": the great dictator's legacy, the transition of the Malenkov-Molotov era and the new Khrushchev era. Solid and knowledgeable, it is a welcome guide to developments since 1953.

THE SOVIET INDUSTRIALIZATION DEBATE, 1924–1928. BY ALEXANDER ERLICH. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, 214 p. $6.00.

A very perceptive essay on the Soviet debate over industrialization in the period leading from N.E.P. to the forced development of the five-year plans, a debate that continues to have its echoes, in fact and in theory, in the Soviet orbit.

THE KHRUSHCHEV PATTERN. BY FRANK GIBNEY. New York: Duell, 1961, 280 p. $4.95.

Mr. Gibney, a journalist and author of "The Frozen Revolution," surveys the successes and failures of the Communist movement around the world in the years of Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" line. A useful and discriminating general review.

VALUE AND PLAN. EDITED BY GREGORY GROSSMAN. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960, 370 p. $7.00.

A valuable collection of papers originally prepared for a conference at the University of California and dealing with various facets of economic organization and planning in the Soviet Union, Poland and Jugoslavia. Each paper is followed by a comment by participants.

INFLUENCE DES EXPÉRIENCES COMMUNISTES SUR LES DOCTRINES. Brussels: Institut de Sociologie Solvay, 1959, 187 p. Belgian Fr. 210.

A symposium of papers by European scholars dealing with various facets of the impact of experience upon Communist theory.

ECONOMIC ATLAS OF THE SOVIET UNION. BY GEORGE KISH AND OTHERS. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960, 96 p. $10.00.

Chiefly a series of regional "cartographic portraits" of the Soviet economy.

RUSSIA'S ROCKETS AND MISSILES. BY ALBERT PARRY. Garden City: Doubleday, 1960, 382 p. $4.95.

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An appraisal of development of Soviet rockets and missiles, bringing together some out-of-the-way information on the earlier history together with more uncertain data on the present.

RUSSIAN SCIENCE IN THE 21st CENTURY. Edited by Sergei Gouschev and Mikhail Vassiliev. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960, 222 p. $4.95.

The marvels of the year 2007 as envisaged by the scientists in the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

HISTOIRE DE L'ARMÉE SOVIÉTIQUE. By Michel Garder. Paris: Plon, 1959, 308 p. NF. 12.95.

A brief history of the development of the Soviet Army to 1958, as both a revolutionary and a national instrument.

GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT IN DER UdSSR UND DER VOLKSDEMOKRATIEN EUROPAS. By Konst. Katzarov. Weinheim: Verlag Chemie, 1960, 378 p. DM. 36.

A monograph on the legal protection of industrial property and copyright in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.

DOCUMENTS ON POLISH-SOVIET RELATIONS 1939–1945. VOLUME I, 1939–1943. London: Heinemann, 1961, 625 p. 63/.

A very substantial collection of documents, Polish and otherwise, prepared by the General Sikorski Historical Institute.

RUSSIA AND CHINA. By J. V. Davidson-Houston. London: Hale, 1960, 192 p. 21/.

A brief, lively though not particularly profound review of Russian-Chinese relations over the centuries to the present.

PAN-TURKISM AND ISLAM IN RUSSIA. By Serge A. Zenkovsky. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, 345 p. $6.75.

An able history of the Turkic groups in Russia, their religious and political movements, from the beginning of the century up to the 1920s and the end of the Civil War.

LES MOUVEMENTS NATIONAUX CHEZ LES MUSULMANS DE RUSSIE: LE "SULTANGALIEVISME" AU TATARSTAN. By Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Quelquejay. The Hague: Mouton, 1960, 284 p.

A welcome scholarly study of Tatar nationalism on the eve of the Russian Revolution and the early years of the Communist régime.

ENTWICKLUNGSHILFE INNERHALB DES OSTBLOCKS. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1960, 122 p. DM. 13.80.

A useful study of a rather obscure subject—economic assistance and influence in three "developing" countries in the Communist bloc: Outer Mongolia, North Korea and North Viet Nam.

LONTOO-VATIKAANI-TUKHOLMA. By G. A. Gripenberg. Helsinki: Söderström, 1960, 390 p. Fmk. 1750.

The memoirs of the Finnish Ambassador who served at London 1933–41, the Vatican 1942–43 and Stockholm 1943–56.

THE UNDEFEATED NATION. By Adolfs Blodnieks. New York: Speller, 1960, 312 p. $6.00.

In these memoirs a former Prime Minister of Latvia tells the story of his nation's struggle for independence.

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CENTRAL PLANNING IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By Jan M. Michal. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960, 274 p. $5.75.

A detailed examination of the Czech economy in the decade 1948–1958, as a case study of central planning in an already industrialized country. The author does not find the performance thus far particularly impressive, as compared to the achievements of the Western European economies in the same years.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

DEFENCE BY COMMITTEE. By Franklyn Arthur Johnson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960, 416 p. $8.00.

A solid study, by the President of Jacksonville University, of the background organization and activities of the Committee of Imperial Defence, an early and very significant example of a device for defense planning under twentieth-century conditions.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH. By K. C. Wheare. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961, 201 p. $4.00.

An analysis of the rules, understandings and practices regulating the mutual relations of the members of the Commonwealth.

BRITISH MONETARY POLICY AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1951–1957. By Peter B. Kenen. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, 325 p. $7.50.

A monograph centering on the British Government's attitude and response to the balance-of-payments crisis in the 1950s.

THE BRITISH LEFT WING AND FOREIGN POLICY. By Eugene J. Meehan. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1960, 201 p. $5.00.

A somewhat theoretically oriented study of the influence of ideology in the field of foreign policy, but based on an examination of British left-wing theory and opinion in the years 1945–1951.

COLOURED IMMIGRANTS IN BRITAIN. By J. A. G. Griffith and Others. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1960, 225 p. $4.00.

An inquiry into race relations in Great Britain, a problem of some magnitude with the recent immigration.

THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF HORE-BELISHA. By R. J. Minney. Garden City: Doubleday, 1961, 320 p. $4.50.

These papers, with background and transitions provided by Mr. Minney, center chiefly on Hore-Belisha's years as Secretary of State for War from 1937 to early 1940. The circumstances of his sudden resignation remain obscure.

THE GROWTH OF CANADIAN POLICIES IN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. By Hugh L. Keenleyside and Others. Durham: Duke University Press (for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center), 1960, 174 p. $5.00.

Eight essays on Canada's growing participation in external affairs.

CANADIAN DUALISM: STUDIES OF FRENCH-ENGLISH RELATIONS. Edited by Mason Wade. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960, 427 p. $8.50.

A bilingual collection of essays exploring the mutual relations of the French and English-speaking inhabitants of Canada.

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NEW ZEALAND BECOMES A PACIFIC POWER. By Bernard K. Gordon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960, 283 p. $6.50.

A study of New Zealand's growing involvement in the power politics of the Pacific, especially in the years since 1936.

The Middle East

THE IDEA OF THE JEWISH STATE. By Ben Halpern. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961, 492 p. $10.00.

A substantial and comprehensive analysis of the various components of the idea of a Jewish state in the development of the Zionist movement. The author is a research associate in Israelian Studies at Harvard.

ISRAEL RESURGENT. By Norman Bentwich. New York: Praeger, 1960, 255 p. $6.50.

The author, for many years professor of international relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, summarizes the creation of the State of Israel and its development in subsequent years.

A SHORT POLITICAL GUIDE TO THE ARAB WORLD. By Peter Partner. New York: Praeger, 1960, 141 p. $4.00.

A concise introduction for the general reader.

WOMEN AND THE NEW EAST. By Ruth Frances Woodsmall. Washington: Middle East Institute, 1960, 436 p. $5.50.

A study of the changing status of women in Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia and India.

CYPRUS AND MAKARIOS. By Stanley Mayes. London: Putnam, 1960, 260 p. 30/.

A critical appraisal of Archbishop Makarios' role as a political figure.

WAR IN THE DESERT. By Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb. London: Hodder, 1960, 352 p. 25/. (New York: British Book Center, $6.25.)

The story of an R.A.F. campaign on the Iraq-Arabian frontier in the 1920s.

South and Southeast Asia

INDIA MEETS CHINA IN NEPAL. By Girilal Jain. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1959, 177 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $3.95.)

A critical appraisal of Chinese policy in Nepal by a staff member of *The Times of India,* Delhi.

PROBLEMS OF INDIAN DEFENCE. By K. M. Panikkar. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1960, 138 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $2.75.)

A discussion, for the general reader, of the main issues of Indian defense, by a professional diplomat.

DOUBLE IDENTITY: THE CHINESE IN MODERN THAILAND. By Richard J. Coughlin. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960, 222 p. HK $25. (New York: Oxford University Press, $5.00.)

A Yale sociologist explores the life and status of the Chinese minority in Thailand.

OVERSEAS CHINESE NATIONALISM. By Lea E. Williams. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1960, 235 p. $4.50.

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A good study, based substantially on Dutch archives, of the origins and development of "nationalism" among the Chinese minority in Java between 1900 and 1916.

NORTH BORNEO. By K. G. Tregonning. London: H.M.S.O., 1960, 272 p. 30/. (New York: British Information Services, $5.60.)

A rich description of North Borneo, a volume in the Corona Library, under the sponsorship of the Colonial Office.

INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE UNITED NATIONS. By Alastair M. Taylor. Ithaca: Cornell University Press (for the Carnegie Endowment), 1960, 503 p. $7.50.

An impressive study of the struggle for Indonesian independence as it involved the United Nations. The author served with the Security Council's field machinery in Indonesia.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM. By Robert Jay Lifton. New York: Norton, 1961, 510 p. $6.95.

While this study, by a doctor and psychiatrist, deals centrally with "brainwashing" in Communist China it also involves broader considerations of totalism—the tendency toward "all-or-nothing emotional alignment."

THOUGHT REFORM OF THE CHINESE INTELLECTUALS. By Theodore H. E. Chen. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960, 247 p. HK $25. (New York: Oxford University Press, $5.00.)

A history of the continuing campaign of "thought reform" in Communist China since 1950. The author is professor of Asiatic Studies at the University of Southern California.

THE ANTHILL. By Suzanne Labin. New York: Praeger, 1961, 442 p. $6.75.

A report on life in Communist China based on some 54 interviews with refugees in Hong Kong.

CHINESE JOURNEY. By Leslie Haylen. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1959, 240 p. 27/6.

An affable report on industrious, peaceloving and fly-killing Communist China, based on a visit in 1957 by a Labor member of the Australian Parliament.

KISHI AND JAPAN. By Dan Kurzman. New York: Obolensky, 1960, 394 p. $5.95.

A substantial biography, by an American foreign correspondent, of the former Japanese Premier, Nobusuke Kishi.

INDIA'S ROLE IN THE KOREAN QUESTION. By Shiv Dayal. Delhi: Chand, 1959, 360 p. Rs. 15.

A monograph dealing with India's role in the Korean conflict before and after the cease-fire.

Africa

THE RELUCTANT AFRICAN. By Louis E. Lomax. New York: Harper, 1960, 117 p. $2.95.

An able American Negro journalist offers a disturbing report of black as well as white racism in Africa. A more important book than its brevity and the author's limited African experience would suggest.

THE NEW NIGERIAN ELITE. By Hugh H. Smythe and Mabel M. Smythe. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960, 196 p. $5.00.

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Although extensive interviews provide a core of material for this book, its strength lies in the authors' observations and comments on the sizeable group of people on whom the future conduct of affairs in Nigeria depends.

NIGERIA: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1960, 141 p. $1.00.

A useful short survey and handbook.

KWAME NKRUMAH AND THE FUTURE OF AFRICA. By John Phillips. New York: Praeger, 1961, 272 p. $5.50.

The author, a South African by birth, and more recently a Professor of Agriculture at the University College of Ghana, gives an informal, not uncritical, but generally very favorable account of Nkrumah.

GHANA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, 1919–1957. By F. M. Bourret. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960, 246 p. $5.75.

A revised edition of "The Gold Coast," which first appeared in 1949.

THE EMERGING STATES OF FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA. By Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960, 595 p. $8.75.

The authors, who have previously joined in writing books on Southeast Asia and French West Africa, here provide a broad survey of the new states in what was formerly French Equatorial Africa.

A NEW DEAL IN CENTRAL AFRICA. Edited by Colin Leys and Cranford Pratt. New York: Praeger, 1960, 226 p. $4.50.

An excellent symposium of essays on the achievements, problems and prospects of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

RACE AND POLITICS: PARTNERSHIP IN THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND. By Edward Clegg. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960, 280 p. $4.80.

An able study of race relations in Central Africa.

THE ASIANS OF EAST AFRICA. By L. W. Hollingsworth. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960, 174 p. $2.00.

A concise but well-informed account of the role and status of Asians in Zanzibar, Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda.

THE ECONOMICS OF TRUSTEESHIP IN SOMALIA. By Mark Karp. Boston: Boston University Press, 1960, 185 p. (New York: New York University Press, $4.50.)

A monograph on the economic development of Somalia under the ten-year Italian trusteeship that ended in 1960.

ERITREA: A COLONY IN TRANSITION: 1941–52. By G. K. N. Trevaskis. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1960, 137 p. $3.40.

A history of the British occupation of Eritrea from April 1941 until the country's federation with Ethiopia. The author was in the administrative service of Eritrea during most of this period.

THE SUDAN IN ANGLO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS. By L. A. Fabunmi. New York: Longmans, 1960, 466 p. $11.75.

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The author, by birth a West African and now an official in the Nigerian Government, has written a history of Anglo-Egyptian disputes over the Sudan that is of interest both for its scholarship and for its perspective on the problem. Dr. Fabunmi anticipates that the political future of the Sudan lies probably with the Arab League and Egypt, though he feels that the British cultural, economic and educational influence is a permanent one.

NORTH AFRICA: NATIONALISM TO NATIONHOOD. By Lorna Hahn. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1960, 264 p. $6.00.

An informed though enthusiastically pro-North African survey of the national movements in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria.

ORDEAL IN ALGERIA. By Richard and Joan Brace. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1960, 453 p. $6.75.

A historian and his wife have the courage to plunge into the unresolved Algerian crisis and make a commendable effort to present the issue from both sides. One of the best studies of this tormenting problem.

THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM. By Jamal Mohammed Ahmed. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1960, 135 p. $5.00.

A study centering on the group of thinkers and reformers around Muhammad Abdu.

Latin America and the West Indies

THE BRITISH WEST INDIES: THE SEARCH FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT. By Morley Ayearst. New York: New York University Press, 1960, 258 p. $5.00.

A study, by a political scientist of New York University, of recent political and constitutional developments in the British West Indies and the move toward a functioning federal system.

THE RISE OF THE LATIN AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT. By Moisés Poblete Troncoso and Ben G. Burnett. New York: Bookman Associates, 1960, 179 p. $5.00.

A brief survey of the development of trade unionism in South and Central America.

LISTEN, YANKEE. By C. Wright Mills. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960, 192 p. $3.95. (Paper; New York: Ballantine, 50 cents.)

RED STAR OVER CUBA. By Nathaniel Weyl. New York: Devin-Adair, 1960, 222 p. $4.50.

Two diametrically opposed views of the Castro régime and Cuban-American relations. Mr. Mills' book reflects the voice of the Cuban revolutionaries; Mr. Weyl sees Castro as an agent in a Soviet assault on the Western Hemisphere.

UNITED STATES UNIVERSITY COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA. By Richard N. Adams and Charles C. Cumberland. East Lansing (Mich.): Michigan State University, Institute of Research on Overseas Programs, 1960, 264 p. $4.50. (Paper, $3.50.)

A study based on an examination of selected programs in Bolivia, Chile, Peru and Mexico.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D.C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 45 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations, International Court of Justice, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1262 New Hampshire Ave., Washington 6, D.C. *European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, Euratom:* 220 Southern Bldg., Washington 5, D.C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 86th Congress, 2nd Session. London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

First African Regional Conference, 1960. Report of the Director-General. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1960. 90 p. (Report, I.) 75¢.

Labour survey of North Africa. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1960. 473 p. (Studies and reports, N. S., 60.)

Report of the Nyasaland Constitutional Conference held in London in July and Aug., 1960. 11 p. (Cmnd. 1132.) 9d.

Report of the advisory commission on the review of the constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. London, 1960. (Cmnd. 1148.) 175 p. 8s.

——. Appendix VI. Survey of developments since 1953. London, 1960. (Cmnd. 1149.) 513 p. £1 2s. 6d.

——. Appendix VII. Possible constitutional changes. London, 1960. (Cmnd. 1150.) 87 p. 5s.

Algerian documents, 1960. Paris, Presidency of the Council, Delegation General in Algeria, 1960. 127 p.

The Republic of the Ivory Coast; hour of independence. N. Y., French Press and Information Service, 1960. 32 p.

The Islamic Republic of Mauritania; hour of independence. N. Y., French Press and Information Service, 1960. 28 p.

The Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the Kingdom of Morocco. n. pl., Islamic Republic of Mauritania, 1960. 58 p.

The Republic of the Niger; hour of independence. N. Y., French Press and Information Service, 1960. 32 p.

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